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ABSTRACT
Dinosaurs for the Digital Age: Democratic Party Organization
in the Twenty-First Century
by
Aaron Shapiro

Advisor: Frances Fox Piven
Abstract: This dissertation traces Democratic Party organization
roughly over the Obama era. It conceptualizes the party at the
national, state, and local level, with a particular focus on Ohio.
This project seeks to reconcile changes in the political environment
that incentivize strengthening party structures, with American
electoral institutions that complicate party organizational
development. I suggest that while demographic change,
polarization, and big data are powerful incentives to focus
Democratic electoral strategy on an Obama-like organizational
model and campaign strategy, institutionalization remains
hampered by significant structural impediments. These are
institutional as well as coalitional. While party integration has been
uneven, I find an evolving and shifting relationship between
national, state, and local party organization. Variation in
competition and resource levels create disparate intra-party logics.
“Battleground” states are marked by ephemeral high resource
presidential organization that deeply penetrates the local level in
service of turning out a coherent party electorate. Yet such
organization tends to be unrooted and unintegrated in local party
structures. This is explained by the absence of organizational
mechanisms that bridge the diverse and path-dependent campaign
practices of these organizations. Struggles to institutionalize such
an apparatus beyond the presidential year, contribute to the broader
problem of Democratic off-year turnout
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“I am not a member of any organized political party. I am a Democrat.”
-Will Rogers

Eight years is a long time in American politics. Barack Obama’s 2008 election
was hailed as the dawn of a new progressive era, one in which a long-coming electoral
majority was finally mobilized with the help of a charismatic standard-bearer and cutting
edge campaign. Democrats had unified control of the federal government for the first
time in nearly two decades. They would finally be able to govern without the help of a
conservative southern wing that was the party’s historical linchpin. The future,
cosmopolitan and liberal, was here. Or not.
Obama presided over two tumultuous terms characterized by landmark legislative
victories, yet also nearly unparalleled partisanship and gridlock, exacerbated once his
congressional majorities evaporated in 2010. While obstructionism and polarization was
on the rise for decades, the single minded-fervor through which Republicans resisted
Obama’s policies seemed unparalleled in modern history.
Despite such difficulties, it seemed a safe bet the Democratic coalition as a
presidential majority would hold. On Election Day 2016, Obama’s approval rating was
virtually parallel to his 2008 popular vote percentage. After eight years of stoking their
base with reactionary fervor, the Republican Party had been unable to prevent an erratic
1

reality TV star from wresting the nomination from a bevy of candidates with far superior
establishment credentials and assumed general election prospects. Hillary Clinton,
Obama’s former rival and now would-be successor, was a perhaps uninspiring, however
solid and safe choice, to hold the Democratic coalition against such a vulgar enemy.
Yet Donald Trump’s shocking victory overturned virtually all assumptions about
contemporary American politics. The progressive future had given way to right-wing
populism, oriented in restoring American greatness on behalf of a group often forgotten
in the new Democratic coalition-- the white working class. True, Hillary Clinton won the
popular vote, yet the vaunted Democratic turnout apparatus fell short across highly
resourced battleground states, where Clinton’s vote totals declined relative to Obama.
What happened?
This dissertation attempts to offer a partial answer to this, at least concerning the
Democratic Party’s troubles in maintaining the Obama organizational apparatus. To be
clear, many factors well beyond the party’s turnout machine influenced Clinton’s loss.
Significant defections among white rust belt voters could not have been stopped with a
better Get Out the Vote operation. An inability to mobilize the Democratic base is not
just due to a lack of door knocks. However, struggles to mobilize the Obama coalition,
not just in 2016, but also in 2010 and 2014, were in part attributable to the challenges of
building turnout infrastructure over this period. Central to this difficulty, is how
mechanisms of fragmentation, both old and new, distort the internal dynamics of party
organization. Campaigning has changed vastly over the last decade. Digitalization and
polarization have altered the way elections are fought. Still constant however, is the
American system remains harsh terrain for the would-be mass party organization.
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Many, in the twenty-first century, view parties wearily, an outdated anachronism
of Tammany Hall and the feudal south. Politics have changed since the heyday of the
party machine. The public may well cheer the decline of the boss, yet not all recent
developments are necessarily for the better. The last several decades have seen an
explosion of money in politics: often filtered through new sorts of political institutions
designed to outmaneuver America’s modest regime of electoral regulation--PACs, Super
PACs, 527s, 501(c)4’s, and more. New strategies for evading electoral competition have
taken hold. These include erecting new (and not so new) barriers to voting, as well as the
development of increasingly sophisticated efforts to gerrymander districts, insulating
politicians from competitive elections. ‘Big data’ has revolutionized the communicative
structures and strategies of electoral politics, leading to concern for both its massive ‘bigbrother like’ databases of citizen information, and creating demand for even more money
to maintain such apparatus’.
Yet the implications of these trends are not all bad. The Obama presidential
campaigns of 2008 and 2012 implemented new electoral strategies and organizing
techniques geared for the digital age to mobilize a majority electorate comprised largely
of underrepresented groups (African-Americans, Latinos, youth, etc.), leading to higher
electoral turnout than in decades. Marrying new forms of low-cost digital communication
to traditional field organization strategies. The outcome was not simply an increase in
voter turnout, but grassroots activist-based political participation: through volunteering,
small donor fundraising, and social media communication, to build the infrastructure
necessary to mobilize a difficult to reach electoral coalition.1 Yet, it is unclear whether
1

Berman, Ari. Herding Donkeys: The Fight to Rebuild the Democratic Party and Reshape
American Politics. Macmillan, 2010; McKenna, Elizabeth and Hahrie Han. Groundbreakers:
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the mobilization of this electorate is largely the idiosyncratic effect of a particular
candidate, or an institutional response to an electoral environment that better incentivizes
mobilization on its further edges than it has in decades past.
If the latter is even partially the case, then what might this mean for the role of
parties in the American system? After all, while the public may be suspicious of parties,
political scientists tend to have a different view. For them, political parties are thought
traditionally to be the “socializer of political conflict.”2 Could a movement toward
electoral strategies based on mobilization suggest a possible resurgence of parties,
historically the dominant organizational instrument of voter mobilization? If so, how will
this affect how parties and politicians construct and deploy resources in the digital era?
The politics of 2008-2016 can be viewed through the emergence of two distinct
electorates. A presidential electorate successfully mobilized once every four years:
younger, poorer, ethnically diverse, and ideologically liberal leaning, and a nonpresidential electorate: that is older, richer, whiter, and more conservative. While it has
always been the case that variation in turnout between presidential and non-presidential
years is correlated with socioeconomic status and resources,3 the Obama coalition’s
electoral success has been particularly dependent on the mobilization of irregular voters.
Yet as 2016 illustrates, one should not assume that this picture of two electorates remains
fixed. Mobilization of the Obama coalition has only been successful with Barack

How Obama's 2.2 Million Volunteers Transformed Campaigning in America. Oxford University
Press, 2015; Phillips, Steve. Brown Is the New White: How the Demographic Revolution Has
Created a New American Majority. The New Press, 2016.
2
Schattschneider, Elmer E. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in
America. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.
3
Miller, Warren Edward, and J. Merrill Shanks. The New American Voter. Harvard University
Press, 1996.
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Obama’s name at the top of ticket, an occurrence no longer possible baring some rather
sudden and unexpected constitutional changes. If this coalition were to be preserved
beyond the personalistic attraction to Obama and turned into the ‘regular’ American
electorate, it would likely have a seismic impact on American politics and representation.
Its failure however, provides grist for a reactionary counter-coalition, based in the ethnocultural identity of a shrinking, if geographically well situated, minority.
Responsibility for the institutionalization of this progressive coalition rests in the
hands of the Democratic Party, as its electoral competitiveness is tied to the ability to
mobilize its 2008 and 2012 presidential coalition consistently. Like it or not, the party
now seems married to both the Obama ‘brand’ and the coalition it represents.4
Mobilization of this sporadic electorate is dependent upon the institutionalization of a
sophisticated resource-heavy voter turnout apparatus. An array of challenges stands in the
way of this: including a skepticism of the Obama coalition among various Democratic
political actors, skepticism of the Democratic Party among many members of the Obama
coalition, and a regulatory regime in American electoral politics that places significantly
more rigorous restrictions on party and candidate-campaign organizations than

4

After the 2016 election, questions arose as to whether the Obama coalition was sustainable or
even existed at all as a meaningful departure from the traditional Democratic coalition. Much of
this focused on the necessity of working class white voters to Obama’s success. While polling
confirms Obama did better with this demographic then Democrats did in recent history or 2016,
long-term trends still show significant erosion of this cohort in both their support for Democrats
as well as their percentage of the electorate. See: Cohn, Nate. “How the Obama Coalition
Crumbled, Leaving an Opening for Trump.” The New York Times-Online Only, Dec 23, 2016.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/upshot/how-the-obama-coalition-crumbled-leaving-anopening-for-trump.html. Accessed Feb 4 2017; Debenedetti, Gabriel. “Democrats Clash Over the
Future of the Obama Coalition.” Politico. November 15 2016.
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/democrats-barack-obama-comeback-231391. Accessed
Feb 4 2017; Maley, Kevin. “What Happened to the Obama Coalition.” Vox Global. Nov 2016.
http://voxglobal.com/intersection/2016/11/what-happened-to-the-obama-coalition. Accessed Feb
6 2017.
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‘independent expenditure’ (IE) campaigns that run outside the purview of the party. Yet
beyond the surface, these challenges are reflective more broadly of American political
institutions designed to fracture parties as the durable organizational expression of a
majority coalition.
This dissertation seeks to assess how this recent shift toward electoral strategies
centered on the mobilization of an irregular electorate has affected the party
organizationally. It asks how does the peculiar logic of an American political system
hostile to parties, impede strong contemporary incentives toward party building? To do
this, I look at the contemporary history of the national, Ohio state and local Democratic
Parties as electoral organizations. As V.O. Key asserted: a party is best conceived as
having three ‘faces’: the party organization, the party in the electorate, and the party in
government,5 what is called the ‘trinity model’ of political parties.6 While this project’s
primary focus is the tracing of Democratic Party organization, the other two faces of the
party are not far in the background. The primary practical question of this project is to
what extent the Democratic Party can (and wants to) turn the ‘Obama electorate’ into a
durable ‘Democratic electorate.’ Following, an integral part of the answer to this question
is informed by whether individual Democratic politicians value the construction of a
long-term Democratic majority in government, perhaps at the expense of sacrificing a
degree of individual autonomy.

5

Key, Vladimir Orlando. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. Crowell, 1955. p. 164.
Alan Ware in his earlier study of American party organization notes that these lines are often
analytically problematic as office-seekers organizational strategies are contingent on the other
two party faces. See: Ware, Alan. The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization: 1940-1980.
Oxford University Press, 1988. pp. 8-10.
6
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I choose to evaluate this with a focus at the state-level because of the unique
character of American electoral institutions. In the United States, there are of course no
‘national’ elections. Even presidential elections are fifty different contests, subject to the
electoral rules of each state. I have chosen to investigate Ohio for its importance to
presidential campaigning. Ohio, which even among ‘battleground’ states has been a top
priority of the national party for its coordinated presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012,
could be argued represents an outlier based on the resources generated on its behalf.
I would offer however that a close inspection of any state party, subject to its
own peculiar mix of electoral rules, civil society structure, and strategic significance to
national priorities, would yield similar idiosyncrasies. In other words, state parties are
like snowflakes, no two are exactly alike. Yet the features that give Ohio its character
may suggest some generalizable propositions about the future of the Democratic Party
and party politics in general. Ohio’s largesse of resources may help go further in
suggesting what a ‘mature’ model of a contemporary resource-heavy party might look
like, as well as highlight mechanisms of fragmentation generally present across the
nation, if perhaps at lower intensity.
One may also question what that is generalizable about parties and the American
party system could be said by exclusively focusing on just one of the major parties. Yet
the dynamics that appear to be leading to change within the Democratic Party are also
valid for Republicans, even if their coalition has made them less sensitive in the shortterm. Democrats pioneering of new ‘digitally-driven’ electoral techniques are a result of
their need to mobilize new and sporadic voters to achieve a majority coalition.
Democratic success would mean Republican viability in the long-term will be based in

7

either mobilizing the latent segments of their own coalition or peeling off segments of the
Democratic coalition. This includes more ‘difficult’ constituencies whose electoral
participation is less consistent (i.e. Latinos and young people- two groups that at least
certain Republican strategists believe it is necessary that the party appeal to7). Indeed,
even outside U.S. borders, technological change makes it seemingly more cost effective
to communicate with and bring in traditionally difficult to reach groups. What the role of
the party in democratic settings will be in institutionalizing these dynamic and fluid
coalitions will likely transcend the American political system.
I approach this question with a number of different strategies to paint a causal
picture. First, I look at the academic and journalistic literature regarding this era and
synthesize it within my model of party organization. Secondly, I will analyze pertinent
trends in campaign finance and voter data. Finally, is my field research, based on
participant observation and subsequent interviews and the surveying of relevant political
actors.
This dissertation seeks to take a historical institutionalist approach to very
contemporary events. Central to this project is an argument that macro-level challenges
are explained by understudied micro-level tensions. Further, these micro-level tensions
are not chiefly the result of interpersonal tensions or idiosyncrasies, but the historical
development of institutions that structure the incentives of political actors.
I have conducted participant-observation with the Ohio Democratic Party in the
run up to the 2014 election. Previously, I have worked with the national organization of
Organizing for Action (the 501(c)4 offshoot of the Obama 2012 electoral campaign) and
7

Rove, Karl. “How Senate Republicans Can Close the Sale.” The Wall Street Journal. Oct 1
2014.
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worked as field staff for the Obama presidential campaign of 2008 in Ohio. In addition to
providing me with a wealth of background information on the topic, these experiences
have helped me select the set of relevant actors for systematic surveying and
interviewing. The intent is to analyze the attitudes of these actors with respect to the
Democratic Party (both nationally and locally) and their perception of their own coalition
and the electoral resources necessary to mobilize it.
The contemporary nature of this project does not offer it the sobriety of settled
history, as does much of the American Political Development literature that it attempts to
settle itself within. It also eludes attempts to gain more rigor over effects and attitudes
that it spends much time discussing, with quantitative analysis. With its reliance on
contemporary events and anecdotal data, there are reasonable qualms over the
generalizability of the processes discussed. Yet with much of the discipline, and
especially the study of Americans elections, focused on such quantitative measurement,
this project attempts to fill in gaps by connecting thick description of campaign processes
understudied in the field. It further situates these events within the tradition of party
theory, and uses this theory to offer explanatory leverage over the empirics presented.

The Mass Party and Fragmentation
Obstructing party development in the United States are multiple mechanisms of
institutional fragmentation. These affect the party as both a coalition and organization.
Even developments that incentivize electoral logics of mobilization of a coherent party
electorate will run into these hurdles across multiple dimensions. At its essence, this
project is an attempt to situate the struggle to institutionalize the Democratic majority

9

coalition and strategic innovations that support its cultivation, with the internal tensions
that result from historical processes of fragmentation in the American system. Party
building in the United States is inevitably constructed on an uneven foundation. Further
chapters will analyze how at the national, state, and local level, what might appear at the
surface level to be endogenous failures of effective organizational development, are
products of deeply embedded structures.
Compared to most of its Western counterparts, party development followed a
rather unique trajectory in the United States. In many western liberal democracies,
universal franchise was a concession to the industrial labor movement, which formed
socialist/labor parties as vessels to win government power through electoral institutions.8
Yet American parties predated industrialization and strongly articulated class cleavages.9
They were not products of movements, but rather caucus parties developed in the early
years of the congress.10 Nonetheless, mechanisms of party competition quickly
incentivized constructing an organizational apparatus to expand this contest into the
electorate. Eventually such competition would enlarge the franchise over multiple critical
junctures of American history. The modern Democratic Party has been the electoral
vessel of choice for progressive American mass movements since at least the New Deal
period: from labor to civil rights.11 Yet its party institutions predate these movements.
These institutions are sticky and dominated by entrenched elites subject to peculiar

8

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?
Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective." The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115.4 (2000): 1167-1199.
9
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Gary Marks. It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the
United States. WW Norton & Company, 2001. pp. 21-29.
10
Aldrich 1996. ch 3.
11
Schlozman, Daniel. When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments in American
History. Princeton University Press, 2015.
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logics. Movements, and their institutional residue of reform interests, must interact, often
uneasily, with party elites.
Maurice Duverger, in his seminal study of political parties, distinguishes between
the ‘cadre’ and ‘mass’ party. He asserts, “the distinction between cadre and mass party is
not based upon their dimensions, upon their number of members: the difference is not
one of size, but of structure.”12 This is largely a function of whether resources are
provided by elites or mass membership. Duverger explains the mass party as linked to the
development of universal suffrage. Cadre parties are tools of political professionals and
elites, characteristic of systems with property qualifications for voting. Mass parties are
the product of the expansion of the franchise to the working class. Whereas cadre parties
could rely on elite financial support, mass parties, by necessity, needed to cultivate
grassroots resources.13 Consequently, centralization was paramount for a mass party
dependent upon ordinary people. The exclusivity of cadre parties on the other hand,
afforded them the luxury of being “weakly knit.”14
Duverger noted the exceptionalism of the American political experience.15
Following, Alan Ware argues that the idiosyncrasies of the American system make
Duverger’s terminology difficult to apply to it.16 Electoral rules particular to the federal
system suggest, “in some circumstances it was appropriate to think of the Democratic
parties and the Republican parties in America.”17 While early parties were still national,

12

Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.
Methuen, 1959. p. 63.
13
Ibid. pp. 63-66.
14
Ibid. p. 67.
15
Ibid. p. 66.
16
Ware, Alan. The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization, 1940-1980. Oxford University
Press, 1988.
17
Ibid. p. 2.
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organization was decentralized. This was a function of electoral institutions based on the
state-level, as well the sectional idiosyncrasies of American politics. Such variation made
generalities about party-member relationships difficult.
The American mass party may only exist as an ideal type, yet E.E.
Schattschneider and other party proponents believed that efforts toward stronger parties
were integral for responsive democracy. In this vein, he and other political scientists
drafted for the 1950 American Political Science Conference the influential report
“Toward a More Responsible Two Party System...,” known since as elaborating the
theory of “Responsible Party Government.”18 RPG called for a set of reforms designed to
strengthen American political parties. For a robust party system, it was necessary to move
toward nationalized, ideologically coherent political parties with the power to enact a
clear, articulated agenda after winning office. Essentially, RPG’s ambition was to graft
parliamentary parties on to the American political system. In the more than half a century
since its inception, RPG has faced critiques about its desirability and feasibility.19 Yet
parties have indeed become more ‘responsible’ since the mid-twentieth century.
Contemporary party teams are in fact nationally and programmatically coherent, in ways
not previously realized in American history.20

18

Committee on Political Parties. American Political Science Association. 1950. “Toward a More
Responsible Two Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties.” American
Political Science Review 44: Supplement.
19
See: Ranney, Austin. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary."
American Political Science Review 45.02 (1951): 488-499; Kirkpatrick, Evron M. "“Toward A
More Responsible Two-Party System”: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?."
American Political Science Review 65.04 (1971): 965-990; Pomper, Gerald M. "Toward a More
Responsible Two-Party System? What, Again?." The Journal of Politics 33.4 (1971): 916-940.
20
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. "Ideological Realignment in the US Electorate."
The Journal of Politics 60.3 (1998): 634-652.
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What this project illustrates is how the architecture of the American system
allows new ways to fragment and distort party organization. American parties are not just
a single national party, but countless state and local organizations. These are subject to
their own peculiar logic. Path dependence arises from their institutional position and the
punctuated equilibrium of American party development. The growth of national party
organization does not eradicate other party vessels. The question is not just whether
office-seekers turn to parties to solve collective action problems, but what party vessel do
they turn to, and how do these differing organizations relate to each other? A city council
candidate will not turn to the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Conversely, a
presidential campaign might have little use for a municipal party organization. The
original sin of an incoherent federal system designed to weaken parties, does not
evaporate through the development of national party structures, nor will these structures
necessarily serve the logics of state and local level parties. Graceful integration should
not be presumed.
The logic of electoral campaigning can be reduced to two broad variables:
competition and resources. The level of competition an individual office-seeker faces
will dictate electoral strategy. A safe incumbent will engage the electoral process very
differently than a challenger in a highly competitive seat. Even in competitive races,
variation in resources has significant impact on campaign practices. Campaign strategies
are chosen from a menu of tactics based on the resources available to build scale. A
suburban county auditor whose district rests in a large media market cannot afford to run
a campaign that relies on television advertising. Such disparities affect not just individual
candidates, but the party vessels that service them. Party organizations can be understood

13

as an institutionalization of the electoral logic that governs their constituent politicians. A
low competition/low resource party organization is unlikely to provide its office seekers
with innovative campaign techniques to prime party turnout.
Ware’s notion of multiple Democratic parties is no longer just geographic, but
also temporal. Data has made infrastructure construction and deconstruction more
dynamic. High resource national level organization, focused on maximum strategic gain
in a single election is channeled into a community, district, or state, implementing
sophisticated campaign strategies focused on mobilization of straight-ticket Democratic
voters. Yet the effect of this on local party institutions will be idiosyncratic. These
institutions are not only constructed without national resources, but often very different
competitive considerations than high resource federal campaigns. Simply put, a lack of
competition over a long period at the local level will likely create divergent and perhaps
incompatible structures with those ephemerally constructed for party mobilization over a
single election. Therefore, a national injection to the ground level will not simply transfer
incentives for long-term local party building there.
Necessary for the understanding of modern American parties as well as the
practical challenges of efficiency is familiarity with the byzantine structure of party
organization. Since the explosion of political spending associated with the rise of PACs,
multiple fundraising and organizational vessels have been constructed21 to take advantage
of rules that allow donors to overcome caps on giving, through spending on multiple
party and campaign organizations. While integral for raising as much money as possible,
this organizational patchwork has decentralized and further fragmented party

Robinson, Jonathan. Building a Business of Politics: The Rise of Political Consulting and the
Transformation of American Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2016.
21
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campaigning. The contemporary ‘party-in-service,’ is not just one organization, but a
myriad of party organizations in service to Democrats running for specific types of
offices. The Democratic National Committee, the ostensible committee of all Democrats,
is complemented, and even somewhat supplemented, by various ‘Hill’ and ‘Leadership’22
committees controlled by congress members. While all working for the ostensible goal of
electing Democrats, each of these committees have specific prerogatives and are
competing among themselves for finite donor resources. These committees become
valuable power centers for their leadership, often integral in legislative wrangling and
increasing prominence for members looking to rise in congressional leadership or run for
higher office.23 Priorities will therefore depart from simply using committees to
efficiently cultivate and deploy resources for the general betterment of Democratic
electoral fortunes.
Committee leadership can be an entry to national prominence, but comes with
responsibilities. These mainly center on short-term electoral success. Leadership will
often have a short leash and be expected deliver legislative majorities, or at least
progress, within one election cycle.24 Resources are distributed with the purpose of
having the maximum marginal effect on a small group of competitive races. The
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) for example, will usually not

22

The difference being Hill committees such as the DCCC and DSCC are ostensibly responsive
to their particular caucus, while leadership committees are to individual members. In practice,
these networks and their decision-making are often closely aligned.
23
Grim, Ryan and Siddiqui, Sabrina. “Call Time Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak
Work Life for Democrats.” Huffington Post-Online Only. Jan 8 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/call-time-congressionalfundraising_n_2427291.html. Accessed Feb 21 2017.
24
Herszenhorn, David. “Schumer Steps Down from D.S.C.C. Post.” New York Times-Online
Only. Nov 24 2008. https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/schumer-steps-down-fromdscc/#header_section. Accessed Jan 7 2017.
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focus on permanent staffers or organizers on the ground, instead sending a check to
supplement a finite number of races projected to be closely competitive. Money from Hill
committees is not usually concentrated on behalf of supporting the Democratic slate
through field. Instead, it is dispensed for paid media campaigning. Campaign finance
rules further exacerbate this by incentivizing Hill committees to run their own noncoordinated IE campaigns to avoid hard money regulation. The result is a further
fracturing of party campaigning on the ground.
This pattern in Washington D.C. replicates itself on the state level. State
legislative caucuses will usually have their own dedicated committees. These committees
are subject to state-level finance rules, and by raising state money are often unable to
coordinate with federal level campaign organizations. The Democratic Governors
Association (DGA) and Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee (DLCC) are also
national organizations responsible for helping Democrats in state races. Yet their
contributions are also subject to numerous firewalls.
Party organizations are chiefly responsible for supporting lower salience races
that cannot generate sufficient resources through individual candidate donor networks.
Yet fragmentation means that help is usually in its most fungible form, money. Building
field, a longer-term enterprise whose efficacy is through building economies of scale, is
often viewed as inefficient. The system as it exists creates disincentives for joint party
infrastructure building. Money is most effectively raised through fragmented
organizational structures that can elude hard money donation limits. Yet, how money is
best spent is another question. Individual prerogatives of party leaders and operatives are
directed toward fortifying party vessels as power centers and demonstration of
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competence for individual gain. Efficiency as a party can be universally agreed upon in
the abstract, but is not a high salience priority for most actors within the party who must
be responsive to their narrower logics, necessary to keep their job (whether as officeholder or operative). Only the DNC is truly institutionally aligned with broad national
party electoral prerogatives.25 Yet, the DNC is just one organization, operating in an
ecosystem of party vessels responsible for far more parochial interests.
State parties, patterned on a similar structure, are institutionally responsible for
all levels of campaigning in their state. This means they can form relationships with
various national committees that have races of interest in their state. Yet finance rules
will create firewalls between different funding sources that must be navigated by state
parties and restrict coherence and efficiency.
The consequences of this dizzying set of pathways to campaign funding mean that
money cultivated on the national level in support of the party makes scaling lower-level
campaigns challenging, especially in regard to field mobilization. Rather than building
coherence locally, resources are subject to legal firewalls, in addition to the prerogatives
of their national organizational sponsors. Put simply, the rules mean that individuals and
factions pursue resource cultivation through means more efficient in raising money than
attaining party voters. No entity is properly incentivized to pay the upfront costs in
overcoming these structural barriers and creating efficient organization that provides
party-wide collective goods.
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When considering Duverger’s conception of the mass party, American politics
presents many challenges. The American system makes party structures not simply, or
even centrally, a matter of bottom-up vs. top-down, but holistic vs. fragmented. Are
resources constructed efficiently enough to build economies of scale that emphasize field
organization on behalf of party mobilization? Money dedicated to this task, even if it
comes from big donors, can have important democratic participatory effects: erecting
structures for grassroots volunteer activism and marrying the party to an irregular and
marginalized electorate. Conversely, grassroots money through fragmented structures is
unlikely to be significant enough for grassroots mobilization efforts, at least on a national
scale.

A Theory of Political Parties
Per John Aldrich, parties solve collective action problems amongst politicians:
including the development of a (1) brand, and (2) organizational economies of scale.
The combination of office-seeking ambition and the very nature of
electoral institutions generates incentives for candidates to solve two
collective action problems affecting voters: becoming informed and
turning out to vote. Candidates have two kinds of incentives to affiliate
with a political party, ameliorating both of the public’s collective action
problems. Party affiliation provides an initial reputation that reduces
decision-making costs and provides a core of likely supporters. Party
campaign efforts, whether conducted by the party organization itself or by
its various candidates, provide economies of scale for all the party’s
candidates as they seek to reduce the costs and increase the benefits for
supporters to come to the polls.26
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In political environments where politicians are incentivized to form joint
resources to solve these problems through party teams, we should expect to see ‘strong’
parties. Whereas when there is little incentive for politicians to sacrifice autonomy to a
party, we should expect to find parties comparatively ‘weak.’ Exogenous shifts such as
changes in technology and civil society patterns, as well as institutional variance in
electoral rules, will affect the raw materials that structure electoral competition, and will
therefore influence whether office seekers decide to amass resources individually or
through joint party structures.
This ‘politician-centered’ view of parties has been challenged recently by the
team of Bawn et al.27 Using network analysis, they suggest that contemporary parties are
better conceived as coalitions of interest groups rather than politicians.
We argue that parties in the United States are best understood as coalitions
of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for
their particular goals…The coalition of policy-demanding groups develops
an agenda of mutually acceptable policies, insists on the nomination of
candidates with a demonstrated commitment to its program…In our
account parties are no great friend of popular sovereignty.
If correct, this interest group-centered conception of parties28 would undermine
the central normative claim on their behalf. Proponents of parties have argued since the
height of American behaviorism in the mid-twentieth century, that by driving politicians
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into two ‘teams,’ parties provide coherence to the average voter, faced with an unruly and
incredibly complicated federal electoral system. Competition incentivizes party teams to
bring new and marginalized groups into their electoral coalition, giving them meaningful
representation within the political system.29 This stands in contrast and as a corrective to
the interest group sphere, which privileges the resource rich, not a popular majority.
Competitive parties are vehicles for the socialization of conflict. Yet if the party as
‘interest group coalition’ theory is correct, parties are not representatives of a broad
majority coalition, but simply a group of already-favored interests.
I confess I remain both intellectually sympathetic to the explanatory power of
politicians as the ultimate structural aggregator of party politics, and lean normatively
toward parties as at least a partial corrective to the inequality of the interest group
sphere¾ and an integral institution to meaningful practice of popular democracy. This is
especially the case in the context of fragmented institutional arrangements such as the
United States, where popular government would otherwise seem hopeless under its antimajoritarian constitution. Yet parties are no democratic panacea. They must—even at
their best—negotiate both their institutional incentives to form a majority under
(relatively) equalitarian American electoral institutions, and the need to procure the
resources to engage in the electioneering necessary to do this, by appealing to elitedominated interests.
This tension animates confusion over the institutional role of parties. Parties must
aggregate both interests that provide resources, and citizens that provide votes. How
these two responsibilities are reconciled will be contingent upon the ways in which
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parties’ link to both interest organizations and citizens at any given moment in time.
Where strong party-citizen linkage exists, the mediating role of interest groups as
resource providers will be weak. Conversely, when these linkages are weak, politicians
will make the decision to solicit the interest group sphere to amass resources necessary to
attract voters from a de-aligned electorate.
It is fair to say that the interest group sphere’s power as electoral resource
brokers has increased since the ‘PAC explosion’ of the 1970’s.30 Successful electoral
campaigns must court interest group organizations to raise the funds necessary for federal
and even most state-level offices. In federal elections, few, if any, party machines could
currently procure the resources necessary to win a competitive election without the strong
support of organized interests through PAC contributions, and increasingly Super PAC IE
campaigns.
The movement from professionalized to amateur activists over the twentieth
century has also weakened parties vis a vis interest groups.31 Professional activism of the
machine era was induced through selective material benefits of party patronage. The
party’s institutional control over the cadre necessary for an effective turnout apparatus
made it the vital organizational vessel for those hoping to win office.32 Yet as machines
have withered, activists are now motivated not by patronage, but by ideological and
programmatic goals. Those chiefly motivated by policy ends will first seek alliance with
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sympathetic interest groups and associated donor networks, not a party organization.
Because new style activism is not predicated on exclusionary rewards for participation, it
is more generally vulnerable to collective action problems,33 as well as socioeconomic
bias.34 This activism is not a vocation, but a civic endeavor for those who have the
resources to bear its burden.
In addition, electoral reforms that have put party nominations in the hands of
primary voters have weakened the influence of party leaders and created new demands
for interest-centered electoral resources. While primaries ostensibly made party
nominations more ‘democratic,’ they are, as Sarah Anzia illustrates, low-salience
elections in which low-turnout is likely to increase the influence of organized and
entrenched actors.35
Yet despite the increasing necessity of office-seekers reaching out to organized
interests over the internal party hierarchy for electoral resources, party politicians—still
in my view—remain at the center of solving the social choice problems that are the main
challenge of electoral coalition-building. They have both the final call in articulating the
campaign program of aggregated interests, as well as brokering this program through
government policy while in office. Politicians (and the electoral staffers that serve at their
pleasure) also, are still the ultimate decision makers regarding electoral strategy. While
the increasing influence of interest groups may decrease politicians’ autonomy in the
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simple brokering of the preferences of a majority coalition, it does not obviate the
continuing reality that politicians¾and their joint party structures¾ remain the principal
as the broker of popular and organized preferences through the electoral system. The
party remains the vessel through which these politicians act collectively and build
organization that centrally serves their electoral goals: the building of a majority electoral
coalition. It remains their collective agent in negotiating an electoral majority and the
electoral resources necessary to mobilize it.
Of central focus to my analysis is illustrating a dynamic model of how
electoral resources move through party organization over time. One weakness in the
study of parties is a tendency to describe their internal dynamics in the abstract or
unsystematically. Much party organizational analysis holds singular focus on the
relationships of politicians, resources, or perhaps voters. Insulating one of these variables
is perhaps most conducive for cross-sectional analysis. Yet party organization is an
integrated apparatus designed to aggregate all of these variables in a coherent organism.
Similarly, most attempts to map parties hold relationships as static, mapping a particular
event or point in history. Yet parties and electoral resource construction are inherently
dynamic: switching modes and goals in accordance with the moment in the electoral
cycle, and a reflection of the constant fluidity in both strategy and resources. What is
needed then, and what this dissertation hopes to advance is a model of, is how party
organization changes over the course of the quadrennial election cycle. This includes
both how resources flow and who makes the decision to cultivate and deploy them. This
dynamism is especially true in our current era, where rapid technological advance leads
to ever changing and evolving campaigning techniques.
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Despite the rise of interest groups and decline of traditionally conceived party
resources, parties have, a number of unique strengthens as political institutions. This
includes perhaps most importantly, that they are indeed institutions. Individual politicians
and campaigns, and the resource networks they construct, come and go, but parties
remain as durable mechanisms for electioneering. Secondly, parties by building a vessel
through which all members of the party team can combine resources for their collective
good, can build economies of scale to promote efficient campaigning.
Yet caveats also emerge from these strengths. As Aldrich notes, economies of
scale are only beneficial if they construct resources that promote the electoral fortunes of
the entire party team.36 If voters are not straight ticket party-line voters, or members of
the party want to make vastly different appeals, constructing resources jointly through a
party makes little sense. A related second concern is that certain forms of campaigning
may have greater benefits through building economies of scale than others. For example,
the mobilization of party voters (presuming they will be loyal party-line voters if they
make it to the polls) yields great efficiencies when done collectively through a party
organization. Yet television advertising, predicated on more charismatic and personalistic
appeals to undecided and often-low information voters, is more effective if focused on an
individual candidate,37 not the abstract and/or transactional appeal of the party vote.
As a result, under circumstances in which mobilizing clearly delineated party
loyalists are a priority of electoral strategy, we should expect to see increasingly robust
party organization. Whereas when goals are focused on using strategies to persuade
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voters with few or unpredictable party allegiances, especially through the more emotional
appeals of mass advertising, politicians will be more apt to construct resources
individually. This in part helps explain party weakness of the late twentieth century, as
campaigning had become increasing focused on television advertising.
The line between party and interest group organization is also increasingly
difficult to untangle. Historically, campaigning was the purview of parties and individual
candidates’ campaigns. Yet interest-based associations act not only as financial
intermediaries between their constituents and candidates/parties, but often autonomously
participate in electioneering on behalf of their preferred candidates through independent
expenditure (IE) campaigns. Therefore, interest groups can develop organizational scale
themselves, exerting more strategic (and perhaps policy) leverage over individual
politicians as well parties. However, as these organizations have grown increasingly
sophisticated, and parties have resorted along coherent ideological lines, IEs have begun
to take up party-like functions of advocacy for an entire slate of party candidates.38 While
there are coordination firewalls between parties and IEs, they still may be complementing
coherent party mobilization strategies, making them— while legally distinct from
parties—conceptually muddled.
If IE campaigns and their more durable organizational sponsors, are devoting
resources to the mobilization of dependable party-line voters, they may while operating
outside of formal party channels, be acting to in consequence ‘strengthen’ the party.’ For
this to be the case however, it must have a clearly partisan effect. This means, if the IE is
mobilizing based on an issue and supports candidates of both parties or mobilized
38
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supporters who may be loyal only to a specific issue; this may not be helping party
mobilization. Because coordination firewalls exist, mobilization efforts may not be
efficient. Interest groups competing for resources may engage in mobilization credit
claiming, but in practice be engaging in superficial and/or redundant tasks when it comes
to mobilization. Recognizing this, Herrnson reimagines parties through a set of
concentric circles of multi-layered coalitions.39 Yet this model misses both qualitative
differences in party and interest group-based IE campaigning, and how coordination
boundaries between these different groups affects the decision-making and the
organizational form of a party electoral apparatus.
I seek to evaluate party strength as resources devoted to the electoral
mobilization of loyal party voters. This may be through explicit party organizations, but
also through ancillary organizations and networks that serve this function. The
fundamental metric is to what extent politicians perceive their electoral fortunes as tied to
a dependable and loyal party electorate and an effective apparatus to mobilize this
electorate.

A Model of Party/Electoral Resource Construction Over Time
Resource construction is a function of the short term caculations of politicans
aggregating electoral majorities. Environmental factors exogenous to a campiagn or party
organization set the context for internal decision-making. Strategy is path dependent.
Practices that have been successful in the past are likely to be replicated, especially when
lacking robust competition that could force innovation.
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Figure 1.1: Temporal Model of Resource Construction

The chart above illustrates a temporally based general model of resource
construction for electoral campaigning in the United States. This is a cyclical process.
Institutional factors (electoral rules) will combine with more fluid civil society resources.
This process patterns the political environment for electoral campaigning, and the
strategies and organizational forms used by office holders and seekers. The perceived
success of these strategies will influence long-term modes of resource construction,
including whether politicians decide to construct individual candidate–centered
resources, or to work jointly though party organization.
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Independent Variables: The electoral regulatory regime is the set of legal rules that
structure electoral campaigning. These include laws on fundraising as well what sorts of
activities parties, campaigns, and other organizations who do electoral work can
participate in. This also encompasses the firewalls that exist between these organizations.
Parties are subject to both federal and state-based electoral laws. The civil society
configuration is what Schattschneider calls the ‘raw materials’40 of politics: this includes
the people, networks, expertise, financial resources, as well as the communicative
apparatus that facilitates their relationships. This exists primarily outside of the political
sphere, but is the primordial material of electoral resources. As these materials and
resources change, parties must modify strategies to capitalize on these shifts.

Intervening Variables (t1): This is the set of resources and organizational structure used
for electoral campaigning. Practically speaking, these are the electoral campaigns
themselves. Structure is a function of the materials that exist within civil society, and how
the electoral regulatory regime institutionally patterns these resources into electoral
activity. As a result, campaigns will use a diverse set of strategies to assemble a majority
coalition, and configure a certain set of resources¾ what Nielsen refers to as “campaign
assemblages”¾ to facilitate this strategy.41 These can be through individual electoral
campaigns or organizational forms that campaign on behalf of an entire party slate of
candidates.
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Intervening Variables (t2): These are the outcomes of the campaign assemblage. They
include both the general success of voter mobilization, as well the degree that
mobilization has benefitted the party ticket. This is not just the substantive causal
relationship between the assemblage and electoral outcomes, but its perceived strategic
impact. In addition to electoral outcomes, another vital consequence is whether the
resources generated on behalf of the assemblage (activists, networks, data, voters, etc.)
are durable beyond a particular campaign, or the idiosyncratic effect of a particular
candidate and/or election. The networks forged during electoral campaigning also affect
civil society configuration beyond the explicitly political sphere.

Dependent Variable: This is the strategic decision-making of politicians to construct
organization either individually or jointly through a party team. This is a result of
politicians’ perception of electoral success and the generation of resources necessary for
future electoral success. Where mobilization strategies have successfully produced a
majority coalition on behalf of a party slate of candidates, and the resources used to build
this apparatus appear to be durable or at least replicable, it politicians should construct
resources through party organization on behalf of continued mobilization of this
coalition. Politicians may decide to construct party resources even without both
conditions being satisfied. If an electoral strategy is successful, it may be reproduced
even if there is little demonstrable value-added by particular aspects of the strategy, such
as the tactics used to build the field apparatus.
There is also the possibility that even without immediate electoral success, if the
resources generated by strategies are ample, politicians may continue to focus on building

29

these resources in the hopes of constructing a long-term successful electoral strategy.
Because of the cyclical nature of electoral campaigning and party organization building
on behalf of it, strategic incentives of politicians are an intervening variable in the
cultivation and construction of electoral campaigning resources.

Variables that Impact Contemporary Party Building
A number of particularly salient variables effect campaign strategies, creating
both incentives and challenges to building electoral resources through party structures.
An evaluation of party strength should be analytically focused on the impact of these
variables:

-Costs and capacity for party mobilization: Technological change has lowered costs of
identifying potential party voters and constructing the mobilization apparatus to activate
them. Yet both these tasks still involve capital-intensive (and largely long-term)
economies of scale to be effective. Although mobilization requires economies of scale,
there is the possibility that costs may decrease over time with the depreciation of the
price of digital ‘tools,’ and the information /resources that these tools have previously
procured (e.g. robust state voter/volunteer files will cost less to activate than ones that are
not thoroughly developed).

-Electoral Competitiveness: The level of electoral competitiveness-especially at the ‘top
of the ticket’- has two important consequences for party building: (1) incentives for
adopting and experimenting with new and more efficacious electoral strategies: including
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in regard to mobilization, and (2) the ability to capture resources necessary for
mobilization through organizational economies of scale (as mentioned above). State
party resources will be effected by the dynamics electoral competiveness (both federal
and state elections) within its boundaries.

-Coalitional Congruity: The degree to which across the various levels of government
there is minimal conflict between the voter in the party coalition and voters that party
politicians want to mobilize. Where there is incongruity in the coalition of party
politicians, politicians will be reticent to focus on building an apparatus on behalf of
party mobilization. Another important area for study in this project is the reciprocal
causal process: meaning to what extent (if any) do strategies that focus on party building
impact overall peaceable coexistence in the party coalition.

Strong Networked Party Characteristics
Because of the difficulty in conceptualizing the party as a structure, challenges
arise in analytically evaluating shifts in party strength. Yet, here I suggest a set of metrics
that measure the construction of party resources and tendency of politicians to use a party
apparatus to construct resources. This includes both how politicians conceive of the party
as an apparatus to effectively mobilize a majority coalition, and a party voter universe
that can be depended upon to be ‘coherent’ in support of a party ticket. Beyond officeseekers propensity to use party organization, analysis should also focus on the
development and durability of the resources necessary for effective party mobilization:
activists, data, and voters.
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Figure 1.2: Strong Party Criteria.

Specifically, there are a number of characteristics that would indicate a ‘strong’42 party
under contemporary electoral conditions:

While broadly generalizable to party resource construction in an era of digitalization and
polarization, practically speaking there may be a number of modal differences between the
Democrats and Republicans. Because the Democratic electorate tends to be more irregular,
effective strategies will center on mobilization. As discussed in proceeding chapters, anticompetitive techniques focused less on the construction of their own turnout apparatus and more
of weakening the logic of the Democrats organization has been an effective Republican strategy.
Nonetheless, ‘strength’ in a Republican Party turnout apparatus should also follow this criterion.
42
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-Resources are concentrated in formal party organizational structure. Party organization
is focused on building an effective coherent apparatus to mobilize party voters.
Organization is capital intensive and builds voter file and activist databases.
Organizationally, we should hope to see electoral campaign resources concentrated in
explicit party structures that are supported broadly by party politicians. This organization
should be focused on building durable linkages between the party and a loyal coalition.

-Party targeted voter universe is clear and coherent based on identifiable party-line
voters who vote consistently. Universe is predictable and durable.
In order to create this durable coalition, the party must know where its voters are and
should have confidence that this coalition can be consistently mobilized come election
season. This means both having an effective apparatus to mobilize voters and the
confidence that issue-based preferences can be successfully aggregated to keep voters
within the party ‘tent.’

–Activist networks are durable and can be channeled broadly into party mobilization
activity. Activists who participate are integrated into party organization that serves the
ticket.
As the voter universe must be durable and identifiable, so too must the activist networks
charged with mobilizing them. Activists must be committed to participation on behalf of
the slate of party candidates. Practically this may not necessarily mean a strong
commitment to every ‘down-ticket’ race, but at the least a consistent dedication to serve
the mobilization needs of the ‘top’ of the party ticket.
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-Politicians are committed to pooling resources through the party organization and
pursuing electoral strategies based on a coherent party universe.
Politicians must see their electoral path as existing primarily through the mobilization of
the party electorate and sacrifice building robust individual campaign organization to
construct joint resources on behalf of the party team.

-Resource construction is focused on formal party structure. Other electoral activity
outside formal organization, such as Super PACS/Independent Expenditure campaigns
form a concentric circle outside of party also engaging in electoral strategies based on
mobilizing a coherent party coalition, with efficient division of labor (even without
coordination).
To whatever extent possible, electoral resources should be constructed through
formal party vessels. While electoral rules may limit this, and the IE sphere may be a
major conduit of electoral resources, it should do so on behalf of the mobilization of a
party electorate.

The Historical Development of Party Organization and Electoral Resources
Electoral organization has varied historically depending on how civil society
resources have interacted with electoral political institutions. Electoral strategies are a
function of how broader social forces--from political cleavages to technological change -are mediated through the campaign environment to promote office-seekers electoral
fortunes. The birth of mass campaigning was a product of the Jacksonian era, through
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the development of Van Buren’s ‘party machine.’ The nineteenth century political
machine followed a conventional logic of clientelist politics.43 A party apparatus,
maintained by activists seeking selective benefits through government spoils, linked a
mass electorate with little in the way of conventional class-based political identification,
or independent civil organization, to a highly coherent party. The populace was placated
by regional and ethno-cultural claims, easing the brokerage relationship between the
electorate and the party. Material goods facilitated this apparatus, being dispersed to
activists and other political elites, yet not as a transactional demand of the broad
electorate. Party allegiances were durable and predictable as there was little in the way of
extra-partisan political association or dynamic issue uptake that would jeopardize loyalty.
Yet by the turn of the twentieth-century, the logic of machine organization would
begin to erode. Progressive-era reforms such as the advent of the Australian ballot and
the professionalization of civil service, weakened the ability to assemble an apparatus
that could successfully deliver a consistent party vote. Party ability to translate and broker
citizen preferences was also greatly complicated by the New Deal era introduction of
programmatic and material claims as an animating force in the American electorate. The
New Deal also led to the flourishing of a number of public interest organizations. Labor
unions, as well as mass constituent organizations such as the AARP, represented more
distinct elements of the electorate, often playing the role of organizational intermediaries
between activists and parties. The post-World War II era also saw a boom in nonexplicitly political civic organizations that often provided the sorts of associational
linkages that can be channeled into electoral organization, especially as machine-activism
43
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declined.44 Party activism was now less a product of the selective benefits of spoils, as
much as comparatively weaker, yet more diffuse and dynamic programmatic motivations.
By mid-century, party organization persisted as an amalgamation of the remnants
of urban machines that could still use patronage to ensure a functioning mobilization
apparatus, and issue based activists and organizations more loyal to programmatic goals
and the politicians who supported them, than to a particular party. At the fulcrum of these
two distinct types of party resources in the Democratic Party was the labor movement.
Unions’ long-standing relationship with local machines spurred a closeness to local party
elites, and strong motivation to protect the status quo. Yet labor’s more progressive
elements were also a major force for change and reform within the Democratic Party. J.
David Greenstone suggests,45 that unions were in many ways the chief intermediaries
between the traditional party machine and liberal activists.
By the 1970’s, interest group ascendance was beginning to alter parties’
unquestioned status as American politics chief institutional vessel of electioneering. The
Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) led (however inadvertently) to the rise of the
PAC as a form of major political organization.46 PACs revolutionized interest group
politics by creating an organizational medium capable of providing resources for
electoral politics that could be scaled in a strategically sophisticated manner, yet exist
outside the organizational control of the party. Interest groups could-- directly as
organizations-- now leverage and support individual candidates through targeted financial
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contributions while eluding party structures. This was buttressed by the increasing
dependence on campaign contributions to service an ever-expanding need for television
advertising as the emerging primary communicative tool for campaigning.47
The rise of television advertising dovetailed with the decline of the participatory
grassroots resources necessary to run an effective field mobilization apparatus. Unions, as
well as other sorts of civil organizations that could provide electoral resources, were on
the decline. This was complemented by broader societal attitudinal and participatory
erosion in regard to institutional political participation.48 Without patronage or robust
civil society organization, party apparatuses were starved of the resources necessary to
mobilize voters and therefore shifted strategy accordingly.
In addition to a lack of resources to mobilize irregular groups, the Great Society
era left the Democratic Party coalition with a high degree of internal tension.49 The party
faced a struggle for power between the white working class that formed the backbone of
the New Deal coalition, and urban non-white constituents, who were the (perceived)
beneficiaries of the Great Society, and voted less consistently than their white
counterparts. Because this ‘irregular’ electorate was viewed by many elites within the
Democratic Party as a liability that could not be counted on to produce electoral
majorities, this further disincentivized spending resources on its mobilization.
Instead, a campaign template arose in the 1980’s that eschewed field
mobilization strategies for capital intensive mass advertising: with a primary focus of
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returning working-class white ‘Reagan Democrats,’ who had become increasingly
alienated from the Party to its fold. Rosenstone & Hansen suggest the apparent
participatory effect of this was a demobilization of the electorate as the party canvass
withered. 50 Activists became further invested in ideologically based interest
organizations, and the post-civil rights regional resorting of partisan allegiances appeared
(at the time) to produce a confused and unstable electorate in matters of partisan
loyalty.51 While unions maintained a role in both mobilizing their members and providing
some of the financial resources necessary for campaigning, party candidates were under
pressure to turn to the increasingly dominant sphere of business PACs to reach enough
relative parity with Republicans to remain electorally competitive.
As further discussed in the next chapter, the decline of mobilization resources,
the rise of PACs, and the internal tension between ideological, regional, and ethnic wings
of the party, all weakened the Democratic Party as a coherent organization dedicated to
constructing a collective apparatus focused on mobilizing a party electorate. As a result,
the party modally transitioned from a vessel of locality-based electoral mobilization to a
national infrastructure primarily focused on raising and distributing financial resources
(and staff) to vulnerable member politicians.52 The party could no longer offer
candidates an effective mobilization-focused organization, instead turning to constructing
financial networks that could compete with their Republican counterparts. This is what is
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referred to as the party-in-service organizational model.53 Rather than party bosses
asserting control over member politicians, the party had become as a passive organization
acting as an intermediary between the ascendant interest group sphere and its increasingly
fragmented member politicians.
Yet by the early twenty-first century, a shifting environment led to
experimentation with a new set of electoral strategies. The rise of the Internet and social
media challenged television as the dominant communicative mode: both in a broad social
context, as well as specifically in the political arena. Where television’s capital-intensive
top-down structure incentivized primarily vertical communication of elite actors making
impersonal and charismatic appeals to the electorate; the Internet created the potential for
low-cost horizontal collaboration and resource construction. Tools such as email and text
messaging created the opportunity for specifically targeted, low cost appeals to voters
and activists, cultivating resources that would have been unfeasible in the previous era. In
addition, social media gave activists and supporters a place to collaborate and build
community with each other, buttressed by tools like ‘Meetup,’ pioneering techniques
moving digitally based communities into the ‘real-world.’ Whereas field organization
required ‘too costly’ of an apparatus to build in the mass media era, these tools altered the
calculus of pursuing electoral mobilization, as activist resources were more efficiently
cultivated.54
In addition, a re-sorted electorate with two ideologically and regionally coherent
parties’ left fewer and fewer true ‘independent’ voters for candidates to target. Unaligned
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Reagan Democrats appeared to finish a transition into the core of a Republican Party now
firmly ensconced in the white south. The rise of big-data also contributed to more precise
and effective voter-targeting techniques as political strategists began to incorporate
consumer data into models, finding not just increasingly small and prized groups of
unaligned voters, but also unmobilized potential partisans.55 Perhaps the effects of this
were first seen on the Republican side in 2004, where George W. Bush, despite having
sagging poll numbers (as well as other negative electoral indicators) used a strategy of
mobilizing non-voting white evangelicals on the basis of social issues to successfully
compensate for his poor performance among independents in battleground states and win
reelection.
As important however, is the seemingly never-ending arms race of campaign
funding was beginning to reach its ceiling of efficacy through mass advertising. Simply
put, campaign advertising had become so ubiquitous (in national elections at the least)
that it began to be perceived as delivering diminishing marginal returns. As a result,
campaigns began to look for other, more effective ways to spend their ever-burgeoning
war chests. Conventional forms of campaign funding have now been complimented by
new vessels of campaign organization through IE campaigning: injecting even more
financial resources into electioneering. The growth of financial resources and finite
amount of productive mass media bandwidth, has incentivized campaign strategies that
channel resources into newer digitally-based modes of social contact.
Apparent is a resulting campaign template that dedicates significant resources and
strategic focus to the mobilization of a sporadic electorate comprised of would-be loyal
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party voters. Digital media has created a new forum to cultivate activism through low
cost digital communication, which complemented by the financial resources necessary to
hire significant field staff, responsible for training and coordinating activist activity,
begat opportunity to mobilize an irregular electorate in competitive electoral
environments.
Noteworthy of this ‘new’ field apparatus, is the incorporation of organizational
techniques traditionally associated with community organizing groups, into electoral
politics. These strategies originate from long-standing experimentation by Marshall
Ganz, historically focused on California politics. In 2004 however, the presidential the
Democratic primary campaign of Howard Dean—one of the first ‘internet-driven’
campaigns—sought Ganz out to apply a community-organizing model to strengthen
linkages among an activist community based largely in the digital realm, and channel this
support into tradition campaign field prerogatives of voter contact.
While the results of this effort were mixed, they should be situated in the
context of a first step in developing a model for cultivating grassroots participatory
resources for electoral politics in the digital era. The ability to engage in low cost digital
communication created new potential for activist mobilization. Techniques originated in
the Dean campaign were quickly diffused within the Democratic Party, and eventually
adapted and refined with far greater success in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012.56
The Obama campaigns focused on mobilization through devoting unprecedented
financial resources to their new media, analytics, and field departments. Field staff
responsibilities diverged from traditional electoral campaigning. Focusing less on the
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management and deployment of previously existing resources for voter contact, and
instaed on organization building through community organizing strategies. Priority was
given to developing activist leadership of locally based “neighborhood teams,” (NTs) and
teaching activists both how to run logistically sophisticated voter turnout operations, as
well as the basics of community organizing to build their NT organizations.
This model is a response to the particular electoral environment of the early
twenty-first century. As we have seen, a diminishing pool of unaligned voters, and
advances in data making newer and sporadic voters easier to target, has reincentivized
strategies of field mobilization. Yet, without machine-based activism or the labor and
civil society organizations of the previous eras, the challenge of building an apparatus to
mobilize these potential voters remains. Campaigns now must cultivate their own
activists, and build durable organizations through which their foot soldiers participate.
Viewed in this light, community-organizing methods make sense as grassroots
organization-building tools that strengthen networks and build organizational leadership
over time.
While the Obama campaign successfully used this model, its generalizability
remains questionable. Inducement to activist participation in the Obama campaign was
the result—not just of technological change – but also of a charismatic and historically
unique candidate, as well as the salience of a presidential election. Activist participation
was predicated on the movement-like appeal of the campaign. Absent this, campaigns
must fall back on the sort of programmatic appeals to activists that have been historically
ineffective in building this apparatus. Further, the financial resources necessary to build
this organization are unlikely to exist outside of presidential campaigns. Maintaining staff
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levels necessary to facilitate this apparatus would appear unfeasible outside the height of
the presidential election season.
Attempts to explicitly institutionalize the Obama apparatus within the Democratic
Party have been to this point unsatisfactory. After the 2008 election, the campaign
organization spun off into ‘Organizing for America,’ (OFA 2.0) which was housed under
the umbrella of the Democratic National Committee. Yet maintaining even a shell of
presidential electoral organization proved a steep challenge. In addition to resource and
salience issues mentioned above, another impediment to institutionalization was evidence
of a tendency of Obama activists to be skeptical of the Democratic Party brand, or of
devoting their efforts broadly to its support. In part, this was a reflection of the remaining
tension between the traditional institutional elite of the party, and a younger, diverse, and
perhaps even more liberal, locus of activists.
Consequently, after the 2012 election the campaign apparatus was transformed
into a 501(c)4 (OFA 4.0) moving out from under the party organizational tent, with the
hope that simply maintaining activist networks would eventually translate into party
electoral resources. Yet on a systematic basis, this strategy has also appeared to be
unsuccessful. The root of these difficulties remains a bit puzzling. Obama activists tend
to be ideologically committed to the articulated programmatic agenda of the Democratic
Party. This group appears motivated by more than just a cult of personality, as they
articulate a largely coherent set of policy preferences consistent with the Democratic
Party as well as being demographically rooted in the Party’s emerging electoral coalition.
Yet they remain largely skeptical of electoral politics and institutional actors independent
of Obama.
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Despite the failure of transferring explicitly the Obama activist base into durable
Democratic Party electoral resources, the party still has the benefit of an expanded voter
universe and robust data on these would-be voters. Campaign assemblages are
contemporarily characterized (to the extent this is possible) as a collage of labor and
progressive activists, along with floating fragments of Obama’s activist organization and
networks, with digital tools used to cultivate activism and resources outside of the
geographic location of an election.

Preview of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 further orients the project to the challenges that have faced the
Democratic Party nationally at the end of the twentieth century, and the response of the
party in the early twenty-first century. It will seek to synthesize existing academic and
journalistic literatures on Democratic campaigning from 2004-2014 and evaluate it within
a theory of party organization and contemporary party building. I will begin with a
discussion of the aftermath of the 2004 election and how the characteristics that have
marked the current campaign environment-- digital media, field organization, IE
campaigning --developed, and then discuss how the development of these techniques has
influenced the renewed strategic focus on voter mobilization and the consequences of this
on party organization through 2014. Central is the development of what I call horizontal
and vertical dimensions of fragmentation. These are macro lines of fragmentation based
upon coalitional divisions and the disjuncture between national electoral institutions and
lower level party structures.
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In Chapter 3, I trace this history within the context of the Ohio Democratic Party.
I evaluate how these tensions have affected the party in a highly competitive presidential
battleground state that is the beneficiary of quadrennial infusions of national resources. I
trace the party’s attempt to meet the challenges of building federal, state, and local
electoral majorities over this period. Has the party—as a holistic entity—moved toward a
focus on the mobilization of the ‘Obama’ electorate, and what have the consequences
been on its strength and coherence? Here, fragmentation is illustrated through different
institutional actors all ostensibly committed to mobilizing a statewide Democratic
majority. Yet still, divergent logics impeding party integration are observed.
Chapter 4 brings the scope of the analysis to the local level. It conceptualizes
what these tensions mean on the ground, across the various campaign and party
assemblages. Here, fragmentation is crystalized as various party actors responding to
their own structural incentives struggle to integrate and institutionalize an efficient
organizational apparatus. Here, most clearly and concretely, consequences of heterodox
path dependent campaign cultures are laid bare.
Finally, I conclude by returning the themes drawn out in this introduction. I
suggest how this project calls into question several concepts central to contemporary
party studies. I assert that while it may be too soon to tell whether our current
environment will lead to stronger party institutions, modal changes in party organization,
and a broader lack of scholarly qualitative party study, have left contemporary party
dynamics understudied in the field.
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Chapter 2
The National Party

On November 25, 2014, Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York
addressed the National Press Club in the wake of the Democratic Party’s disastrous
recent midterm election performance. Schumer, who was the party’s Senate whip at the
time,57 former chair of the DSCC,58 and a chief conduit to the donor class, is widely
thought to be among the most influential forces on party strategy. The speech was
conceived as an early attempt to frame a way forward in the run-up to the 2016
presidential election. Ostensibly introducing a new Democratic Party populism, what
raised most eyebrows was what this meant in coalitional and policy terms:
“…The Affordable Care Act was aimed at the 36 million Americans who
were not covered. It has been reported that only a third of the uninsured
are even registered to vote. In 2010 only about 40% of those registered
voted. So even if the uninsured kept with the rate, which they likely did
not, we would still only be talking about only 5% of the electorate.
To aim a huge change in mandate at such a small percentage of the
electorate made no political sense. So when Democrats focused on health
care, the average middle-class person thought the Democrats are not
paying enough attention to me…”59

The idea that the Democratic Party’s focus on poorer, non-white, and younger
voters is an electoral luxury that it cannot afford is far from a new trope. Yet, considering
the previous two presidential elections its persistence might seem surprising. This chapter
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seeks to situate the logic and consequences of dueling impulses in the contemporary
Democratic Party as a national organization. Efforts to build a Democratic Party
apparatus that links the party to a coherent electorate over the period in focus have been
bolstered by a successful national mobilization strategy in two presidential elections. This
success was facilitated by steady demographic shifts in favor of underrepresented yet
strongly Democratic elements of the electorate. Further advancing these opportunities
was the rapid development of new digital tools that made identifying and communicating
with both potential voters, and the activists to mobilize them, exponentially more
efficient. Yet despite these developments, the party remains constrained by fragmentation
deeply embedded in the American party system.
On a national level, incongruity remains a function of a presidential majority
coalition never fully transitioned into a party-wide resource. An analysis of Obama as a
“party builder” can point to the success of a coherent two-time presidential electorate.
Yet this coalition could not be sustained for midterms or policy advocacy over this
period. While the Obama campaigns did seem to identify, and mobilize, a long
anticipated Democratic majority electorate, its failure at institutionalization can be traced
to an inability to mediate party tensions and build strategic coherence through national
organizations. Neither the Obama brand, nor organizational infrastructure, was a
powerful enough force to mobilize such a coalition outside of presidential election years.
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Table 2.1: 2004-2014 Federal election results. Presidential Electoral votes, House of
Representatives totals, Senate totals (whole senate make up after each election)
Dem
Year
EV
2004 251
2006
2008 365
2010
2012 332
2014

Rep
EV
286
173
206

Dem
House
202
233
257
193
201
188

Rep
House
232
202
178
242
234
247

Dem
Senate*
45
51
59
53
55
46

Rep
Senate
55
49
41
47
45
54

*Includes Independents who caucus as Democrats

This chapter will describe the development of the organizational strategy of the
Obama presidential campaigns, and the efforts to institutionalize an apparatus that could
mobilize the Obama electorate on a durable basis. Further, it will situate this within the
broader framework of systematic party fragmentation and attempts to overcome it. This
can be analyzed, to borrow from the American Political Development literature,60 as an
intercurrent relationship between newer forces that suggest a stronger, more coherent
party, and deeply embedded structural hurdles that have so far inhibited these forces from
reaching maturation. In the American system, even in moments in which incentives
toward party building seem apparent, party organizations must deal with centrifugal
fragmenting forces. These reflect complicated multi-dimensional mechanisms, difficult to
untangle.
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A Structural Explanation for Party Fragmentation
In the American system, parties are weak as brokers of coherent majoritarian
preferences. This is not an accident, but a reflection of an institutional design that uses
elections and government to fragment national coalitions by creating a set of hurdles to
their rule. One might conceive of this fragmentation as existing across two dimensions:
(1) horizontal- representing coalitional/factional tensions inherent in a ‘big tent’ major
party of a large and diffuse republic, and (2) vertical- the disjuncture of institutional
logics within the party in a system characterized by separation of powers and federalism.
Specifically: the imperatives of state (and local) parties, national ones, and constituent
politicians, may differ as they operate under different regulatory regimes and often over
different election cycles.
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Figure 2.1: Axis of Fragmentation

Horizontal fragmentation is a result of the diverse interests accommodated in a
majority political coalition. In a winner-take-all system such as the United States, major
political parties must aggregate the interests of broad coalitions, both programmatically
and though the political identity associated with the party brand.61 Crosscutting material,
ethno-cultural, and sectional tensions must be reconciled within a national political
coalition. The difficulty of achieving this in a long-term equilibrium position has
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historically weakened party coherence;62 and consequently the incentive to create a
national apparatus focused on mobilizing such an electorate. Politicians will not want to
put resources into the hands of a national party, if there is not broad coherence in the
party coalition. Therefore, historically the locus of strong party organizations such as
urban machines, have been at the local level, where electorates tend to be somewhat less
unruly. 63

Presiden5al(Year(
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Na5onal(Party(
Liberal(
North(
Black(
Unions(
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((((((South(
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(

Figure 2.2: Democratic Intra-Party Cleavages
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Even at the height of New Deal Democratic Party dominance, the party
necessarily had to assimilate its northern urban liberal wing with its Dixiecrat southern
faction. FDR tried—and failed—to nationalize the party by attempting to primary and
pressure undependable southern Democrats.64 While the partisan realignment of the
south65 has created a more rationally (and responsibly) sorted party, a majority party in a
nation so large and diverse is likely to be burdened with factional tension. Championing a
party apparatus that can give a party power to govern, rather than simple protection of
member politicians’ idiosyncratic coalitions, would be dependent on broad agreement
within the various party factions that their interests are served by sacrificing autonomy
for the possibility of programmatic control of government.
The vertical axis is a function of fragmentation of government and electoral
representative institutions themselves. Even if a party is ideologically and
programmatically coherent, staggered election cycles and differing campaign finance
laws surround each level of government, creating different strategic priorities for party
politicians. For example: a party organization structured to prime turnout for quadrennial
presidential elections does little to suit the needs of vulnerable congressional members
who face midterm elections, as well as the overwhelming number of state and local
officials not on the presidential clock. The federal patchwork of electioneering laws
creates firewalls between coordination and resources of federal and state candidates.

64

Katznelson, Ira. Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time. WW Norton &
Company, 2013.
65
Magleby, David B., Candice J. Nelson, and Mark C. Westlye. "The Myth of the Independent
Voter Revisited." Facing the Challenge of Democracy: Explorations in the Analysis of Public
Opinion and Political Participation (2011): 238-266.

52

Expenses such as palm cards paid for with state party money cannot legally feature
federal candidates.
These crosscutting dimensions of fragmentation create a powerful bulwark
against national organization: as party politicians, both as factions and individuals, will
be hesitant to focus on resource construction through a singular apparatus. Even in a
political environment where high turnout elections appear both feasible and to heavily
advantage the Democratic Party, as the period of the Obama presidency demonstrates,
significant challenges remain to aligning the priorities of Democratic politicians
operating under divergent institutional logics.

Background: The Fall of the New Deal Coalition and the Rise of the Two Electorates
From a bird’s eye view, the federal elections of 2008-2014 represent the
crystallization of the “two electorates”66 thesis in American politics. Indeed, binaries do,
and always have, permeated American politics. We have two parties as a response to
institutional conditions. Progressive politicians have often referred to “two America’s” as
a reflection of economic inequality. One could perhaps even view the two electorates as
mediating these other binaries. Those disadvantaged remain only partially included in the
polity. They are more difficult for political actors to mobilize, and are therefore left with
less influence on government.
The idea of two consolidated coherent electorates occupying the same moment,
but coming to the fore at different junctures of the electoral cycle, puts a twist on
traditional conceptions of parties as democratizing mechanisms. Schattschneider’s
66
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classical allegory of the political “street fight,” presents the crowd’s behavior and
willingness to enter this fight as determinative of political outcomes:
The spectators are an integral part of the situation, for, as likely as not, the
audience determines the outcome of the fight. The crowd is loaded with
portentousness because it is apt to be a hundred times as large as the
fighting minority, and the relations between the audience and combatants
are highly unstable. Like all other chain reactions a fight is contained. To
understand any conflict it is necessary therefore, to keep constantly in
mind the relations between the combatants and the audience because the
audience is likely to do all types of things that determine the outcome of
the fight.
…the outcome of every conflict is determined by the extent to which the
audience becomes involved in it. 67
We might however imagine this phenomenon as leading to an equilibrium with a
critical percentage of the citizenry with ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of this street fight.
For party leadership, the central question persists as to whether efforts should be spent
attempting to bring both feet in or disassociating from this group in search of more
dependable brawlers. Systematic fragmentation does not just operate exogenously acting
as a bulwark against majoritarian rule, but though creating disparate institutional logics
internally among party actors, frustrating the development of party infrastructure as a
mobilization tool. It’s not just that our system prevents a majority coalition from easily
controlling government, but that the system’s incentives dissuade an internally coherent
and consistent view of who is in the majority and the mechanisms necessary to maintain
it.
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Table 2.2: Turnout and vote share of overall turnout
Year
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014

Turnout
55.3
37.1
56.8
37.8
53.6
36.3

Black
Share
11
10
13
10
13
12

Latino
Share
8
8
9
8
10
8

18-29
Share
17
12
18
11
19
13

If heightened attention to the two electorates is new, the outlines of this dynamic
are not. Underrepresentation of groups on the low end of the socio-economic spectrum
has been a persistent characteristic of American electoral politics, as is the exacerbation
of this tendency in lower salience elections.68 Yet what is striking about the period under
discussion is the sharpness of the correction during presidential years, contrasted with its
apparent minimal residual effect during midterm elections. Of further concern for
Democrats is evidence of a counter-reaction of more “moderate,” yet stable blocs of
voters, now increasingly aligned with Republicans.69 The consequence of this is the
consolidation of a presidential majority coalition rooted in poorer, non-white, and
younger subsections of the American populace: where aggregate levels of electoral
participation remain tenuous and unreplicated outside of presidential years.
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Table 2.3: Democratic share of the vote. Source: Kilgore (2014), CNN Exit Polls
Year
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014

Whites
41
47
43
37
39
38

Blacks
88
89
95
89
93
89

Latinos
53
69
67
60
71
62

18-29
54
66
66
55
60
54

65+
47
49
45
38
44
41

The coming of this electorate, now often referred to as the ‘Obama coalition,’
embodies the hopes of some and fears of others going back several decades. Anxieties
among Democrats have been prevalent since at least the civil rights and Great Society
reforms of the 1960’s. What would happen to the party that to paraphrase Lyndon
Johnson had “lost the south for a generation”? In place of this solid south, was a northern
party increasingly anchored programmatically in what was often euphemistically
described at the time as an “underclass”70 of undependable voters, and ideologically in a
“left” thought too far removed from the moderate center of American politics. Much of
intra-party contention in the 1980’s was a function of battles between those championing
these lower resourced constituent groups, and those who believed they were a liability
that would turn the Democrats into a permanent minority party. Tensions were a result of
multi-dimensional yet overlapping cleavages within the party involving race, class, and
region. Indeed, by this period, the New Deal coalition, based upon an American public
broadly supportive of the party as broker of an interventionist state, was falling apart.71
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Yet while these racial and ideological vulnerabilities affected the party’s national
hopes, the nature of American party fragmentation meant that individual Democratic
politicians would feel these pressures differently. Many Democrats anchored not just in
the south, but also the Sunbelt and mountain west regions, began to feel the party’s
national brand was toxic, yet Democrats in urban northern areas remained insulated from
such shifts in public opinion.72 These vulnerabilities were further exaggerated by the
newly emboldened role of interest groups, particularly business interests, through
Political Action Committees (PACs).73 One might expect business organization to view
the southern and more conservative wing of the party in relatively more favorable light
than northern liberals. Yet, business was less concerned with the politics of individual
members than with strategically leveraging resources to help Republicans win
congressional majorities, while currying at least relative favor with ‘safe’ Democrats who
they had little chance of upending. Business would therefore, often give perfunctory
financial support to safe Democratic liberals, while focusing their resources on the
eradication of the Democratic Party in the newly competitive south. This led to further
friction between an insulated liberal wing of the party, which had little to fear electorally
in representing the Democratic Great Society coalition, and a panicked conservative wing
whose constituents were turning away from the party’s national brand and facing the full
brunt of organized business interests’ political force.74
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By the 1980’s, the party experienced decline as a presidential coalition, yet still
maintained congressional majorities through an amalgamation of its safe northern wing
and durable (yet fading) bloc of southern incumbents. On a national level, the party was
linked to a coalition of underrepresented (poorer, non-white) and declining (unions)
segments of the electorate that neither had the votes nor resources to keep the party
competitive. Strategically, there was little consensus on how to return to a majority, and
who to blame for its failure. Some believed that the party had to regain working class
white “Reagan Democrats,” which could only occur by distancing the party from its
African-American base. Others, suggested a more business friendly party, a response to
the increased importance of big donor fundraising (and decline of unions) to electoral
campaigning. These factions looking to reinvent the party found an organizational outlet
in the burgeoning Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). In an influential paper
published by DLC-associated think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute, Elaine
Kamarck and William Galston accused traditional liberals of ‘evading’ the electoral
reality of the Democratic coalition as constructed:
Liberal fundamentalism refuses to adjust to changing circumstances by
adopting new means to achieve traditional ends. Instead it enshrines the
policies of the past two decades as sacrosanct and greets proposals for
change with moral outrage. Whether the issue is the working poor, racial
justice, educational excellence, our national defense, the liberal
fundamentalist position is always the same; pursue the policies of the past.
During its heyday, the liberal governing coalition brought together white
working-class voters and minorities with a smattering of professionals and
reformers. Over the past two decades however, liberal fundamentalism has
meant a coalition increasing dominated by minority groups and (white)
elites—a coalition viewed by the middle class as unsympathetic to its
58

interests and its values. The inescapable fact is that the national Democratic
Party is losing touch with the middle class, without whose solid support it
cannot hope to rebuild a presidential majority. Jimmy Carter forged his
1976 victory with the help of a majority of middle income voters, while
Michael Dukakis was able to win only 43 percent of this vital group.75

During this period the party experienced a related modal shift organizationally.76
Under the chairmanship of Ron Kirk, the DNC as a bricks and mortar organization
expanded as cultivation of business resources helped fill the party’s coffers.77 Yet this
new groundswell of funds did not bolster a centralized apparatus to mobilize base voters,
but was typically funneled to individual candidate campaigns for the purposes of
television advertising. Efforts concentrated on enlarging the party’s remaining base as a
share of the electorate through greater mobilization were most closely associated with
Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaigns of 1984 and 1988, and the associated growth of
the Rainbow coalition as a nexus of black and progressive forces within the party looking
to consolidate left-wing influence within it.78 Contrasted with Kamarck and Galston’s
calculus, was Jackson’s, seeing the party’s increasing diversity as a strength:
America is not like a blanket -- one piece of unbroken cloth, the same
color, the same texture, the same size. America is more like a quilt: many
patches, many pieces, many colors, many sizes, all woven and held
together by a common thread. The white, the Hispanic, the black, the
Arab, the Jew, the woman, the native American, the small farmer, the
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businessperson, the environmentalist, the peace activist, the young, the
old, the lesbian, the gay, and the disabled make up the American quilt.79

While this tension has never fully abated, it has been mediated by demographic
shifts that would appear to advantage those that comprised the Democratic base in the
coming decades. Most influential in arguing this was John Judis and Ruy Teixeira, with
claiming an “Emerging Democratic Majority”80 (EDM) also known as the “New
American Electorate,”81 (NAE) based on consolidating a coalition of non-whites and
upper-middle class social liberals (especially women), with segments of the party’s
traditional white working class base. While party’s national coalition was a losing one in
the 1980’s, long-term demographic drift would soon start to advantage Democrats if such
a coalition could be maintained:
As a result of the transition to postindustrial society, each of the
McGovern constituencies (women, professionals, and minorities) will
continue to grow as a percent of the electorate. And barring a sea change
in Republican politics, these constituencies will continue to vote
Democratic. Second of all, as post-industrial areas continue to grow, white
working-class and professional voters in these areas are likely to converge
on a worldview that is more compatible with Democrats than
Republicans…it is fair assume that if Democrats can consistently take
professional by 10 percent, keep 75 percent of the minority vote, and get
close to an even split of white working-class voters, they will have
achieved a new Democratic majority.82
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Yet how soon this would take hold, and how strong this would be, would depend
on the party’s ability to bring these groups percentage of the electorate in line with their
percentage of the voting age population. Questions remained about whether a party
anchored in the Democratic ‘base’ coalition could be depended on to turn out come
election time. From a mechanical perspective, the party’s shifts in the 1980’s left it
unequipped as an apparatus to pursue mobilization. The party was focused on the
nationalization of networks to move financial resources and staff in pursuit of campaign
strategies centered on mass media communication.83 Urban machines that used unions
and patronage to turnout the masses were shells of their former selves.84
Who would be the foot soldiers of this new mobilization effort? Political activism
in the United States had declined (at least in the institutional context), with remaining
activists loyal to specific issues rather than party.85 Effective mobilization efforts do not
come about overnight through a finger snap, but are a years-long process of identifying
voters on a precinct by precinct basis, building an activist infrastructure (volunteer or
otherwise) that can be depended on to efficiently and effectively assure voter turnout.
Even if a majority coalition did exist for Democrats somewhere in the farthest reaches of
the polity, it would still take years for the party built the capacity to locate it.86
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Dean as Prelude
The turn from vague exhortation in some corners of the party, to the actual
realization of such an apparatus finds its modern genesis in the 2004 election and the
primary candidacy of Howard Dean. In fact, the defeated presidential hopeful’s influence
on the story is far broader. While Dean’s presidential campaign failed, he and his staff
would play an integral role in diffusing his campaign’s innovations throughout the party.
Most directly he would continue to shape the Democratic Party’s response to this
changing political environment through his subsequent role as Democratic Party
chairman and the development and implementation of a “50 state strategy” of party
building over his tenure.
Dean’s campaign of 2004 was marked by his strong anti-war stance, making him
a darling of the party’s liberal activists. In a sense, his campaign could be viewed
dismissively, as another in a long line of insurgent flavor-of-the-month candidates,
characteristic of the long primary season, inevitably destined to fail once actual primary
voting began. Yet, even if this were the case, Dean’s run took place at a critical historical
moment that precipitated the invention of a swath of new campaign tactics ideal for a
candidate of his particular appeal. Dean’s, was the first campaign to use digital tools to
transition amorphous grassroots enthusiasm into concrete campaign resources. These
included using early social networking technology such as ‘Meetup’ to facilitate
organizational meetings of campaign supporters, as well and using the campaign’s email
“listserv” to solicit small donor contributions from its grassroots supporters. This was not
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just evident in the campaign’s innovations in communication, but in the understanding of
a potential voter universe, through the development of a dynamic digital voter file.87
Fundamental to this was a change in the communication environment of
campaigns that virtually eradicated costs of dynamic interaction with campaign
supporters, incentivizing their cultivation. That these techniques would be forged in a
Democratic primary campaign should not be a surprise. Policy differences between
primary candidates are often negligible. Elections will often be won or lost not so much
on programmatic differences, but campaigning: incentivizing experimenting with new
campaign tactics to produce marginal gains in efficiency.88
Dean spent much of early campaign season in the lead among Democratic
candidates in fundraising (thanks largely small donors89), media attention, and national
polling. However, his campaign faltered once the actual voting started, evident in his
poor showing in the Iowa caucus, from which the campaign never recovered. John Kerry,
the eventual nominee, who spent months before actual voting as a middle-of-the-pack
candidate in a crowded field, wound up quickly and easily wrapping up the nomination.
Veterans’ of Dean’s campaign believed that this was due to the campaign’s
misapplication of its digital tools. This technological focus came at the expense of more
traditional campaign fundamentals. According to Jeremy Bird, a Dean Field staffer who
would become a critical architect of OFA:
The technology is the net…but not necessarily the engine…when we try to
fit the strategy into the technology, I think we’ve also done a disservice to
87
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the work we’re trying to do. When we come up with a strategy and a
program and then we say what resources do we have to do this, I think
we’ve been more successful.90

There was an incongruity between simply amassing resources made possible by
digital campaigning, and transitioning these resources into effective campaign
communication. During the Iowa Caucuses Get out the Vote (GOTV) effort, Dean’s
“orange hat brigades” of young liberal volunteers who would descend on the farms of
Iowa, were particularly indicative of the campaign’s flawed approach. Despite their
enthusiasm, the cultural divide between these activists and Iowa caucus goers made them
poor campaign surrogates. As put by a journalist at the time:
Maybe it’s unfair to blame the hats, but put yourself in the boots of an
average Iowa Democrat a few days before the caucus. The campaign is so
intense that it has become a form of political harassment. Your phone
rings every 10 minutes with an automated robo-call on behalf of one
candidate or another. Your mailbox is jammed with political junk mail.
Then comes a knock on your door and there you find a couple of
committed campaigners from Park Slope or Noe Valley or Wicker Park
telling you that Howard Dean is your man. And they’re wearing these
really loud orange caps.91

This was exacerbated by haphazard voter data produced by these canvassing
efforts. Activists’ combination of enthusiasm and lack of training led to the reporting of
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overly optimistic measures of candidate support, distorting mobilization-targeting
efforts.92
Dean’s story did not end however in the snowy beginnings of 2004. The first
notable indicator of an important shift occurring was the transitioning of his electoral
campaign apparatus into a permanent organization, “Democracy for America” (DFA).
This organization was the first digitally facilitated post-campaign “bridge” organization:
attempting to take an ephemerally based campaign apparatus and transition it into a
permanent political force. While in some sense presaged by Camp Wellstone, an
outgrowth of Paul Wellstone’s senate campaign,93that effort focused on the diffusion of
campaign techniques on behalf of advocacy.94 DFA however, represented a pioneering
attempt to institutionalize a campaign activist network in a digital space. Before email,
the costs of keeping an activist base mobilized without a resource heavy, staff centered,
organization would seem nearly impossible. Yet once a campaign listserv is established,
maintaining communication with its cadre has almost no financial cost and with little
labor, allowing the potential to maintain organizational coherence and capacity.
Dean’s legacy on the party might be most pronounced in his tenure as chairman
of the DNC. In this role, he attempted to integrate the ethos of his campaign with the
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party’s national infrastructure. Dean ran his primary campaign stressing his insurgent
brand, positioning himself as a candidate taking on the party establishment. Yet
becoming DNC chair (when the party does not hold the presidency) is dependent upon
winning the support of state party chairs.95 These were the sorts of party insiders that
Dean spent his campaign railing against. Yet after another poor performance by
Democrats in 2004, many in the establishment were open to organizational change. Dean
consequentially, sold the state party leadership on a vision focused on building state party
infrastructure. He made his pitch as a fundamental shift away from the previous
chairmanship of Clinton era stalwart Terry McAuliffe. McAuliffe, who following and
expanding on the organizational model of Kirk, was a prodigious fundraiser, successful in
keeping Democratic campaign accounts competitive with their Republicans counterparts,
fostering even closer relationships to business donors. Yet, he spent little time on
building party infrastructure, especially in assisting struggling state party organizations.
Dean, however promised a ‘50 state strategy’ based upon funding state party hiring of
field and digital staff across every state in the nation. Dean made his case that party
fortunes are tied to assisting state parties in cultivating grassroots resources over the long
term by building durable activist leadership and networks. This should not just be
temporal organization based on short-term national electoral imperatives, but scaling
infrastructure across the country that will make the party regularly competitive from local
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elections on up. This marked the first deliberate contemporary attempt to move away
from a party-in-service model, to reinvigorate a more traditional party organizational
apparatus focused on a joint structure to serve the needs of the party team. Yet if this
marked an important shift in party architecture, it would be another presidential campaign
that would take the next step in scaling such an organization.

The Development of OFA
The organizational strategies deployed by Obama for America (OFA) built on
those developed by Dean and the party in 2004. Central was combining new digital
technologies with field methods based on relational organizing, traditionally associated
with community organizing groups such as Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). IAF
characterizes this strategy as based on the “golden rule”:
Never do for people what they can do for themselves. Applied to
organizing it means professional organizers should train leaders on how to
run action campaigns, not do it themselves. In practice organizers often
assist leaders. This way they help leaders grow, and avoid the risks of
costly mistakes.
The staff of most community organizations conduct campaigns
themselves, and give little time to developing new leaders. As a result
their member base gets smaller and smaller. By making the focus of staff
recruitment and training of leaders the IAF continually expands its
member base.96
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The large-scale adoption of such methods by electoral campaigns is a direct
response to a changing political environment. OFA’s implementation of relational
organizing techniques represents a strategic response to the need for building durable
activist-based resources where the traditional pathways for this have declined. Without
patronage or strong civic society organization to channel into political activism, the
campaign’s central challenge was to harness its groundswell of grassroots interest and
create durable bonds over the course of the election. Its fundraising prowess and
dependence on the mobilization of a non-traditional electorate, gave both the capacity
and necessity to construct such an apparatus. This strategy was based on upfront
investment in field staff, trained at not just managing voter contact operations, but using
relational organizing techniques to build the social bonds necessary to construct a durable
volunteer-based apparatus.97
This model was a response to intra-party competition in the 2008 Democratic
Party primary. The Hillary Clinton campaign had the loyalty of the Democratic Party
establishment, including party politicians and operatives, as well as an electorate
grounded demographically in groups likely to vote in a primary election.98 OFA then,
was incentivized to focus on mobilization among youth and African-Americans. These
were groups that Obama’s narrative generated tremendous enthusiasm amongst, yet were
traditionally underrepresented in the overall electorate, and even more so in primaries.
Such a fight had echoes of the intra-party coalitional wars of the 1980’s. Yet, Obama’s
campaign consequentially melded two insurgent factions within the party: The AfricanAmerican and left base associated with Jesse Jackson’s presidential runs, with the
97
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reformer wing of the primary associated with Gary Hart, Bill Bradley, and more recently
Howard Dean. Dean and his forbearers did not have the capacity, or any particular
incentive to move beyond the traditional primary electorate.99 By uniting these groups
into Obama’s primary coalition, Clinton’s advantages with a more stable primary
electorate could be overcome.100
OFA had the financial resources101 to make early and robust investments in field
and the participatory resources of its millions of supporters, most of whom had never
been political activists before. Having staff not just throw volunteers out on the streets
with clipboards, but develop social bonds within the campaign that could lead to durable
participation, as well volunteer based leadership capable of organizing sophisticated
campaign events themselves, could add exponential value, even over the course of a
single election.102
Fundamental to this OFA template was an early and capital-intensive devotion to
field organization, eventually developing a sophisticated organizing model. The role of
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the field organizer was transitioned from simply a recruiter and manager of voter contact
activities to the implementer of community organizations known as neighborhood teams
based on organizational modes (one on ones, house meetings, etc.) traditionally used by
IAF-style community organizers, not electoral campaigns. This template, prefigured by
Dean’s 2004 campaign, the further development of technology,103 as well as the tactical
evolution prompted by having experienced Dean’s mistakes, helped make these efforts
more effective. Why neighborhood teams? Community organizing after all is based on
long-term goals of organization building, whereas electoral politics is grounded in short
term imperatives, and the construction of transient and haphazard organization that
services the immediate election. Building durable social bonds would seem to be a poor
use of activist time in the short period of an electoral campaign, where there are always
doors to be knocked and phone calls to be made. One important lesson of the Dean
campaign however, was the importance of precision of volunteer voter contact as a
linkage between the campaign and voters. For campaigns to effectively use the data
produced to model their electoral universe, volunteers had to be trained to record accurate
results. Building effective mechanisms to diffuse such skills through durable volunteer
leadership was paramount.
Such strategies had a history in Democratic politics. Harvard professor Marshall
Ganz, a consultant to Dean and Obama campaigns, and a teacher and mentor to many
who played integral roles in developing the field organizations for both, has been
experimenting with using community organizing for grassroots electoral politics since
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Robert Kennedy’s California primary campaign in 1968.104 The neighborhood team
model itself, had its origins in Ganz’s work with organization behavioral scholar Ruth
Wageman and the Sierra Club between the 2004 and 2008 elections.105 A number of
recent developments however, have incentivized its systematic adaptation. In addition to
new forms of media, were the diminishing returns and bandwidth of traditional forms of
political communication.
While money in electoral politics continued to increase, the amount of television
advertising space and its utility could not continue to expand at a uniform pace.106 As a
result, campaigns would look for new ways to use their funds. The Dean campaign
advanced a model of cultivating activists, but OFA with its strategic necessity for
mobilization, and fundraising and activist numbers that quickly dwarfed even Dean,
believed that the most efficient path to mobilization was through channeling funds early
in the campaign season into field organization. Staff deployed to use relational organizing
techniques to build a formidable volunteer apparatus that could mobilize a non-traditional
coalition on Election Day.
To do this, OFA concentrated on early investments in field organization in the
all-important first set of primary states: Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South
Carolina.107 Iowa, with its difficult to navigate caucuses was especially important: as a

104

Berman, 2009. pp. 39-42.
Mckenna & Han 2012. p 58.
106
Gerber, Alan S., et al. "How Large and Long-Lasting are the Persuasive Effects of Televised
Campaign Ads? Results from a randomized field experiment." American Political Science Review
105.01 (2011): 135-150.
107
In the primary states, field organizing was still in its experimental stage. Relational models
were used in Iowa and South Carolina: the two ’early’ states in which Obama was victorious.
This success lead to the development and institutionalization of the model through the primaries,
and resulted in its focus through the general election.
105

71

well-developed field organization was needed to expand the caucus universe in this
traditionally low turnout process. Perhaps most striking when evaluating institutional
barriers to participation and OFA’s approach during primary season was their focus on
state caucuses. Traditionally, the complexities of the caucus process led campaigns, even
ones with high levels of grassroots enthusiasm, to eschew pursuing mass mobilization in
caucus states. OFA however, saw its combination of grassroots enthusiasm and
organizational sophistication as an opportunity to vastly increase turnout in these
caucuses and run up their lead in the delegate count.108 The higher the transaction costs of
participation, the more motivation OFA had to use its superior organization, here, higher
thresholds to participation were successfully navigated as a result of campaign
enthusiasm and an effective apparatus to mobilize it. In the all-important Iowa caucus for
example, Democratic turnout reached over 227,000, a near 50% increase from the record
established previously in the 2004 election.109

Table 2.4: Increase in youth (17-29) share of Democratic Primary/Caucus Turnout
in early states. *Nevada did not have exit polls conducted in 2004. Sources: Pew
Research, NBC Exit Polls, CNN Exit Polls.
State
Iowa
New Hampshire
Nevada*
South Carolina

2004
17
14
n/a
9

2008
22
18
13
14

Diff
5
4
n/a
5
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The cumulative result of turnout efforts during the primaries was dramatic. In
2004, overall Democratic primary turnout was approximately 16.1 million; in 2008, it
more than doubled to over 35 million. This included approximately 2% increases in the
share of African-American and Latino proportions of the electorate, and an over 5%
increase in the youth (17-29) share. Democratic primary turnout as a share of eligible
voters in primary states rose to highest point on record in 2008 at 19.5%. This was nearly
double the 9.5% who voted in 2004.110 While this was in part due to both Obama and
Clinton campaigns waging battle through nearly all 50 states before Clinton conceded,
the result of this was the mobilization of nearly half of the party’s projected vote totals in
the general election. This was an extraordinarily valuable down payment on the data and
GOTV apparatus necessary for the general election.

Table 2.5: 2008 Democratic Primary Early State Youth Vote (17-29) Preferences.
Sources Pew Research, NBC Exit Polls, CNN Exit Polls
State
Iowa
New Hampshire
Nevada
South Carolina

Obama Clinton
57
11
51
28
59
33
67
23

Diff
46
23
26
44

Schattschneider would be impressed. Here was an instance where in fact
competition does appear to overcome fragmentation, strengthening party resources and
expanding participation. Perhaps ironically, competition was not between parties, but
within a singular party. The horizontal domain of coalitional party fragmentation helped
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to expand the scope of conflict through a competitive electoral system. A competitive
primary gave two highly resourced campaigns the incentive to organize and mobilize
their targeted coalitions across primary states. At the time, it was feared that this
competition might depress general election turnout among Democrats. The rationale
being that its fraught nature might lead to the losing side’s supporters staying home, if not
defecting in large numbers come November.111 Yet, a highly competitive, high salience
primary in fact greatly helped bolster the party’s general election apparatus. Party voter
and activist files were strengthened through the primary season, as well as activist
networks given an important jumpstart. Classical party theory points to the cue of binary
competition between well-established party brands as essential mechanism of making
political decision-making understandable to the average person.112 Yet, even intra-party
competition, if robust, presents incentives and opportunity to expand the sphere.113
After the primaries, Obama field staff spent several weeks at Chicago
headquarters debriefing, discussing what worked and did not across the various states.
Methods pioneered during the primary, were instituted on a larger and more systematic
scale in the general election campaign.114 This included the neighborhood team model,
digital tools, and using new media for grassroots communication. OFA was now tasked
with increasing electoral turnout by tens of millions to win a general presidential election.
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Significant field staff focused on implementing neighborhood teams deployed to
battleground states by the early summer of 2008. These organizers used their relational
organizing model to build organizations that by November featured volunteer leadership
that could be depended on to run sophisticated GOTV operations through locally grown
teams, to mobilize among the Obama coalition at a much larger scale for the general
election.
Campaigns in recent resource-heavy presidential battleground states have
typically been run as coordinated campaigns (campaigns organized as joint ventures of
OFA, the DNC, and the respective state party), ostensibly on behalf of the entire party
slate of candidates. Coordinated efforts combined the presidential necessities of winning
a statewide popular majority, with the specific imperatives of the particular campaigns.
Neighborhood team boundaries were drawn around the needs of particular state parties
(e.g. in instances where winning the state senate was the highest state priority, staff
organizers were based in state senate regions). Yet, staff and strategy existed largely
independently of the preexisting state party infrastructure. State OFA organizations ran
through ‘Chicago,’ under the chain of command of OFA national. 115 Implicit is the
assumption that what was good for the top of the ticket would serve the electoral
prerogatives of all Democratic candidates. Indeed, success in 2008 and 2012 would seem
to support this point. Yet, this did not obviate tension on the vertical plane resulting from
institutional party fragmentation. OFA’s methods were foreign to many party veterans
and politicians. Organizational focus on a dynamic and precise set of voter targets
facilitated by ground level organizers often deviated from traditional forms of local
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outreach.116 This aroused suspicion by among many in the party’s old guard. National
presidential campaign resources were largely no-strings-attached patronage, not as
handfuls of young out-of-state organizers with laptops and team building metrics.
While it would be hard to quantify the value added by neighborhood teams, it is
difficult to argue with the overall electoral results. Obama’s victory was predicated on
raising turnout to its highest percentage in decades. Exit polls suggest that turnout
increased among traditionally underrepresented groups such as non-whites, youth, and
economically downscale voters.117 Internal campaign records and independent polling
further suggest that the numbers of voters contacted by campaigns was also significantly
increased compared to recent elections.118
Obama’s victory appeared to have strong coattails for the party, at least on a
federal level. Democrats won seven seats in the Senate and twenty-one in the House. In
no state that Obama carried did Democrats lose a Senate seat or race with a nonincumbent, or suffer a net loss in House representation.

Democratic Victory, but Governance?
After the 2008 election, as is common practice, the Obama constellation took
control of the Democratic National Committee. Former Virginia governor Tim Kaine, an
early supporter and friend of the president, replaced Howard Dean as committee
chairman. Most organizationally consequential was the canceling of Dean’s 50 state
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project. This was replaced with “Organizing for America” (OFA 2.0), led by two OFA
field veterans Mitch Stewart and Jeremy Bird. The ostensible purpose of OFA 2.0 was to
transition the grassroots campaign organization created for the presidential race, for the
purposes of advocating for the president’s agenda, electoral mobilization, and broader
civil society projects.119 The decision to house this project under the DNC reflected a
commitment to connect the Obama organization to the durable institutions of the party. If
the volunteer-based field apparatus of the presidential campaign could be institutionalized
within the party, it would have enormous impact on party resources and subsequently
electoral outcomes in campaign years to come, or so it was thought.
Decisions about OFA 2.0’s structure were acrimonious. In one of the few
journalistic accounts of its inception period, such in-the-moment tensions were
illustrated. Tim Dickenson described the centrality of campaign manager David Plouffe
in the decision to move OFA 2.0 inside the DNC:
Steve Hildebrand, Obama's deputy campaign manager, tried to dissuade
Plouffe. "The DNC is a political entity," he says. "Senators who you are
going to need to put significant pressure on to deliver change — like Ben
Nelson of Nebraska, who was opposed to health care reform — are voting
members of the DNC. It limited how aggressive you could be."
Hildebrand pushed Plouffe to make "Obama 2.0" an independent
nonprofit, similar to FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity, the
right-wing instigators of the Tea Party uprising. Free from the party
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apparatus, Hildebrand argued, the group could raise unlimited funds and
"put enough pressure on conservative Democrats to keep them in line."
But Plouffe was resolute. Obama was troubled by the prospect of bigdollar donors driving an independent nonprofit, and the DNC offered a
ready infrastructure and fewer legal hurdles. "The president is a
Democrat," says Stewart, a veteran of Obama's victory in Iowa who took
over from Plouffe as OFA's director. "It would be very hard to explain
why Obama's grass-roots field team is not housed with his party."120

The move from the 50 state project to OFA 2.0 marked an important shift in
national party infrastructure building. Ostensibly, both projects simultaneous operation
would seem redundant, as OFA 2.0 planned to operate in every state (contingent on
meeting projected fundraising goals) with levels higher than under Dean. The promise of
OFA 2.0 was an attempt to institutionalize a much broader grassroots activist base within
the party. While Dean gave state parties resources previously deprived, vast grassroots
enthusiasm was not among them. OFA 2.0 presented the potential for party building in a
hurry, if it could successfully transition the campaign infrastructure to the party.
Despite (or perhaps because of) Democratic victory, suspicions endured. Indeed,
what could be viewed as the “shock therapy”121 of the OFA-party transition brought back
to the fore both horizontal and vertical domains of party fragmentation. Coalitional and
strategic tensions that endured caused unease among loyalists of both the president and
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the party. Unsurprisingly, Obama’s victory meant that when push comes to shove, it
would be his coalition –on both horizontal and vertical planes—that took priority. Yet
party coherence still required out of power factions to buy in, as their defection
organizationally (and programmatically) could still weaken the party.
Even if the Obama coalition became the strategic driver of the party on a national
level, this did not necessarily alleviate suspicions of the party brand and its institutional
vessels among rank and file Obama supporters. These activists’ enthusiasm and
continued participation was integral for OFA 2.0. Grievances persisted among the party
establishment as well, as the president’s victory took power away from the state party
chairs and their priorities. Party tensions seemed inevitable as in a world of finite
resources, disparate party actors all operating under different institutional logics will be
difficult to satisfy.
The electorate of 2008 ushered a coalition that was young and non-white to the
center of the party, along with non-institutionally organized liberal activists. This
coalition was linked to a new congressional class that successfully rode Obama’s coattails
through OFA’s mobilization efforts. Outside of this were many established party actors
aligned with Clinton’s primary coalition, along with state party leadership. These ‘losing’
factions overlap, yet were not the same. While many members of state party leadership
cut their political teeth during the Clinton years, Dean’s instillation as DNC chair was in
part a rejection of the McAuliffe/Clinton model of party organization. State party
leadership wanted infrastructure (and control of it), not just money funneled to candidate
campaigns. The aftermath of the 2008 elections presented a significant opportunity to
take another major step toward the reemergence of state parties. Data cultivated across
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the nation in a highly competitive 50 state primary cheered by party organizations finally
showing some signs of life after Dean’s reign. Yet abstract commitment to party building
is not necessarily enough to bring a disparate set of national factions, with histories of not
always seeing eye to eye, together. As one state party operative put it:
The (incumbent Democratic) governors didn’t endorse [Obama in the
primary], so the relationship wasn’t there, the trust wasn’t there to begin
with. They [state parties] felt like they were on the outs and [the
administration and OFA] wasn’t sensitive to their concerns…that was the
perception, was there merit to it? There was probably blame to go around.
Again though, it’s about relationships, communication. That wasn’t
always there. You could argue over whose lap that falls into, but I don’t
think in the early days (of Obama’s presidency) there was a sense of what
the states need (from the DNC)122

The 50-state plan hoped to win gradual consensus among divergent party actors.
To show that the DNC was there to serve their needs in good faith, OFA 2.0 as an
alternative structure presented a new dynamic in national-state party relationships. Its
staff would fall under the chain of command of the DNC, with state party leadership
having no formal control and little in the way of influence over strategic and staffing
decisions within their states. Despite commitment to 50 state staffing, the pace and scale
of this seemed to suggest a bias toward presidential battleground states, especially when
compared to Dean’s tenure.
This felt like a lost opportunity for state parties. Even in non-battleground states,
highly competitive primaries and the excitement around Obama’s general election
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campaign were a tremendous boon for state parties’ data files and organizational
resources. Party databases benefitted from the flurry of new activists and voters. Even in
non-competitive states, OFA had a presence. While they did not run the type of capitalintensive field program of neighborhood team building indicative of battleground states,
staff and grassroots enthusiasm still had campaign offices overflowing with volunteers
ready to call (and travel) into battleground areas. Yet for parties struggling financially, a
lack of post-campaign funds made cultivating these new resources continually difficult.
What effect the maintaining of 50 state organization would have had remains unclear, but
its absence and the subsequent sense of a missed chance to build locally, increased
friction between party stalwarts and the new national regime.
Presidential victory transferred control of the party from a proxy of the
aggregated interests of the state parties and individual federal politicians to the
presidential national standard-bearer, shifting institutional priorities along with it. Instead
of the building of state infrastructure, prioritization went to efforts to consolidate the
party’s new presidential majority coalition. Because OFA largely subverted the Clintonleaning state based party infrastructure in the primary, this exacerbated still simmering
tensions. Dean navigated the implementation of insurgent techniques by putting
organizing efforts under the discretion of establishment party actors. OFA 2.0 however,
appeared less as a complementary organization, and more as a potential colonizing force,
with little in the way of formal linkage to state party organization.
Even from congressional Democrats’ perspective, the decision to house OFA 2.0
within the DNC--the chief organization nationally dedicated to the election of
Democrats-- could be seen as a disturbing broadening of its organizational mission. If the
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DNC morphed into a lobbying arm of the president, resources previously dedicated to
electing candidates might now instead potentially bully members into supporting the
president’s agenda. While the party’s legislative caucus was not a safe majority coalition,
let alone a governing one, most of its members (including many of its most senior and
powerful ones) had the benefit of safe seats. This would suggest little interest on their
part in reinventing the traditional vessels of party organization.
Everyone had reason to be distrustful of the potential implications of building
party coherence through an Obama-led DNC, especially when electoral victory gave all
party factions seeming proximity to power and their goals. This trepidation was present
among many Obama activists who were skeptical of the Democratic Party brand, and of
devoting their efforts broadly to its support.123 The Obama campaign’s rhetoric of change
portrayed itself against a political establishment that for many of its supporters included a
Democratic Party that had grown stale. That was at best ambivalent, and at worst
resistant, toward the Obama coalition. Memories of a Democratic organization that was
largely hostile to Obama and his coalition in the primary, and at times lukewarm even
during the general election were still fresh. Moving the organization within the party ran
the risk of having it coopted by the ‘establishment’ it spent much of the campaign
framing itself in opposition of.
Beyond broad unease over the possible ramifications of the OFA-DNC merger
was the difficulty of getting OFA 2.0 off the ground. After announcing in January of
2009, the organization struggled with fundraising out of the gate. Campaign donors,
already fatigued from the election, were asked first to contribute to the ornate first
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inaugural rather than funding OFA 2.0. With the campaign organization having gone
largely ‘dark’ in the post-election period until after the inauguration, organizational
momentum among campaign activists had come to a halt. Only skeleton staffs appeared
in many states until well into the summer of 2009, by which time many activist networks
were long dormant.
Fragmentation was not limited to the organizational face of the party. It did not
take very long for splits to emerge within the party caucus of the 111th congress. The
Republican Party responded to their losses by becoming a disciplined opposition party
singularly focused on obstructing the Democrats agenda. Even traditionally moderate
Republicans, thought to be unlikely to engage in procedural gamesmanship or be overly
hostile to the new agenda, quickly cowed to party leadership and the reemerging
conservative activist base exemplified in the Tea Party movement. In the case of Arlen
Specter, a long serving Pennsylvania moderate, this pressure led to his abandonment of
the Republican Party, giving the Democrats a 60-vote “supermajority,” in the senate.124
With the parties polarized, even on procedural issues, Democrats would have to
count on equivalent unity within their party. Any piece of significant legislation would be
subject to forty de facto Republican votes against cloture. The consequences of this were
effectively turning every Democratic senator into a veto player, as any singular defection
before a bill reached the floor would lead to its doom. A number of the party’s more
moderate to conservative senators signaled a willingness to defect from the party on
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necessary procedural votes if programmatic and/or patronage based concessions were not
granted in the legislation.
These tensions culminated in the yearlong wrangling over the signature legislative
accomplishment of the Obama presidency: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (known commonly as the ACA). The battle over the ACA crystalized this new
balance of power in the party caucus, where the party’s moderate outliers leveraged their
individual veto power, curtailing both the scope of the bill and slowing down the
legislative process. Glacial pace of legislative movement made the bill particularly
vulnerable to media distortion. This not only affected the legislation’s public popularity,
but became an important rallying point for the then burgeoning Tea Party movement.
From Aldrich’s conception of party strength, even with supermajority status, Democrats
appeared weak as a caucus that could solve the social choice problems of its members.
Rogue Democratic senators were neither beholden to the party brand, nor its
organizational resources, and had little incentive to usher the bill through to protect the
popularity of the president and generic Democratic brand. These senators instead chose to
emphasize an image that stressed independence from the national party, and cultivated
resources from as an idiosyncratic amalgamation of groups, many of which were
ambivalent, if not outright hostile to the party and its constituency’s broad agenda.125
While the Tea Party emerged on the right, grassroots activism on the left was
disappointing during this period. OFA 2.0 fell short of having the transformative effect
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on the legislative process that Democrats had hoped. Activists met the transition to issuebased campaigning with lukewarm support.126 Electoral work uses a clear objective with
a defined date. Issue-based organization however, must react to a convoluted legislative
process with many key decisions opaque to ordinary people. While OFA 2.0 attempted to
use its still massive email list in support of the ACA and other high profile items on the
president’s agenda, it did not distinguish itself within the patchwork of interest groups
within their coalition, and fell short of the transformative political organization hoped for
in the wake of the 2008 election. Strategic tensions between OFA activists, the White
House, and the party came to the fore. It was reported that when activists approached
white house Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel to pressure conservative Democrats, he
retorted "We won't give you call lists. We can't go after Democrats — we're part of the
DNC."127 When OFA 2.0 did run ads lobbying Democrats to support the ACA, it received
quick rebuke from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid: "It's a waste of money to have
Democrats running ads against Democrats."128
OFA 2.0, as a proxy for the party, appeared to be in a difficult position. As a
party organization, it was stuck between the white house and congress, grassroots
activists and politicians, party building and legislative advocacy. Consistent Republican
intransigence left no margin for defection among Democrats, putting intra-party tensions
at the fore of the legislative process. Under such conditions, an organization
institutionally tasked with representing all of these actors has a near impossible mission.
Ultimately facing such challenges, it was unable to capture the sort of enthusiasm and
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political resources of the campaign within the national organization of the Democratic
Party, even for its most pitched legislative battles.129
Conditional party government scholars have claimed increasing coherence of
parties in the legislature since the 1970’s.130 As polarization has increased, officeholders’ goals are consequently more closely tied to the partisan composition of the
legislature. Indeed, over this period, legislative behavior increasingly patterned itself on
party blocs, with strategy emanating from party leadership. Yet legislative coherence
does not solve the incredibly complex coordination problems of electoral organization.
Whereas office-holders unified programmatically can have compatible strategies in the
legislative context, when constructing electoral organization, institutional fragmentation
still puts politicians on different planes. Resource construction is highly idiosyncratic and
uneven. Whereas parties-in-the legislature brings office-holders together, party electoral
organization is still subject to disparate actors, operatives, activists, and political cultures.
These are not easily bridged.

The 2010 Midterms: A Return to Form
The 2010 midterm elections saw the voter universe regressing to “normal”
levels, as the ascendant elements of the Obama coalition stayed home on Election Day. A
still sputtering economy and dissatisfaction with the legislative process, especially of the
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ACA, appeared to move independent voters into the Republican column, as an antiincumbent mood prevailed.131 Yet evidence is not clear to what extent Republican victory
was a result of independent voters breaking for Republicans as opposed to the
consolidation of a Republican electorate based on older, whiter, richer voters that are
more likely to turn out in midterm elections. Disconcerting for Democrats was how the
negative political environment dampened enthusiasm among sporadic Democratic voters.
From a social-psychological outlook on voting behavior, seeing Obama under fire and the
party seemingly being ineffectual from a political and policy standpoint, altered
perception of the efficacy of participation in electoral politics.132 Explanations of
enthusiasm levels being weaker among the presidents’ party has historically at least
partly explained the difficulties of a presidential party in midterm elections.133 It would
follow that if that incumbent coalition is especially dependent on a non-consolidated
electorate, the effects will be more pronounced.
Whereas Obama’s approval rating was overall mixed, he remained popular still
with self-identified Democrats. Polling showed large discrepancies between approval
rates of Obama among registered voters, and those who would vote in the 2010 midterms.
Per the Pew survey taken in the lead up to the midterm: Republicans were favored 46-42
among registered voters, but 50-40 among likely voters. Obama’s approval also reflected
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this trend as his approval/disapproval was -4 (44-48) among registered voters, but -9
among likely voters. Further illustrating a still pronounced bias among those in the
electorate compared to the unregistered, Obama’s approval was actually +1 (46-45) in the
general public.134 Whereas for Republicans, the midterms stood as a referendum on
Obama, sporadic Democrats did not view the election with similar salience. From a
programmatic standpoint, the ACA, passed but not implemented, was a rallying cry for
conservatives, and yet had not developed a coalition of stakeholders ready to defend it at
the polls.135
Could these losses have been mitigated by the construction of an organizational
apparatus on par with 2008? Social-psychological effects are not simply limited to voters.
A negative climate is likely to have the same adverse effect on organizational resources
as it does on base voter attitudes. Activists will be less likely to contribute money and
time for the same reasons that sporadic voters will be less likely to show up at the polls.
This vulnerability will only increase when resource networks are not consolidated. For
example, an activist who turns out to canvass for Democrats habitually from election to
election is less likely influenced by the idiosyncratic dynamics of a specific election year,
than someone whose first effort in activism was in the previous election. If salience is
consistently lower during non-presidential years, an organizational apparatus dependent
on an irregular volunteer base will be more vulnerable to losses, than was true historically
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when participation was motivated by patronage or union activism. Notably, two states
that bucked national trends were Colorado and Nevada, which both celebrated statewide
top of the ticket victories. Both states were presidential battlegrounds, which then had
competitive 2010 races. As a result, these states had the resources to build on the
infrastructure established in 2008.
Yet nationally, the party in 2010 was not able to reconstitute the apparatus of
2008. Financially Democrats lagged behind Republicans, even more so with Independent
Expenditure (IE) money factored in.136 On the upside Democrats reported a near doubling
of campaign contact form 2006, yet this still fell far short of OFA’s 2008 efforts.137 OFA
2.0’s volunteer apparatus was not a major factor, never reestablishing the scope of its
2008 operations and mobilization capacity. Party-wide mobilization efforts ran through
the under-realized reconstruction of the OFA apparatus. By August, OFA 2.0 volunteers
had knocked on 200,000 doors, one-tenth of the total at the same point in 2008.138
Losses however exacerbated accusations within the party that OFA 2.0 was less
concerned with transitioning the Obama organization to the party broadly, than
subordinating party mechanisms to the narrow electoral prerogatives of the president.
Over half the DNC budget for the 2010 campaign was under OFA 2.0. This was seen by
some in the party less as an effort to mobilize voters in 2010, than as a backdoor
abdication of efforts to stem midterm losses, to bolster infrastructure for the coming 2012
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presidential race.139 The emergence of the Obama coalition seemed to arouse suspicions
that those not on the right electoral clock could be abandoned by party organization now
acting as a proxy of a quadrennial presidential coalition.
The 2008 and 2010 dichotomy illustrates the crystallization of the twoelectorate’s theory. Causal impact can be broken down to two separate (yet far from
mutually exclusive) variables. One social psychological, with organizational decline
echoing voter turnout: lower salience and a negative political environment made activists
less likely to build the apparatus, and voters less likely to vote, creating a mutually
reinforcing dynamic that depressed Democratic turnout. The other is mechanical: based
upon the institutional logics of vertical fragmentation. A presidentially-led party will
prioritize the quadrennial presidential year over alternative party priorities-- including its
midterm election year performance.
While congressional Democratic losses were the loudest cause of despair at the
time, perhaps most far reaching was how down ticket Republican success altered the
partisan composition of state governments. In 2010, Republicans gained full control of 11
new state legislatures, bringing their total to 25, their highest since 1952.140 Such losses
would be especially costly for Democrats with post-census legislative redistricting
immanent. As it would turn out, Republican success at the state level was not just the
happy coincidence of a national wave election. Republicans embarked on a under the
radar state legislative strategy known as REDMAP, attempting to maximize victories in
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state government and increase advantage over redistricting. According to journalist David
Daley, who has tracked REDMAP closely:
The idea was that you could take a state like Ohio, for example. In 2008,
the Democrats held a majority in the statehouse of 53-46. What RedMap
does is they identify and target six specific statehouse seats. They spend
$1 million on these races, which is an unheard of amount of money
coming into a statehouse race. Republicans win five of these. They take
control of the Statehouse in Ohio - also, the state Senate that year. And it
gives them, essentially, a veto-proof run of the entire re-districting in the
state.
So in 2012, when Barack Obama wins again and he wins Ohio again, and
Sherrod Brown is re-elected to the Senate by 325,000 votes, the
Democrats get more votes in statehouse races than the Republicans. But
the lines were drawn so perfectly that the Republicans held a 60-39
supermajority in the House of Representatives, despite having fewer
votes.141
Republican control of redistricting would lead to advantageous maps for the
GOP, as well as reducing local competition through the drawing of more safe districts.
This would have indirect but important consequences on party building, as later chapters
will discuss. Most immediately pertinent however would be an increasingly uphill battle
for Democrats to regain the House. There is evidence that the role of gerrymandering in
the decline of competitive seats has been overstated. Most notable is Bill Bishop’s
persuasive analysis of increasing voluntary self-clustering of socially and politically like-
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minded people.142 Yet while it may be true that geographic clustering is the main driver
of competitive decline, this does not suggest that political actors do not use the
redistricting process to compound the effect of growing partisan geographic coherence.143
As REDMAP illustrates, strategies directed toward marginal shifts in districts can have
outsized impact on representation, as well as party/candidate incentives.

2012: The Obama Coalition Remerges
After 2010, anxieties were high that the 2008 coalition was an aberration based
upon the historic nature of Obama’s campaign to be the first black president, imperiling
both his and the Democrats chances in 2012. Yet, the 2012 election would once again see
Obama victorious successfully remobilizing his 2008 coalition. In some ways, this was an
even more impressive organizational accomplishment. The enthusiasm level of the 2008
race was no longer apparent. Further evidence of this being an organizational victory is
suggested in the disparity in turnout between battleground states and “safe” states: which
did not get the benefit of resource intensive field campaigns.
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Table 2.6: 2008 and 2012 Turnout Disparity. Source: Obama for America.

Whereas overall electoral turnout declined from four years earlier, battleground
states actually experienced a modest increase. Voter contact once again had reached an
all-time high.144 OFA trumpeted that 2.2 million volunteers had been scheduled for
GOTV—an 80% increase from 2008.145 Despite this, impressionistic evidence suggests
that neighborhood teams were not as robust as they were in 2012. The increase in voter
contact is a product of the development of more sophisticated and user-friendly digital
technologies, specifically call tools that allowed out of state volunteers to call voters in
battleground states easily through their computers without having to visit a campaign
office. 146
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Table 2.7: 2012 OFA voter contact. Source: Obama for America.

The reconstitution of a high resource mobilization apparatus helped down-ticket
Democratic fortunes as Obama vote totals replicated across federal elections. This led to
Democratic gains in Congress. Yet 2010 redistricting helped protect Republicans,
minimizing losses in the House. Redistricting further exacerbated vertical fragmentation
within the party, as even in presidential years, congressional gerrymandering can dampen
the advantage of base mobilization in House races. If districts are uncompetitive, even
significant turnout increases cannot put seats in play.
One major shift in Democratic campaigning during 2012 was an embrace of
Super PACs. This marked a dramatic departure from 2008 and 2010, when donors were
generally discouraged from giving to non-coordinated vehicles. Resisting such vessels
could be tempting, and not just as protest. After the Supreme Court’s loosening of
campaign finance rules on non-coordinated electioneering in the Citizens United and
Speechnow decisions, there were still strategic reasons for hesitancy to embrace Super
PACs. While Super PACs (and other forms of dark money campaigning through
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nonprofit organizations) have relatively few financial restrictions, coordination firewalls
between such organizations, candidates, and parties are strict. This sort of fragmentation
has little downside in regards to paid media, yet pursuing voter mobilization through a
fragmented organizational structure can lead to redundancy and inefficiencies. This was
the case in 2004 where battleground states were flooded with 527 organizations dedicated
to mobilizing Democrats, but were outflanked by a more centralized and efficient
Republican operation.147
OFA discouraged sympathetic organizations from doing supplemental field
campaigning in 2008, believing that building a coherent voter file and volunteer
apparatus through explicit coordinated campaign organization was the most effective way
to do mobilization. While field efforts were successful in ’08, a massive upswing in IE
spending by Republicans in 2010 was due at least partial credit for their electoral
success.148 In response, the Democrats were more open to the strategic use of Super PAC
campaigns in 2012,149 including the Obama-led Priorities USA and AFL-CIO backed
Workers United, complimenting OFA efforts. While viewed as necessary to keep up with
Republicans, such organizations created another level of fragmentation within the party,
instituting a number of high resource electoral vessels that would not be able to
coordinate.
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After the 2012 election, the presidential electoral campaign apparatus (OFA
3.0) restructured into a 501(c)4, dubbed Organizing for Action (OFA 4.0). Eschewing a
party organization,150 the hope that a focus on maintaining activist networks would
eventually translate into party electoral resources. Restructuring was premised on a hope
that freeing OFA from the restrictions of a party brand many activists still viewed with
suspicion, as well as the fundraising limits placed on party organization, activist networks
could be more easily maintained. Under OFA 4.0’s status, the organization be freer to
raise large sums of money, as to expand their staff support of activists. Activists would be
more attracted to participate, by having more influence over the issues, with control
devolving to local volunteer leadership. While the ambition was that by keeping these
networks active they could be channeled back into electoral politics, OFA 4.0 marked an
explicit retreat from the task of institutionalizing the Obama apparatus within the
Democratic Party. Yet on a systematic basis, this strategy has appeared to be
unsuccessful. OFA 4.0 has also struggled like 2.0 to maintain activist networks as well as
the financial resources necessary to induce participation.151
Despite intra-party tensions, the roots of these struggles remain a bit puzzling.
Obama activists tend to be ideologically committed to the articulated programmatic
agenda of the Democratic Party.152 Activists appear motivated by more than just a cult of
personality, as they articulate a largely coherent set of policy preferences as well as being
demographically rooted in the party’s emerging electoral coalition. Yet per OFA’s own
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internal polling, they remain consistently skeptical of electoral politics and institutional
actors independent of Obama.153

2014: Midterms Redux
The 2014 midterm elections followed a similar pattern to 2010. The DNC (still
presidentially-led) sensitive to criticisms of its 2010 strategy, focused on a broader
collection of states, devoting $60 million dollars to the “Bannock Street Project.” This
initiative used capital-intensive OFA mobilization strategies in a number of strategically
important states, attempting to build an apparatus to mobilize an Obama-like electorate in
competitive senate races concentrated in the South.154 Much like the presidential
campaigns, this was temporary infrastructure with a focus derived from short-term
electoral goals based on national strategy, than long-term state level party building. Yet
this project included a number of states that were not presidential battlegrounds and saw
their first large-scale financial infusions in an attempt to build OFA-like infrastructure.155
If the 2014 election saw a broader party dedication to mobilizing the Obama
coalition, the results tracked closely to those of 2010. Why should this be so? In part, the
variation in strategic focus from year to year meant that resources were often not built
evolutionarily, but were based on the attempt to rebuild an Obama-like apparatus under a
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lower salience election, without preexisting infrastructure. OFA’s original success in the
2008 election was a combination of both high levels of financial resources and the
salience of the election. The DNC trumpeted that it made 41 million voter contact
attempts on behalf of 2014 races, yet this was still under half of OFA’s totals for 2012.
This was also largely the result of out of state phone banking, rather than door to door
canvassing. While increases in phone banking in 2012 helped work against voter
disenfranchisement due to new electoral barriers, the task of mobilization in lower
salience elections such as midterms may require comparatively stronger communicative
methods such as canvassing to be effective.156
This is not to say that Bannock Street’s efforts did not have an effect. An analysis
by the Brookings Institute, concluded that Bannock targeted states saw an increase of
81,000 Democratic votes compared to their counterparts.157 While the study does not
claim that this disparity just attributed to Bannock money, it does suggest that Bannock
might have had a significant marginal effect on Democratic turnout. Yet significant is not
determinative. Further investment in such efforts is challenging if they are not associated
with party victory, regardless of actual causal effect.
Even in states that were both presidential and midterm battlegrounds, the party
still fell short. North Carolina and Colorado benefitted from both being presidential and
2014 battlegrounds. Yet in neither of these states were the cumulative amassing of
resources sufficient to carry the top of the Democratic ticket to victory. North Carolina’s
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senate race was a race more competitive than the national dynamics might indicate. This
might suggest that the long-term success of building toward a consistently mobilized
Democratic electorate will be a slow process and dependent on consistent resources. Such
gradualism however will give little solace to office-seekers searching for an electorate for
their next race, not a far-off campaign. Nor will it convince politicians to buy in to such a
long-term strategy at the expense of their own electoral fortunes.

Conclusion: The National Legacy of the Obama Years
The Democratic Party of the post-civil rights era has been marked by coalitional
tensions. White working class defections compromising the party’s national majority,
spanning the half century since the New Deal, was a constant vulnerability. Entering the
2008 election, Democrats had not received a majority in the popular presidential vote
since 1976. While organizational transition to a party-in-service helped Democrats
remain financially competitive with Republicans, candidate-centered campaigning did
not suggest sufficient incentives for mass mobilization through party mechanisms such as
during the high point of the New Deal Era Democratic-labor nexus.
How has the development of a new campaign template, prioritizing mobilization
affected the party nationally? The most broadly recognized durable resource developed
has been data. Voters and activists have become more legible and easier to communicate
with, which incentivizes political strategies based upon doing so. If the construction of
robust and durable voter and activist files make the future cultivation of actual concrete
resources easier, it still is not a guarantee of success. Obama’s victories and deep party
coattails suggest the realization of the mobilization of a majority coalition; yet persistent
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fragmentation has prevented the party from moving successfully toward consistent
victories dependent on such a coalition.
While twice mobilizing a majority electorate in presidential years, an inability to
institutionalize this voter universe is both a reflection, and cause of, tensions remaining in
party. These tensions are no mere accident, but the result of institutional arrangements
that have stymied the construction of an American mass party. Yet parties have still had
periods of relative strength when the political environment has provided an opportunity
for organizational responses to mitigate such barriers. Digitalization and increasing
national ideological coherence of parties appear to suggest such a period. The political
environment should incentivize campaign strategies based on an expansion of the scope
of conflict. This is at least for a Democratic Party anchored in a coalition that comprises a
majority of the populace, if not always the electorate. The broad goals of the party seem
best served by consolidating its presidential coalition of an irregular, yet coherent
majority.
Still, the persistence of fragmentation has frustrated efforts to construct an
effective and durable organization to mobilize such an electorate consistently.
Coalitionally, the party has made progress since the 1980’s in creating a more peaceable
and coherent electorate. Yet coherence to the point in which disparate party factions all
buy into the centrality of mobilization of a party electorate remains unrealized. The 2008
primaries, the inability to fold Obama activists into the party organization, and the
immediate second-guessing of such mobilization strategies after losses (as expressed by
Sen. Schumer at eh top of this chapter), all illustrate continued challenges to bring the
party together.
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Obama’s victories overcame these challenges. Yet the struggle to institutionalize
both the campaign’s electorate and turnout apparatus point to fragmentation still
impeding consolidation. Ephemeral resource construction at the presidential level can
overcome party fragmentation in a specific election, but does not provide a path for
integration and institutionalization. Outside the high tide of the presidential season,
tensions that have plagued the party since the New Deal era continued to persist. In some
sense, the disjuncture became even greater as the presidential wing of the party’s success
further alienated other actors within it. A new campaign template was constructed, but
institutional fragmentation prevented adoption throughout the party. Without
consolidation of the presidential electorate, coalitional tensions are likely to persist.
Without broad coalitional congruence, the party will have difficulty efficiently
constructing organizational economies of scale. A conundrum remains.
The American constitutional structure has presented a set of formidable barriers:
creating divergent logics for politicians in different levels of government, and on
different electoral calendars. Even a coalition dependably mobilized as a presidential
majority, does not service the needs of numerous party politicians in the wrong place and
at the wrong time, unable to ride presidential coattails. Most notably, a successful
presidential coalition will see its efforts at maintaining such a coalition immediately cut
against the interests of disparate actors in the party who do not benefit from a presidential
majority’s electoral path.
A quick look at top-line election results of 2008 and 2012 might give the
impression of a party vote, broadly exploitable by Democratic office-seekers. Yet, even
at the national level, a closer look suggests the party as set of political actors, navigating
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idiosyncratic electoral environments. If in a macro sense, the party looks more coherent
and organizationally capable, the test of consolidation still lies in the perception and
decision-making of various party actors all over the nation. From their standpoint, party
integration looks much different from the neighborhood teams and hi-tech digital tools of
presidential campaigns.
In the following chapters, this story will move to Ohio and down to the local
level, where we will see how both these processes of mobilization and fragmentation play
out closer to the ground, through the idiosyncratic lenses of both state and local politics.
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Chapter 3
Ohio: So Goes the Nation

Ohio encapsulates both the promise and the perils of the Emerging Democratic
Majority. Like nationally, Democrats were largely successfully in 2006, 2008, and 2012.
Yet these victories were interrupted by bitterly disappointing midterm elections in 2010
and 2014. Ohio is also the case that perhaps best captures campaign resource disparities
between presidential and non-presidential election years. Institutional fragmentation
produces variation in the strategic priorities of the national party and aligned donor
networks. Even in a specific state, organizational scale is contingent upon the short-term
electoral priorities of national party leaders.
There is nowhere more coveted during the presidential season than Ohio. It
received more money for the presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012 than any other
state. Yet this influx most clearly crystalizes how a temporary injection of resources can
present challenges to institution building on behalf of mobilizing a consistent party
electorate. Ohio did not feature top of the ticket priority races in 2010 and 2014. Its
vulnerability to the ebb and flow of the national spigot illustrates the difficulties of
building durable institutions with such fluctuation in resources. This instability
accentuates the fragmentation at the heart of the American party system.
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Table 3.1: Ohio Democratic Party Fundraising 2008-2014158 Source: Federal
Election Commission

Year
2008

Fundraising
$25,946,114

2010

$19,053,549

2012

$37,082,076

2014

$8,171,726

This chapter focuses on state level party organization over this period. It
recounts these elections through interviews with senior staffers of both the Ohio
Democratic Party (ODP) and Obama for America’s Ohio operation (OFA). It then
attempts to tease out the challenges to institutionalization of the campaign apparatus, and
intra-party, inter-organizational tensions that follow from the contemporary American
political campaign environment. Of central importance is how the presidential campaign
as a provider of money, staff, activists, and campaign strategy, interacts with the state
party as an institution.
As a case, Ohio illustrates that presidential party building is a very specific type
of organizational development. Its integration into durable party structures is highly
contingent. Strategic theories of campaigning suggest that some states will be winners or
losers organizationally due to their priority for national party and specifically presidential
prerogatives. Yet, even for battleground beneficiaries, goals of the state party may be
very different from just quadrennial statewide mobilization. Institution building is a
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function of the cultivation and maintenance of networks, data, and processes that bring
diverse party stakeholders together. Such development benefits presidential organization
in the long run. Yet to borrow from Keynes, “in the long run we are all dead.” Short-term
imperatives reign in electoral politics. Campaign infrastructure might be determinative
for party success, yet party building in the contemporary era appears to be largely a
positive externality of more narrow short-term electoral priorities. Fragmentation disrupts
the building of a statewide apparatus, even where presidential resources are generous.
Also illustrated is a movement away from candidate-centered campaigns to top
of the ticket-dominated parties. Data and polarization strengthen the logic of mobilizing a
party electorate. Yet this is not centrally contingent on durable state party structures, but
on top of the ticket campaigns that control resources and therefore strategy. If these
campaigns construct resources to mobilize a party electorate, they are as formal
organizations, only temporary. Formal party structures play an ancillary role, and yet are
the ones charged with bridging resources from one election to the next. It is this paradox
of party-based mobilization without an integrated party apparatus, which marks the broad
challenge of this era in high-resource states.

Brief Background on a Battleground
Demographically, Ohio’s national representativeness might depend upon the
metrics that one chooses. It earns its reputation as a reflection of American regional
diversity. It has media markets and cultural characteristics distinct to the Northeast,
Appalachian, and Midwest states it borders.159 The state also captures the common rust
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belt struggles of deindustrialization and economic decline (although with signs of a late
period coda of revitalization).160 Yet, attributable to its economic condition, it has faced
recent stagnation in its population.161 As a result, it has not been subject to the rapid
influx of immigrant and younger workers that has shifted the national political picture
and driven much of Democratic battleground strategy. Ohio curiously, is at the fore of
national priority and yet incongruent with the demographic shifts that animate party
strategy.
While its African-American population of approximately 12% is roughly
reflective of the national average, the state is otherwise significantly older and whiter
than the nation as whole. Its Latino population rests at under 2%. Although Ohio boasts a
large public university system, it is well behind the national average of 18-29 year olds as
a population cohort.162 This leaves a Democratic Party more oriented toward the
traditional labor-farmer nexus of the New Deal coalition.163 Urban political organization
is often characterized by still functioning machines. Cuyahoga, the largest county in the
state and home to Cleveland, still boasts Democratic clubs in most of its 56
municipalities.164
Electorally, the state has recently drifted from leaning red to blue in presidential
years. Despite experiencing competitive races at the presidential level, Ohio Republicans
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enjoyed unified control of state government from 1995-2006; and held the governorship
from 1980-2006. This streak was interrupted by a Democratic governor from 2006-2010,
and state house from 2009-2010. Yet precipitous drops in midterm voting coupled with
districts gerrymandered for optimum Republican representation, have helped insulate
Republican state legislative majorities from the Democratic presidential coalition.165
Gerrymandering has also strongly affected congressional elections. Despite statewide
competitiveness, the GOP retains a sizable lead in their House delegation with few seats
competitive.166 The consequences of this partly accounts for the lack of national
Democratic money during the midterm cycle, as congressional fundraising goes
elsewhere.
Inducements to party building in Ohio remain as variegated as in the nation as a
whole. Consistently competitive statewide elections incentivize the mobilization of a
party electorate every two years. Yet from the top-down, national resources are typically
relegated to presidential year priority: when campaign and party money floods the state.
From the bottom-up, gerrymandering minimizes robust electoral competition. This
diminishes incentives to build strong mobilization apparatus’ locally, as most seats below
the statewide level remain uncompetitive.

Strickland, Redfern and the ODP
Despite decades of being shut out of the governor’s mansion, Democratic
candidate Ted Strickland’s personal popularity, scandal within the previous Republican
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administration, and a national Democratic wave led him to an easy victory over his
opponent Ken Blackwell, by a 60-40% margin in 2006.167 Strickland, the son of a
steelworker, and an ordained minister from rural Scioto County, represented a potent
combination of the populist union and farmer traditions of the Ohio Democratic Party.
Having been elected to congress (after two unsuccessful tries), he ran for office having
built potent fundraising networks as well as relationships with state politicians. Yet
despite large leads in polls heading up to the election, Strickland remained in relative
parity with his opponent in fundraising. According to Strickland staffer, Carri Twigg:
“in the 20 years previous to 2006 there hadn’t been a Democrat anywhere and so
you probably saw the greatest amount of collaboration and goodwill…by the time
we got to autumn of 2006 we could taste that the tide was in our favor, the polling
reflected that, Ken Blackwell was a mess, people believed in Ted to carry the
ticket.”168
Yet the strategic tensions involving urban vs. rural remained:
“You saw a huge amount of resources comparatively going into the places that
Ted was strong: the Appalachians, industrial (sic) Youngstown, Steubenville.
There was a constant tug for resources with the cities and they got the resources
they need, but it wasn’t like we’re going to win this campaign by winning
Cleveland, that was never the catalyst. It was lose better everywhere else, where
Democrats historically have lost.”169
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Strickland’s ascent to office was paralleled by that of the new party chairman,
state assembly minority leader Chris Redfern. Redfern was a logical bedfellow for
Strickland, hailing from a conservative district he navigated with his own populist
sensibilities.170 Yet in contrast with Strickland’s amiable old-line minister persona,
Redfern’s loquacious and bombastic personality somewhat belied his small-town roots.
The state’s executive committee, half elected and half appointed, decides the state party
chair. Traditionally, like the national party, control over the appointed portion of the
committee, and by extension the chairmanship itself falls de facto to the highest elected
Democrat in the state. For Redfern, Democratic struggles to win statewide races however
had created a leadership gap with the party:
“When you have no natural leader like a governor or a United States
Senator, there is a vacuum of power that is created, and there are a lot of
people that want to fill that vacuum, some for their personal political
reasons, some more nobly for idealistic reasons, but the overwhelming
majority for money and power” 171
Redfern in the years leading up to 2006 found himself by default hoisted into this
positon:
“When I became chairman there were no elected officials in Ohio, and as
the minority leader I had spent the previous two years (sic) traveling the
state doing the things the highest ranking elected official would do. He’d
be the surrogate for John Kerry in 2004, he’d be the guy carrying the torch
in 2005 convincing Democrats that we ought not write our obituaries”172
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Gubernatorial victory in 2006, gave Democrats a significant opportunity to focus
on party building efforts. Redfern saw the chance to give the party organization two
things it desperately needed: a statewide officeholder tethered to the electorate rather than
party insiders, and the fundraising network that came with control of the governor’s
mansion. If Redfern had become the party leader by default during its time in the
wilderness, he lacked the office necessary to cultivate resources to induce party cohesion.
Leading a legislative minority does not come with much cache for major donors and
interests. Without the power of the purse, and its carrots and sticks, there is little party
leadership can do to induce unity and build the party as a coherent team of politicians.
Taking control of at least one branch of state government, especially the executive, gave
the party the potential influence to bring people to the table.
Despite a substantial victory, Strickland recognized that he would be unlikely to
have such a favorable electoral environment in the future. He remained tasked to deal
with a unified Republican legislature in the state. Consistent with Galvin’s view of the
president’s relationship with the national party,173 the executive was motivated to engage
in party building to win party control of the legislature. Yet without a history of
competitive local elections or leadership from the state, many county parties were
moribund with little in the way of resources and expertise. This was reflected in a
statewide audit and listening tours of county parties conducted in 2006, which showed a
strong demand for resources on the local level. “Doug (Kelly, the party Executive
Director at the time)…let everyone beat up on them about how they didn’t get what they
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wanted in 2006…the party had historically been under resourced, there was lingering
tension.”174 (Twigg)
Beyond organizational decay, the party also had to deal with strengthening
alliances within its coalition. Both Strickland and Redfern, in their respective
gubernatorial primary and party chair races, beat out African-American challengers
seeking more diversity in party representation. As nationally, the social-choice problems
of navigating a multi-racial coalition were never far from the fore. Despite being a largely
white state, and still majority white party, African-Americans made up a significant
minority of the party’s voters and elected officials. Yet representation on the state level
through both party and political office remained nearly exclusively white.175
Congresswoman Stephanie-Tubbs Jones and other African-American leadership had a
history of not always seeing eye to eye with Strickland as well as much of the state
party’s white power structure.
In a state that did not feature the same growth in demographic diversity as the
nation, the party’s electoral viability remained largely in generating and maintaining
support of a nearly 90% white populace. Organizationally, the party was wedded to
hierarchal institutions of machines and labor unions. Leadership was a result of seniority
and paying dues more so than diversity and democratic responsiveness. These factors
gave little opportunity for African-American leadership to develop institutionally within
the party, outside the machines of African-American districts. The result was a sense of
suspicion and alienation among many black political leaders. Strickland’s electoral
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courting of a more rural electorate stoked these fears, yet victory, and its spoils—
including the soon to come presidential largesse—led to improved, if not yet quite
smooth, relations.

Building for the Presidential Election
Foremost for the state party was building for the eventual takeover of the state
legislature. The assembly was a realistic option in the short-term future. Yet district
apportionment and the structure of the electoral cycle presented significant barriers. The
senate’s gerrymandering kept it largely insulated from even a significant Democratic
wave election such as 2006. Years of Republican control resulted in districts highly
favorable to the GOP. In addition, with seats up once every four years, the senate
remained electorally insulated from the majority preference of any given election.
Most important however is the opportunity that would come with the influx of
resources into the state for the presidential election. For Redfern, a reinvigorated state
party would offer the opportunity to channel these resources in ways productive for state,
not just presidential goals:
“When Bill Clinton was setting up his organization in 1996, or Al Gore in
2000, or Kerry in 2004, they had to build their own organization and it
involved the Ohio Democratic Party. But it was just a framework, it was a
pass-through organization for the whims and the wishes of the presidential
candidate. Once the presidential candidate left, the party was left as a
shell…I vowed when I was elected not to allow that to occur again.”176
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State party leaders were early and strong endorsers of the Clinton campaign.
Ohio’s stature as a battleground meant the Clinton’s had deep ties with the party
infrastructure dating to the 1992 and 1996 elections. Obama was a long shot, and one
whose campaign strategy was not particularly congruent with the characteristics of the
Ohio party. In a race in which the primaries wound up roiling racial cleavages, Ohio’s
party leadership, populist and white, stood in stark contrast to Obama’s coalition. Obama
had little in the way of institutional support within the state. Indeed, the language used in
the run-up to the Ohio primary, even by the normally restrained Strickland,177 was
evidence of a highly competitive election, and one in which the delegate math was
making the Clinton campaign increasingly desperate to find a way to alter the candidates’
coalitions. Such a tone however would further exacerbate tensions that threatened
coalitional unity.
Yet if state-level competition frayed nerves, it also created a strong inducement to
take advantage of intra-party competition and mobilization to build the party. Unlike
many other states, the ODP gave both Obama and Clinton campaigns access to voter and
volunteer files, with the understanding that each would build the database with their
activists and voter contact data once the primary concluded. Ohio, whose primary came
relatively late178 in the contest, was important ground for Clinton to stop Obama’s
momentum. Clinton’s win by a 54-44% margin, represented both her demographic and
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institutional strength in the state. Obama however, would nonetheless claim the
nomination, and be the vessel on which Ohio Democratic futures depended.

OFA Comes to Columbus
The Obama campaign’s general election staff began arriving in the state in May
of 2008. OFA and the state party folded, as it conventionally does, into a coordinated
campaign, a legally structured joint venture of OFA, DNC, and the ODP, called the Ohio
Campaign for Change.179 This allowed money and coordination to flow freely through
this structure. Significantly, in respect to state coherence, there was no U.S Senate race
on the ballot in 2008. Another key election at the state level could have potentially caused
tension. A presidential campaign, especially one targeting a somewhat non-traditional
state Democratic electorate, might have been in jeopardy of butting heads with another
high resource statewide race in play.
Tensions between national and state parties are largely inevitable. Disjuncture is
not just a matter of strategy, but tactics. Differences will arise not just over narrative and
coalitional structure, but the modes of campaigning used to communicate and organize on
the local level. The national party controls the financial resources and the brand of the
party. Staff implements modernized campaign techniques. These honed through dynamic
competition, are adapted to highly resourced and competitive political environments. This
was especially true for OFA, which won a strongly contested fifty state primary
campaign against a formidable candidate, with the help of new developments in
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campaign data and field organization. Yet the state party is likely to feel a sense of
expertise when it comes to the specifics of their own backyard.
The state party stands as an intermediary of sorts between the national and local
parties. Like the national party, it is primarily concerned with statewide turnout, yet its
own linkage is strongest and most consistent with its county parties. These clashing roles
can bring to the fore inevitable structural tension. One former county party chair,
described a meeting with her colleagues where the role of the national party during a
presidential election year was: “they come in [and] tell everyone what to do and leave
nothing.”180 State parties are dependent on national resources, yet much of their function
is in supporting in-state candidates, subject to different electoral rules than federal
candidates.
To bridge this divide, OFA made sure to integrate experienced state staffers into
their operation. Two veteran Strickland staffer’s, Aaron Pickrell and Greg Schultz, joined
OFA as General Election and Constituency Directors, respectively.
“One of the smartest things Barack Obama’s people did, Plouffe did a lot
of smart things, but hire the very person who beat him (in Ohio) in the
primaries, and so Pickrell (Schultz and others)…those people know how
to pronounce Lima. They know they have to understand the dynamics of
Ohio and respond to them accordingly.” (Redfern)181

Electorally, the coordinated party strategy reflected not Strickland’s 2006
coalition, but that of the other successful statewide candidate running that election yearSenator Sherrod Brown. Brown, a nationally prominent liberal, was more representative
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of the electorate Obama (and the ticket) would be able to attract. In addition to being
more ideologically in tune with the Obama coalition, Brown’s name “sounded black,”
which gave operatives confidence that his voters would be transferable to Obama.
OFA’s first task was to build relationships with a party infrastructure that was
suspicious, if not in some instances hostile. According to Schultz:
“My role coming in as both an Ohio native, and having worked on the
Hillary primary, was to help the Obama campaign with some relationships
they just never had an opportunity to form during the primary…and then
part of my role was to introduce the campaign to the rest of Ohio, whether
they were involved in Hillary or not…Hillary had most of the
establishment in Ohio…the Obama campaign didn’t walk into the
campaign for the general election with a lot of relationships to the county
party structures, local electeds, because the vast majority of them (sic)
endorsed Hillary…and I don’t use (establishment) as a pejorative, but
quite the opposite, truly infrastructure.”

Statewide OFA senior staff set up shop within the ODP’s state headquarters in
Columbus. The spacious former church, while costly, supported integrating national staff
and grassroots activity in its meeting rooms. Breaking with tradition, staff at the Field
Organizer (FO) level was tasked with setting up Neighborhood Teams; each with a
volunteer neighborhood team leader responsible for building up and running their area.
Staffing apportionment was itself an attempt to bridge the priorities and
prerogatives of national and state operations. Focus on high-density areas, while best
from OFA’s standpoint, competed with a focus on turnout in swing legislative districts.
Negotiating these priorities was a first order of business in building a harmonious culture
within the state. While consideration was given to legislative districts, overwhelming
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priority was given to urban and university areas central to Obama’s coalition. According
to Deputy Field Director Chris Wyant “first and foremost…we went where the votes
were.”182 Luckily, resources can alleviate tensions, and OFA, already directing tens of
millions of dollars within the state helped pacify all.

OFA in the Field: Giving up Power to Get More Back?
Yet, if resources were abundant, OFA’s field strategy was still unusual.
Relational organizing tactics were nothing new, but they were not associated with
presidential campaigns. Schultz notes: “It was super old, but was done at a level that was
new.” Traditionally, the presidential field program is designed to have staff help support
preexisting apparatus from unions, and other active civic groups, increase campaign
visibility, and distribute ‘chum’ (lawn signs, buttons, bumper stickers etc.) to loyal
supporters. The OFA neighborhood team (NTL) model focused on cultivating new
infrastructure particularly among Obama activists. These were often people previously
uninvolved in politics, largely indifferent, and perhaps even hostile to traditional party
institutions, especially at a local level.
Field staffers, who traditionally acted like ambassadors from the national party,
went to work recruiting volunteers, having one on one conversations, house meetings,
and evaluating volunteer leadership for training in sophisticated voter contact operations.
This might have been a strange sight to long time party stalwarts. One staffer
characterized local politicians’ reaction: “I think they viewed us as aliens and were not
really sure whether we were allies or enemies.”183 According to Schultz: “What the
182
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decentralized organizing model of the campaign does as a structure is that it forces (the
local party) to give up power, but I think at the end of the day, it gives you more as a
result.”184 While the organizational locus of voter outreach flows through OFA, the
resources (and down-ticket electoral victories) garnered can help local parties in the long
term. Yet this would be a difficult sell to many accustomed to their own way of doing
things.
The first task over the summer was increasing voter registration rolls. Ohio did
not have the same high ceiling on its Democratic electorate as many states with rapid
population growth: especially among youth and Latinos. Yet outreach in urban, AfricanAmerican, and university areas was integral before the late September voter registration
deadline. OFA was not alone in doing registration. ACORN, a mass national organization
with a long history of organizing the poor, ran a separate program, with a focus on urban
minority areas. Organizationally far more unwieldy than OFA, the two organizations
(unable to coordinate legally) made at times strange bedfellows.185 From OFA’s
standpoint, data was of the utmost importance, and registering through OFA was the most
surefire way to have an exact sense of the changing voter universe as registration
increased. Yet a significant increase in the voter rolls, beyond the efforts accounted for by
OFA, made ACORN’s contributions difficult to deny.
Frustration and skepticism with sympathetic outside organizations is common for
campaign organizations. This is especially true as voter universe modeling has grown
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This contrasted with the professionalized OFA model, in which registration was the first phase of
activist organization building on behalf of the campaign. Through the summer and early fall of
2008, much of urban and university OFA activism was focused on registration.
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more sophisticated and dynamic. OFA viewed outside groups with suspicion. This went
beyond mere parochialism. In 2004, blame for the Democrats’ close loss in Ohio was
directed at organizations such as ACT and MoveOn. Such groups had the advantage of
being able to raise large unrestricted sums of money from wealthy donors, however
firewalls between each organization and the actual campaign/party led to confusion and
redundancy in organization and voter contact activities.186 As a result, OFA (and the
ODP) signaled strongly to leave the field to them in 2008. This would give the campaign
the advantage of having up to date lists of the voter universe and voter contacts,
necessary to ensure turnout models are dynamic and accurate. Information is power, and
other groups meddling was assumed counterproductive. Activists were encouraged on a
local level to fold their activities into the OFA organization.
Incongruity between the party brand and Obama brand continued to cause
difficulty. Indeed, in Ohio the primary campaign was bitter, encapsulated by coalitional
fragmentation through both racial and generational divides. Yet if OFA was to run the
mobilization effort it intended, it was essential to put the party back together for the
general election. The campaign often ran a concurrent if (by varying degrees) cordial
campaign with local Democrats. Local party and candidate outreach efforts lacked formal
integration into OFA. This was in part due to fundraising restrictions that did not allow
local candidates using ‘state raised’ money to use literature featuring Obama. Conversely,
while OFA was legally able to use federal money to support state races, they resisted
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systematic coordination with local candidates.187 It was viewed on the state level that
deciding which local candidates to do ‘asks’ on behalf of could impact local cohesion and
cause headaches and distraction for field staff. Better for all to focus on mobilizing on
behalf of Obama, letting local candidates ride the coattails of an efficient operation.
If OFA organization tended to remain separate from local party infrastructure, it
seemed to do significantly better with local liberal activist networks. Learning from 2004,
MoveOn, rather than form its own IE on the ground, instead encouraged its members to
go to their local Obama field office and volunteer with the campaign. While MoveOn
activists and other local groups provided support for the campaign, less clear was largescale integration into the neighborhood team leadership, so important to the OFA model.
Indeed, almost without exception, sentiment among the OFA staff interviewed
for this project was that high-level volunteer leadership (NTLs and other ‘captains’)
tended to be new to political activism. They were not formerly involved with the party or
issue activism. Obama’s appeal as an outsider candidate, attracting people often alienated
and frustrated by the political process, may help explain this. It is also likely that building
organization around activists with a blank slate was simply easier than if they had
preconceived notions of campaigning at odds with the OFA model.
Why such divergence in electoral campaign activity between an ‘OFA’ and
‘traditional’ model? Here, variation in electoral competition comes to the fore. Whereas
the OFA model blossomed in a highly competitive environment, many local activists
remained cut off from infrastructure developed under dynamic strategic incentives to
experiment with field mobilization. Without consistent and intense party competition,
187
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local party infrastructure is primarily tasked with managing power in a governing party
and safe electoral districts rather than building infrastructure for constant mobilization.
State and national party competition is the state and national parties’ problems.
Challenges on the local level more oriented toward managing the majority through
control of government. Keeping the peace is normally a higher priority than mobilization.
Relationships between local parties and OFA seemed to vary greatly as the next
chapter makes clear. In many localities, warm and cooperative relationships were
reported. With local elected and party leaders impressed by the OFA organization. Yet
even in these spaces, organizational integration was not usually significant. In other
areas, often with more horizontal fragmentation, mutual suspicions persisted between
OFA and the local party. In Columbus, however, relationships remained friendly with
operatives from the Strickland, Obama, and Clinton universes all united behind a field
plan that would mobilize a coherent Democratic electorate across the state.

Targeting and Voter Contact
Field campaigning has two overreaching goals: mobilization and persuasion.
While the mechanics of voter contact are the broadly the same, effective approaches
differ. Mobilization targets are usually new or sporadic voters with high probability of
voting for the candidate (and likely his or her party). Mobilization is largely a function of
registration, identification at point of contact (the correct address/phone number), and
repeated contact in the days leading up to Election Day (what campaigns colloquially
refer to as ‘touches’). This culminates in ‘knock and drag’ on Election Day to make sure
people have voted. Electoral rules have a significant impact on the efficacy of such
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tactics. For example, the longer the gap between the end of registration and the election,
the more difficult mobilizing sporadic voters either unregistered or without updated
registration will be.
Perhaps most significant is whether there is an ‘early vote’ period, in which
voters can vote in person before Election Day. 188 Early vote creates significant
advantages for campaign mobilization. Rather than using the period before the election to
prime voters contacted to get out on Election Day, it allows the campaigns to run a
days/weeks/months long knock and drag operations, allowing any voter contacted to vote
immediately. On Election Day, this lends itself several advantages.189 The universe of
voters to mobilize is significantly smaller and more manageable and the infrastructure
can therefore be more focused and efficient. At the polling site, itself, lines will be
significantly shorter, as well as the number of voting irregularities the campaign must
deal with, allowing campaigns to be better able to stay on top of and address any such
complications.
In Ohio, this is consistently a pitched battle around election time. Control of the
state executive branch, who oversees elections, is critical in this respect. In 2004,
Republican Secretary of State Ken Blackwell was accused of attempting to depress
Democratic turnout by limiting early/absentee voting opportunities and putting too few
voting booths in high-density urban areas, leading to hours long lines and depressing
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turnout.190 Strickland on the other hand supported a significant early vote period, the first
week of which overlapped with voter registration, effectively creating what functionally
amounted to an opportunity for same day registrants to vote. Republicans attempted to
block and curtail many of these measures in court, yet despite some temporary
injunctions,191 early voting went off rather successfully.
Persuasion, on the other hand, focuses on consistent voters who are demographically
likely to be undecided or ‘swing’ voters. While these voters are easier to find, campaign
effects are notoriously difficult to ascertain.192 Research shows that most contemporary
self-identified independents are in fact partisans, who do normally vote a straight party
ticket.193 Yet in a state like Ohio, which featured a smaller pool of ‘mobilizable’ base
Democrats than many other competitive states, there were further incentivizes for the
campaign to focus on persuasion. If the mechanics of effective voter persuasion are still
mysterious, one important tactic for OFA was the recruitment of local volunteers to do
this voter contact. While out of state volunteers were often voluminous, much like the
Dean orange hat brigades, they were thought to have lower levels of efficacy than
organically built local teams. Policy would move voters less than the credibility of local
activists vouching for the candidate.194
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What is the profile of a persuadable Ohio voter? Overrepresented in the Ohio
electorate are those who at least superficially look strongly like the type of voters who
have vacated the Democratic Party over the past several decades. They are working class,
white rust belt voters, like those profiled in Macon County by Stanley Greenberg.195 Yet,
Ohio has still (relatively) high union density196- a strong predicator of retained
Democratic loyalty among the white working class.197 In addition, the economic
devastation in Ohio that took place under Republican state and national regimes had
reduced whatever loyalty many Ohioans might have gained for the GOP. This was
evident in Strickland’s landslide victory and the strong Democratic showing of 2006.198
Yet, if these voters were open to the Democratic Party, it was not certain they would be
for Obama’s’ Democratic Party. This was strong ‘Clinton Country’ after all, in the
Democratic primary. It remained a major question as to whether a candidate with
Obama’s particular appeal-- so mismatched with the typical Ohio Democratic voter-could build a winning coalition.
The goal was for GOTV (scheduled for the entire last week of the campaign)
was to have staging locations run by trained local volunteer leadership. With the voter
universe narrowed by early vote, identifying and making sure Democratic targets made it
out to vote was more manageable. Capacity to track and project the voter universe greatly
improved by 2008, yet uncertainty persisted. Were persuadable voters actually

195

Greenberg, Stanley B. Middle Class Dreams: The Politics and Power of the New American
Majority. Yale University Press, 1996.
196
Ohio remains seventh in the country in union membership, despite a multi decade trend toward
per capita decline. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm
197
Silver, Nate. “The Effects of Union Membership on Democratic Voting.” New York TimesOnline Only. Feb 26 2011. http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/the-effects-ofunion-membership-on-democratic-voting/?_r=0
198
Coffey et al. 2011.

124

persuadable? Were canvassers getting positive IDs? Were the turnout targets right? From
a local party perspective, would a rising Obama tide lift all Democratic boats?
Election Day was an uneasy experience. Early vote numbers were not current,
creating uncertainty. Internal accounting also was far from reliable. Polling places
seemed ominously sparsely attended. ‘Project Houdini,’ a system that was supposed to
give OFA up to date information on which voters had turned out, allowing them to adjust
canvassing accordingly, broke down early in the day.
Yet less than two hours after polls closed it was clear that both Obama and the
ODP were on their way to a resounding victory in Ohio. Obama would win the state
51%-47%, while Democrats would take back the state assembly and make gains in the
senate. Overall turnout had dropped modestly from 2004. Yet this could be the result of a
decline in state population over this period rather than ineffectiveness of mobilization.
Concerns that Democrats would suffer down ballot did not come to fruition.
However, there were exceptions. This was especially true in county judge races, as
judges do not have a partisan indicator on Ohio ballots. While sample ballots with ‘the
ticket’ proved largely unnecessary for those listed as Democrats, without the partisan cue,
many Obama voters simply left those races blank. If the OFA model was largely
successful, this illustrates that getting the party ticket into voters’ hands still matters.

2009-2010: Organizing for America and the Midterms
OFA 2.0 would get off the ground in Ohio in March 2009. Leading the
organization was Greg Schultz, now a former Obama and Strickland staffer. Without any
staff in the state for five months, reconstituting OFA’s volunteer networks would be
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challenging. Schultz started out, much like the ODP in 2006 by conducting a listening
tour of forty cities. County chairs were invited to kick off the meetings, encouraging
relationships with local parties. Schultz found a generally warm reaction from the county
parties. Yet warm did not necessarily translate to knowing what to do, or what could be
done, with such an organization: “We understood that what we had done was new to
almost everybody, particularly at the scale with which we did.”199
Local politics were outside of the explicit OFA 2.0’s mission. Yet the
overarching aim was to institutionalize the Obama organization as an electoral
infrastructure. This was sold as being to the significant benefit of local parties, too.
“we tried to encourage the county establishments to say (sic) now is this
the time (for those who had not embraced OFA during the campaign)…
we were here to grow this coalition…how do we keep (the volunteers)
engaged for the forseeable future.”200 (Schultz)

Yet OFA, centered on national issue advocacy,201 was not at the outset
particularly relevant to local political actors. As the next chapter will discuss in detail, the
party at the local level looked less like an assemblage of a singular party, and more like
silos grafted onto the federal system. This meant a lack of local integration into the party
as it faced an election without Obama at the top of the ticket. OFA 2.0’s potential for
local parties meant channeling its activist networks into local campaign work, yet this
was a far bridge to cross for volunteers whose political linkage was to Obama, not local
party politics. According to Schultz, the sell to the local parties had mixed success:
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“Some were open (but for some the argument is) you’re bringing new
people in who don’t know how things have been done…those people have
been around for decades, they’re part of the structure and that’s a good
thing. But you have people that have just shown up six months ago and
were then given control of turning out their neighborhood, standing next to
someone who had for 20 years been in charge…They saw resources that
they thought should have been dedicated to them, and look we had two
staff and maybe a laptop, so we weren’t taking up anything, but what
people thought is usually you elect a president and three, three and a half
years later, they come back. But we weren’t going away, some people
were encouraged by that, but some people were like well, you need to be
doing this.
So we said we were going to work on issues and certain people said well
you should work on electing Democrats, which is certainly fair, but some
of our belief, well more my belief, is you can’t have a perpetual campaign.
You can have a perpetual organization and I think people, especially new
people, were not involved because they loved the Democratic
infrastructure. They were involved because they wanted to see a change.
Now many people involved in the Democratic infrastructure wanted to see
a change as well, but these new people were involved because they
believed a person and a presidency could make a difference, and I think
our assumption was if you wanted to keep them engaged, ok now we’re
going to elect every other Democrat, part of it is how do you show what
the president’s doing and connect it to other Democrats.”202

If the party infrastructure could not be immediately integrated, could OFA at
least maintain its networks and hope that in the long term such a transition was possible?
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Institutionalizing the neighborhood teams was proving to be a significant challenge. OFA
2.0 had few203 staffers in the state, tasked with maintaining the capacity of organization
that took several hundred staff to build. Issue advocacy helped bring a significant number
of new volunteers in. Yet there was a sense that many activists were burnt out from the
presidential election, found the tasks confusing, or were disappointed by what they
viewed as capitulations from the White House.
Another concern was that this new vessel would be competing for not just
activists, but financial resources with the party’s electoral organizations:
“I think there was skepticism about OFA’s capacity to organize around
issues…people just don’t get as jazzed, and these legislative battles would
be unfolding at the same time as mayoral campaigns, city council
campaigns, that are lifeblood to the structure of the Democratic Party”204
(Twigg)
“I’m sure many Dems were saying well look OFA, you’re spending all
this money, you’re getting these activists out to do things that don’t
directly help us. Why worry about this healthcare stuff when you’re not
going to make a difference, when you can help us get ready for this state
house…I don’t know what the right answer is, but I think that’s why there
was frustration.”205 (Wyant)

As the 2010 election approached, strong national headwinds against the
Democrats created a conundrum for Strickland and the ODP. Should Strickland, who in
2006 showed an ability to transcend the national Democratic coalition, distance himself
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from Obama and the national party, or attempt to reconstruct the Obama infrastructure
and coalition? Strickland did have the advantage of being an incumbent, raising over $30
million dollars for his campaign. This gave him the autonomy to construct his own
electoral organization separate and autonomous from OFA and national Democratic
financial arms. If OFA was the chief resource driver to the state party in presidential
years, they were, financially at least, a minor player compared to what Strickland himself
could raise in 2010. Yet, OFA still had its volunteer networks and expertise that if
activated could take much of the field burden off the Strickland campaign’s hands.
“As we were contemplating Ted’s path to victory, we all wanted to keep
as many of the voters of the president’s as we possibly could, but we were
under no false notion that could get them all or that we could even get a
majority of them. Tensions remained between the White House and Ted
that were very real, very tangible (from the 2008 primary)”206 (Twigg)

Strickland’s electorate would look similar, if perhaps smaller, than 2006. Yet
with the hopes of greater support of high-density urban African-American voters:
“There wasn’t a contentious primary, and so the governor had been
through the win as governor and announced programs and just had
developed a greater level of comfort in some of those cities that he had
never been in before.”207 (Twigg)
For Twigg, his strength in the black community has less to with 2008 and more to do
with his transition from a congressional representative from a white, rural district to
statewide officeholder with a significant African-American constituency:
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“(He didn’t) have deep roots in these communities. Four years later as
governor for a long time it’s just a different proposition. He had an
opportunity to work with these civic leaders in a formal capacity, he built
better relationships, and then you probably get invited more places and
feel more comfortable seeking out richer opportunities.”208

Strickland would wind up losing a close and contested election, with significant
Democrat loses in the legislature. African-American turnout remained constant with its
percentage from 2008 and share of the state population. Yet turnout was depressed,
especially among youth and women voters. Despite Strickland faring better than national
dynamics might have suggested, a loss in politics is nonetheless a loss, and viewed so by
party insiders. Increased black turnout was a positive and evidence of Strickland’s
improved relationship with black constituencies since 2006. Yet without significant youth
turnout, the national party brand presented a seeming liability among the white working
class voters that were integral to Strickland’s 2006 electorate. At minimum, no
mechanism existed to remobilize necessary portions of the 2008 democratic coalition.
How close Strickland hewed to Obama, is a point of contention. Strickland had
Obama in the state six times and built a field program to attempt to remobilize the
Democratic coalition. Yet this infrastructure was not integrated with OFA. While OFA
encouraged volunteers to go to Strickland’s field offices, Schultz believes there was a
significant cultural difference in the field program:
“Wave elections happen nationally, that being said the state of Ohio did
not run an Obama-model organizing effort in 2010…people didn’t knock
on doors, (instead) people jumped onto a phone system that would lead
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them into a central system and they would call people 13 counties away. It
was the exact opposite of the Obama model…The volunteers who came
(out for Strickland) through the Obama model…saw that the culture of the
2010 campaign did not reflect the culture of the 2008 campaign…(there
was) a lack of understanding of the model by some decision makers… I
don’t know if it was a lack of faith...I don’t know if it was a belief that if
you don’t have 500 field organizers that it’s not possible…what I don’t
understand is when you are between two presidential elections with a
sitting president with (sic), maybe excitement’s the wrong word, but (a)
knowledge base of a group of volunteers, why would you change the
structure? And I understand why, people said well look this worked in ’08,
but ’08 will never happen again. More African-Americans won’t vote,
more youth won’t vote, but in 2012 we surpassed that…and (the people
running the 2010 campaigns) are good people, but there are different
models of organizing. In 2010 we used a more traditional model…and I’m
not saying that people didn’t listen to us and if they did we would have
won, I do believe that the model is more productive and would have
yielded more votes…and change is hard, you know that you’ve run the
last 20 gubernatorial campaigns a certain way and one presidential race a
certain way, and you’ve won (a number of races in the past) that
(traditional) way, so you have one proof point and you have twenty. The
culture’s not there…it requires buy in and an acceptance of
decentralization.”209

The consistency of weak midterm results for the incumbent president’s party
remains a systematic hurdle to party building. The salience of presidential elections
presents the opportunity to shift and restructure a national majority coalition. Yet if
unfavorable conditions are present as the party seeks consolidation of that coalition in the
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next federal election, party office-seekers are likely to turn away from constructing party
resources. If put in a persistently vulnerable position, office-seekers cultivating their own
electorate and financial resources is a quite understandable strategic choice. Insulation
from competition by taking advantage of incumbency to cultivate strong personalized
fundraising networks provides a clearer path to electoral stability than movement toward
long-term building of a party.210
There was little to suggest at a local level that OFA was of great benefit in the
midterm elections. Party activists are traditionally different from that of presidential
campaigns. The post -2010 period was a struggle for the party in Ohio as well as
nationally. A return to unified GOP control of state government was particularly poor
timing with post-census redistricting immanent. Such efforts would make regaining
control of the House significantly more difficult in the near future and depress incentives
for robust party building in many localities.

Regaining Momentum for ’12: The 2011 Referendums
Failure at the state and national level left a sense of disappointment among many
Democrats. The pre-presidential year in Ohio is often a sleepy one, with no federal or
statewide offices decided. Yet, 2011 would be different. Resurgent Republicans quickly
attempted to capitalize on their victories. The Ohio GOP would move in two areas with
far-reaching consequences for Democratic resources and constituencies: legislation to
restrict unions and voting rights. These efforts however would provoke a counteraction,
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galvanizing progressive forces who would push referenda eventually leading to the defeat
of both bills.
On March 31, 2011, freshly elected John Kasich and Republican legislative
majorities passed Ohio Senate Bill 5 against unified Democratic opposition. It featured
numerous provisions restricting the power of public sector unions: allowing members to
opt out of political dues, as well as restricting the unions’ rights to collectively bargain
and strike. The bill provoked a strong response by the Ohio (and national) labor
movement, who in conjunction with state and federal Democratic interests formed the
“We Are Ohio” campaign to repeal the bill via a referendum in November of 2011. The
repeal referendum passed overwhelmingly, with nearly 62% or the vote, and over 2.2
million voters supporting it. This was over 400,000 more voters than had turned out for
Strickland one year earlier.211
During this period, another polarizing bill passed, this time involving voting
restrictions. House Bill 194 cut the early vote period from one month to two weeks, along
with reducing polling hours for early vote and Election Day. By fall of 2011, a
referendum campaign, largely driven by African-American constituencies, was gathering
steam. After collecting more than a million signatures, rather than having to face a
referendum likely to drive Democratic turnout, Republicans reversed path, repealing the
bill with the hopes of returning to the issue after the 2012 election.212
Both bills drew key Democratic constituencies, who organized in collaboration
with the Democratic infrastructure in the lead-up to the 2012 election. If national issue
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campaigning through OFA 2.0 was not having a transformative grassroots effect, the
threat of losing labor and voting rights reenergized and unified progressive forces within
the state, as well as bringing attention (and resources) from national interests.
“You re-woke the Ohio working class…you were able to remind Ohio
voters…that elections matter and probably more importantly that they
have a role. So you think about in 2011, (with the anti-union bill) you had
white working class in particular, it was much broader than that, and then
you have African-Americans, you’ve got a legislature that directly has
gone after one of the most sacred obligations we have to our citizens-- the
right to vote. So in one calendar year after 2010 you had reminded every
part of Obama and the Democratic coalition that elections matter and they
have a role. You had citizens stop a legislature from doing something and
that is one of the most empowering things (you can do). And so we had in
African-American churches people talking about Selma, with this
president, a year before Election Day. I would say without HB 194, 2012
was always going to be tough…it would have been closer…You can’t
replace getting a million signatures…we had lists, we had leaders, we had
people speaking out, and you could say this is why we need to
vote.”213(Schultz)

Yet if these referenda were integral in the build up to 2012, another that did not
get off the ground reflected tensions between national and state Democrats. The ODP
wanted to challenge the state legislature’s redistricting plan-- which would both reduce
overall competition as well as the number of seats in play, through a referendum. Yet, it
was not such a priority for the national party:
If we would have collected the petitions in 2011, we would have stopped
the implementation of the gerrymandered map, not because we would
213
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have won in the ballot initiative, we would have stopped it because the
timing meant that those elections could have not been held and that a
federal judge would have had to come in and make the map…so that’s a
big deal, we’re Ohio, why wouldn’t you get involved if you were Steve
Israel and the DCCC…but he doesn’t care (where his districts come from),
his job is to (get to a majority)” (Redfern)214

While the national party has a strong interest in the state as a presidential
battleground, this does not necessarily extend to the national congressional committee,
whose priorities differ. For the DCCC, as Redfern states, districts can come from
anywhere in the nation. While redistricting and a subsequent lack of competition could
have significant effects on state party building, and therefore the party’s presidential
chances in the state, such concerns are several steps removed from the calculations of the
congressional campaign committee.
The two issues, in which referenda were successful, were of high salience to
national organized interests, local activists, as well as voters. In both cases, the
infrastructure of ODP/OFA was essential in providing staff, data, and activist resources to
bring coherence and scale to the campaigns. Yet redistricting, not yet seen as the
existential partisan threat it would become, was not able to garner such support. With
political salience, the party organization appeared integrated and effective. However, in
the case of the district map, the party was not able to manufacture such focus and
cohesion on an issue with few natural stakeholders able to provide raw political resources
that the party infrastructure could then channel into campaign organization.
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2012
If OFA 2.0 did not save state Democrats electoral fortunes in 2010, it did leave
an important proto-infrastructure of staff and volunteers in place for a quick transition to
the 2012 election. This allowed the campaign to begin to scale back up in Ohio during the
first quarter of 2012. In 2008, Democratic success was attributed to a positive national
environment for Democrats, and excitement around Obama’s campaign. However, 2012
was more reminiscent of 2010’s climate. The presidential election would test
organizational capacity and strength of the Obama coalition under election fundamentals
not conducive to Democratic success. In persuasion-heavy Ohio, coming off a
gubernatorial loss, a tough election was ahead.
OFA valued continuity in personnel. Greg Schultz, Ohio OFA 2.0 director
remained to run the campaign for OFA in 2012. Chris Wyant, a former Deputy Field
Director also returned as General Election Director. Despite a challenging national
climate, several developments would complement Democratic efforts. Fundraising would
reach an even grander scale than 2008. While this would be the case for both parties, the
struggle to scale the field operation that plagued Democrats in 2010 would not be an
issue. Tens of millions of dollars went into in the general election field infrastructure by
spring of 2012. While many Democrats, including the president, greeted Super PACs
ambivalently, Democrats conceded their apparent success in helping GOP efforts in
2010. This led Democrats to a weary acceptance that that they would have to create their
own Super PACS to keep pace. Priorities USA and others complemented party and
candidate money both in the battle over the airwaves, as well as targeted field
campaigning. This allowed more OFA resources directed toward a focused field program.
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Most significant however were advances in data that made voter targeting more
precise and dynamic. Cross-tabulating consumer data with previous voter contact
information allowed the party’s data analysts to construct a highly nuanced and accurate
profile of the electorate, including the likelihood of an individual voter to be an Obama
supporter and Democrat. OFA used its influx of data and field resources to run field
experiments in the hopes of better framing individual-level voter contact interactions.
Scripts were A/B tested215 for efficacy in moving voters toward the Obama support
column.216 Ohio, as the most lavishly resourced state was central to these efforts.
“At its core it was about our data. It was so different, our analytics while
very sophisticated in ’08, and way beyond anything we’ve ever seen
before in campaigns, (but) you were flying blind largely in that your kind
of like ok these five or six factors: a person’s age, race, precinct, voting
history, maybe a couple other things. Here’s the likelihood that this
person’s supporting us, and we had the pulp persuadability score, but it
wasn’t really a persuadability score. Fast forward four years and just the
accuracy of the support models…was just phenomenal. To know that you
called this universe of people and you talk to them enough times and from
these hundred people, you’re probably going to get five new
supporters.”217 (Wyant)

These new data tools were a boon for the development of the voter file and the
identification of the Democratic electorate. Yet they also shifted the organizational
culture around OFA’s field program. Whereas team building was the central focus in

Contrasting wording was testing during voter contact and voter responses were then recorded
to optimize the language. Think about a visit to the optometrist, where your ideal prescription is
identified by choosing between binary options.
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2008, many staff saw 2012 as increasingly motivated not by the building of neighborhood
structures, but by reaching data metrics. Increasing confidence in the location and
majority status of your electorate would indeed make such strategy understandable. Yet,
this could come at the expense of an organizational focus on network and skill building
that would be the mark of any long-term residue left by OFA.
When organic teams presented the best linkage to the electorate, OFA focused on
team building. Yet with precision targeting, an even greater influx of field staff, and an
environment in which locally based activist activity might not reach the levels of 2008,
these networks might have taken a backseat in the grind toward a close victory. Could
the increase in field resources possibly be a double edge sword? In 2008, most staff
joined the campaign over the summer. Yet the steady trickle of hiring in 2012 might have
disrupted linkages between staff and local volunteers. According to 2008 and 2012 Ohio
OFA field staffer and co-author of “Groundbreakers: How Obama's 2.2 Million
Volunteers Transformed Campaigning in America.”:
“All of that relationship building…having been the foundation…in’08 was
impossible to do while onboarding a (field organizer) while doing dry runs
for GOTV. So it was…onboarding people during the mobilization period
(instead of) the organizational period. Then there’s also the question of
overabundance of resources. So in ’12 we had all this money, the sense
that we got was (we) didn’t know what to do with this money: Do we need
more printers? Do we want more chum? More organizers?”218

A GOP governor also made for significantly more resistance to early voting,
through efforts to restrict the hours of county locations. Yet, technological advances were
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a major asset. The further development of user-friendly call tools allowed an out of state
volunteer to have their own virtual personal phone bank, directing millions of calls into
Ohio. These calls were not high quality as persuasion. However, they helped to keep
mobilization lists clean and data dynamic, allowing in state staff and volunteers to focus
on actual persuasion, and knock and drag, through the early vote period.
With Sherrod Brown’s senate seat also up for grabs, there was another
competitive statewide race. While Brown was previously the template for Obama’s 2008
coalition, as the senator’s profile grew in the state, his campaign believed that it had the
opportunity to play a map that hewed close to Strickland’s, running up votes in rural
areas. This would protect against an overdependence on mobilization of base Obama
Democrats. In an election year in which Ohio and the nation were likely to be highly
competitive, and with the president having sagging approval ratings, insurance seemed
prudent. A separate high resource field program ran through the ODP with efforts
focused on mobilizing a wider and more rural electorate. Yet this produced tension
between OFA and the Brown campaign/ODP.
“I think that the biggest challenge was having a presidential race and a
senate race in the same place during the same cycle and trying to navigate
that because, frankly OFA was going to be far more resourced, and there’s
a ton of data that makes clear that people rise and fall with the
presidential, with the top of the ticket. I think many of the people on the
OFA side would have said you should just trust that we’re going to run a
really good turnout operation and you should be thoughtful about your
communication strategy and we’ll ID for you where we can, but ultimately
our analytics are clear in that people support us both enough, just join, just
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trust us we got this. Obviously if someone’s political fate is on the line it’s
hard to…just trust that we’ll take care of it.”219 (Wyant)

Without field coordination, efforts could become redundant, much like the 527
chaos of 2004. Given the importance of volunteer-led infrastructure, the campaigns
would risk competition for the same activist support, rather than building a coherent
apparatus. Perhaps even more concerning in a close race was the possibility that the
other statewide Democratic campaign could be expending resources to mobilize Romney
voters. Such scenarios did not sit well with OFA.
“Certainly, I would have loved if there was no one (else) in the field
organizing, and people hired for other campaigns were doing events, or
political connections, or communications…it can be an interference. When
you have two people in the same turf who have goals for doors and
knocks…it makes it less efficient.”220 (Wyant)

Yet from the ODP’s standpoint efforts were seen as qualitatively different,
according to Elizabeth Brown, the 2012 ODP Executive Director (and Sen. Brown’s
daughter):
“We didn’t use (the NTL) model and that’s a pretty big differentiation I
think. We were also because OFA was here, we were able to fill in parts of
the state where they didn’t concentrate as heavily: the Mansfield’s, the
Zanesville’s, the Middletown’s…places like that, what we called the
hometowns. So you have the three biggest cities, then you have the next
five, and that’s where most of your driving up turnout happens, and then
there that other (sic) set of cities where organizing looks very different”221
219
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Whereas for OFA, the level of cooperation with local parties was contingent, the ODP
side focused largely on supporting the county infrastructure:
“We would hesitate to open up an office space outside a county party
headquarters…when you’re organizing via a state party you inherently are
thinking about the long-term value of the campaign. That does not mean
people who work for OFA don’t [care] about long-term value, but they are
two different mechanisms.”222 (Brown)

By October, an increasingly bullish outlook on the party’s presidential odds
coupled with the overwhelming capacity of OFA in Ohio, led to the Brown campaign and
state party relenting in its ancillary field plan, and folding its ground operation into OFA.
This helped the party run a coordinated GOTV effort. Obama would wind up victorious
in Ohio by a closer margin than 2008. Yet with only 100,000 fewer voters than 2008, this
seemed to reflect stability in the Democratic electorate in a more challenging political
environment. Brown would also have a slightly smaller vote total than his first senate
race (although he would outpace Obama’s percentage). Top of the ticket success once
again translated down ticket. Gerrymandering however, prevented state vote share from
translating into dramatic state legislative victories.
There was a sense that at the least the culture of the OFA model was filtering
through the state:
“I think in a lot of the bigger counties there is now a really good
integration…you’ve got new blood…and by 2012 you had the
overwhelming majority of Ohio county parties understand we can all work
together and actually these new voters are an asset and it’s how you
222
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include them will determine your party structure moving forward.”223
(Schultz)

After 2012
Like 2008, once the general election campaign concluded, its staff structure was
quickly dismantled. Based less on explicit presidential electoral considerations and more
on supporting grassroots activity wherever they sprouted, OFA 4.0, “Organizing for
Action” had fewer resources dedicated to Ohio than 2.0. After two elections, even if not
the norm, there would be neighborhood teams across the state that appeared to be durable
as activist networks. Because of the 501(c)4 status of OFA, these teams could not be
explicitly channeled into party activity, at least not by OFA staff. Yet, in a number of
counties, OFA organization had penetrated the county party and local politics. The 2014
campaign would be a challenge as it lacked OFA’s presidential resources and activist
passion, as well as Strickland’s incumbency and personal popularity. Given a challenging
environment, finding Democrats for the top of the ticket was a difficult task.
One task of parties not yet discussed is that of the candidate recruitment.
Presidential elections often feature competition between highly resourced candidates
acting as proxies for various alignments of interest groups. In most other elections,
parties must recruit a singular ‘viable’ candidate. While an impressive resume is useful
for a potential candidate, more important is a base fundraising network. In return for what
could be viewed a down payment on viability, the party might pledge staff support and
further assistance in fundraising. The state coordinated campaign director focuses on
prepping and grooming candidates new to the statewide ticket. When the party brand and
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its resource network is strong, it will be more likely to draw top rate amateurs into
politics, and lower level politicians into bigger competitive races. Yet, when the brand is
a liability and the party can offer little in the way of support, there are few inducements to
coax the best candidates. Potential candidates will be reticent to jump into races with
little chance for success.
Incumbency is an overwhelming predictor for victory, as its likelihood increases
through the fundraising advantages it confers. The lack of this can be devastating for
party building. A lack of incumbent resources over time is likely to have the effect of
starving the party infrastructure, further depressing its capacity for candidate recruitment.
Long-term incumbency by candidates not facing term limits and parties in safe districts
will likely institutionalize into patronage machines that further buttress party support.
Strong candidates bring with them robust fundraising networks, which even if not
directly becoming institutionalized as an explicit party resource, allow other candidates to
free ride on financially strong Democratic candidates’ campaigns. If over time, the
candidate pool is weak on the federal level and for other high resource campaigns, this is
likely to hurt down ticket party strength, further dissuading new potentially strong
candidates to run for office. Winning begets winning; losing begets losing. These patterns
will alter party logic over time.
In 2014, the political environment pushed several high profile Democrats
away from taking a chance at the top of the ticket. This included Ted Strickland, as well
as Betty Sutton, a prominent former congressional representative from the Akron area,
redistricted out of her seat in 2012. With a Republican-held senate seat up for grabs in the
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2016 presidential year, and the hope of better conditions in 2018, neither was willing to
fight an uphill race during the midterm year.
The party settled on Cuyahoga County Commissioner Edward Fitzgerald. A
less well-known pol without an established fundraising background (and as it would
happen a less than well-vetted background in general). The lack of star power at the top
of the ticket would harm down ticket recruitment. It would also lead to fundraising
effects that affected other statewide down ticket races. Yet the hope would be that better
targeting, complemented by the increasing sophistication of the party’s data tools could
perhaps help to pull an unexpected upset, or at least help the party pull a few surprises
down ballot.
The goal was to raise $30 million dollars for coordinated efforts. While reaching
Obama-levels of youth vote was seen a bridge too far for this election, the party’s
strategy was focused on maintaining turnout within the black vote, while making
significant gains among white woman who are likely Democrats, yet sporadic midterm
voters. Advances in targeting hoped to better identify Democrats among broad-based
demographic profiles. By identifying low turnout voters within higher turnout groups, a
more modest field apparatus could be more efficient. Better targeting of precincts with
loyal Democratic voters could capitalize on those likely to be responsive to campaign
mobilization treatment.
Yet Fitzgerald would quickly wind up failing to meet his modest expectations.
Early fundraising was lackluster. Party insiders grumbled about his effort doing the grunt
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work of fundraising and campaigning. When personal scandals hit the press, any
momentum and veneer to maintain a credible campaign quickly collapsed.224
The lack of a strong top of the ticket would subsequently halt momentum for the
entire party. This illustrates the precarious nature of even a well-resourced and coherent
party. Party institutions could not cultivate resources outside of the strength at the top of
the ticket. Fundraising and activist resources are dependent on a baseline level of
enthusiasm, harnessed on behalf of the lead candidate.
While a couple of statewide candidates maintained respectable fundraising and
poll numbers through the fall, Election Day would be an unmitigated disaster for the
party. This suggests both the importance and relative helplessness of the contemporary
party as an institution. Without strength at the top of the ticket, idiosyncratic coalitions
and resource construction have little chance against a consolidated opposition. As an
institution, the party as a brand cannot induce support from its loyal voters, activists, and
donors absent a figurehead at the top of the ticket that can inspire confidence.

State Parties and the Top of the Ticket
Clear over the period of study is the importance of the top of the ticket to state
party organization. While the state party represents the institutional expression of the
party team, its ability to provide resources rests on the candidate positioned at the top of
the race. State parties have little in the way of an independent fundraising apparatus,
without at the very least a credible candidate. Fundraising is still a result of interpersonal
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nearly impossible, with senior staff quitting, as the campaign could not make payroll.
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relationships. Candidates, not the party, are under most circumstances expected to make
the pitch to donors. The party may be an intermediary vessel, important in providing both
networks and the brand signature of a major party. Yet if it is to provide a connection
between a team of politicians and a state electorate, it remains largely a prisoner of its
premier candidate.
In Ohio, where the gubernatorial election (along with much of the state
legislature) tracks with midterm federal elections, the party seems situated to have a top
of ticket candidate amassing resources for the party apparatus. Yet evidence from the
period under discussion presents several impediments to the institutionalization of an
every-other-year apparatus. Despite an Ohio electorate that is more homogenous, and
perhaps therefore ‘less complicated’ than much of the nation, we have seen different
strategies to constructing a Democratic majority. At least a portion of the rural
conservative electorate has demonstrated a willingness to vote for at least some
Democratic candidates. Disagreements over whether to pursue these voters at the
strategic expense of a more demographically dependable, yet irregular electorate,
pervades even the top of the ticket. Even in 2012, such tensions persisted between an
incumbent president and senator’s respective organizations.
Further, as impressive as Strickland and the ODP’s efforts at fundraising and
party building were from the period of 2006-2010, it was not enough in a bad Democratic
year to replicate the coalition that won with ease just two years earlier. Despite all the
resources of the presidential year, Strickland’s own success at using the office of
governor to unite the party, and make it a fundraising force, was not sufficient in 2010 to
carry himself, nor the party slate, to victory. National donors and party priorities still
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revolve around short-term campaign-centered resource construction, making steady statelevel party building difficult.

Fragmentation in the Coordinated Legal Structure
A point of consistent frustration for ODP staff interviewed is how campaign
finance law makes it difficult to mobilize on behalf of a party ticket. While federal laws
are far more restrictive than that of the state of Ohio, its election law does not allow
federal money in state races or vice versa. This means that money raised by the state
party, cannot feature the president and other federal candidates often most strongly
associated with the party brand. While these resources can be devoted to field operations,
identification with the leader of the party who is the most salient cue for the party’s
irregular electorate is a violation of campaign finance law.
By fall in presidential years, national party donors will often have reached the
fundraising limits for national campaign and party committees (now jointly organized as
‘Victory Funds’) and therefore often donate large sums to the state party state election
campaign funds. Yet the inability to produce campaign literature or coordinate with
federal campaigns prevents using these resources efficiently. The state party can then do
little with this money, but supplement paid media campaigns of local races. This might
win the goodwill of some local actors (and perhaps even offices), yet will do little for
long-term party integration and organization building.
If one consequence of campaign finance law is fragmenting and weakening party
organization through coordinating firewalls, even more severe is the advent (and
increasing popularity) of political vehicles that eschew explicit party and campaign
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structures completely. The macro story of the rise of Super PACs and other IE vehicles
has been discussed in earlier chapters. Yet from the standpoint of the state party, what is
apparent is both the frustration and relative unawareness as to how IE’s have affected
campaigning.
While the development of the Democracy Alliance225 has made liberal IE’s more
coherent and efficient as a network,226 this is of little consolation to state party actors. Put
simply, without coordination, the ODP has no real idea what IE’s are doing and how
effectively they are doing it. Precision in voter targeting is a function of up-to-date voter
ID’s that are made impossible if the contact is done through an IE vessel, as they cannot
share data. While some efforts by labor are thought of more forgivingly, the consensus
appears to be that IE’s are offering little help on the ground to the party’s efforts.
What IE’s do accomplish is to give big donors alternative vessels to give money.
This has accelerated the process of consultants channeling political resources away from
more efficient, if unexciting vessels, such as parties. These sentiments might reflect
frustration that organizations that used to hold a near monopoly on political resources
must compete in a marketplace of sorts (in which campaign finance rules handicap their
ability). Yet when considering both efficiency in campaign mobilization, as well as
normative academic considerations of party function and value, the evidence seems to
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suggest that IE’s play a distorting role, adding another layer of fragmentation to the
American political system.

Digital Diffusion
In addition to money, another resource diffused unevenly through national-state
party mechanisms was its data tools. The two most significant forms of information
developed by OFA were its voter and activist data files. The anticipated transfer of this
information was for the ODP, an opportunity to connect its candidates to the Obama
volunteer base and electorate.
In 2008, the post-election transition of OFA and its activist networks from
presidential campaign into the national party, gave it paternal considerations regarding
the data. Hopes were that using the OFA brand to keep the Obama network active could
mean a permanent army for the party. Yet this meant keeping the data as an OFA
resource, as the volunteer networks were thought best activated maintained by OFA, not
the local and state party. This led to tensions as local and state actors wanted to translate
such enthusiasm to their own efforts and saw the potential for party building squandered.
This reinforced preexisting perceptions of an obtuse party in D.C. Once again, so the
story goes, the autonomy and prerogatives of the national party would leave the local
party organization out in the cold. This would be another example of the winds of a
national campaign that blew in and blew out without local parties having much tangible
to show for it. What is telling is the ‘lists’ as reflections of differing campaign practices
and culture among party actors:
“Everybody wanted the list, everybody wanted the list. The list was
supposed to be this magical piece. They wanted the email list and they
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wanted the volunteer list. I was telling people the DNC was holding the
list, but we are facilitating the relationships. The list is not worth anything,
the relationships are worth everything, you have the one on ones, people
come for Obama, but they stay because of the relationships with other
people…that took a long time to communicate…we want to build
something that is more meaningful than a bunch of emails.”227 (Schultz)

After 2012, it again hoped that OFA data would quickly filter to the local and
state parties, especially since OFA had now abandoned attempts at explicit national party
building. Yet the story of who got the data is a muddled one. Many different actors have
different perceptions of how and when the data finally made its way to the state and then
local parties. This is at the least, once again evidence of fragmentation between national
and state party, as once the presidential campaign leaves, so too do the relationships and
accountability between the varying levels of the party. State OFA operatives and the data
shop disappear. There is nobody left at a desk handling the specifics of data transmission
to the state party.
If big data is the future of campaigning, confusion and tension remains over
exactly why and how it is important. From the standpoint of many the OFA staff
interviewed, frustration over when and what data made its way to the Ohio party is
misplaced. The networks that OFA constructed do not come from the Voter Action
Network (VAN), but the real world, where it is the state and local party’s responsibility
to take those relationships and channel them into their campaigns. Yet from the state
party’s perspective, it is the data, and efficiency of contact facilitated by it that is a
necessary first step for that cultivation. The inability to receive the data quickly and
227
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transparently is a reflection of the indifference and perhaps even mistrust of the national
party.

Voter Contact and Identification
One outstanding question raised by the last several presidential elections appears
in the cross-sectional data available on voter contact. While significant technological
advancements in field campaigns have taken place in 2008 and 2012, surveys have shown
that the height of voter contact made by campaigns happened in 2004.228 One should
however be careful when delineating between quantity and quality in this regard.
Elections, especially national ones, fought on the margins mean efficacy in individual
voter outreach varies greatly because of contingent factors. Sending a piece of literature
to millions of dependable partisan voters in non-competitive states will not have the
impact of just a handful of well targeted door to door canvassing attempts to reach
persuadable or irregular voters.
It follows that large-n national and state analysis taken with caution. Efficacy
comes from the communicative impact of a mixture of individual (and media)
communication techniques over the course of the election. As influenced by Donald
Green and Alan Gerber’s research,229 the general rule for presidential campaigns is to
make three successful door contacts in the months leading up to the election for those in
the persuadable universe. The development of more precise voter targeting might mean
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fewer people overall contacted, with efforts more economically focused on those whose
behavior is likely to vary from campaign treatment.
Voter identification for individual campaigns over this period can also lead to
tension in joint organization through the party. Lower-level campaigns will often want a
top of the ticket race to do identification on their behalf. Yet such asks become logistical
hassles and can impede volunteer activity (for instance, those canvassing for Obama may
not be comfortable campaigning on behalf of down-ticket candidates). As a result, the
decision made at the state-level was to eschew having OFA do voter identification for
candidates other than Obama. This was out of the belief, as one of OFA staffer said: “A
rising tide lifts all boats…we were confident that Obama voters would be Democratic
Party voters…”230 On the local level, OFA staff had more flexibility to ‘carry lit’ for
other candidates,231 yet this too was generally resisted. Such efforts were seen as
logistical hassles during a campaign period in which building infrastructure and
efficiency among volunteers was paramount: “I mean if you carry lit for one race, when
does it end? soon your carrying around a different lit piece for every Democrat
running…I get that trust us, let us handle it can sound arrogant…but look at the
results.”232 Yet from the standpoint of local candidates, it reflected enough of an
insensitivity toward their own interests that there was little incentive to integrate voter
contact into OFA operations.
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Conclusion
In the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012, no state was more prized than
Ohio. As a locus of high resource campaigning, development in party organization
associated with an OFA-like campaign model should be more apparent here than
anywhere else. In the most basic and important sense, variation was clear: Democrats,
after losing the state in three straight presidential elections, carried it twice. On a macrolevel, Obama’s vote totals held down ticket. This success cannot be explained by the
major demographic shifts affecting the nation, which were largely absent in Ohio.
Yet this success did not transition to midterm election years. In these cases, an
older and whiter electorate carried the GOP to victory. The party could not reconstitute
the money, staff, and volunteer base necessary for the mechanics of high-level voter
mobilization efforts. If we expect office-seekers to turn to parties to solve their collective
action problems, why the continued struggle for cooperation across campaigns to build an
apparatus that could like serve as a determinative factor in many of their electoral
fortunes? A large part of the answer is the feast or famine of resources associated with the
presidential year. Politicians do not decide to construct a joint apparatus by committee,
but ride the wave of resources procured at the highest reaches of politics. When those
resources contract in non-presidential years, the lines of fragmentation, never erased, but
overwhelmed by a national infrastructure and electorate that can make effective, if
perhaps somewhat resentful, free-riders of those underneath it, come back to the fore.
Parties and party organizations matter. Yet the most durable party vessels, state parties
themselves, are limited in their own resource construction, often in function being an
ancillary actor to candidate-based, top of the ticket resource construction. The ephemeral
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nature of candidate campaigns focused on party mobilization, while comparatively
durable structures of party building face neglect, presents an apparent conundrum in the
institutionalization of an organization that can consistently mobilize a loyal party
electorate. In the next chapter, these dynamics and their consequences will be discussed
in more depth.
Yet, despite the tensions and frustrations involved, Redfern remains confident OFAlike turnout and mobilization can indeed be institutionalized:
“It can happen. Sure, it can happen. You have to have a strong political
directive and confidence in the state level parties to ensure that it does
happen. Here’s the deal: it doesn’t mean anything unless you understand
data. If you can get the data, you can manipulate it and start turning out
folks down ticket. If you start turning out folks down ticket, you’re going
to pull up not just county commissioners, but state legislators. If you pick
up state legislators, you’re going to start getting control of legislative
chambers. Then you can end gerrymandering and become more
competitive going forward from a DCCC perspective….Now there’s an
ability to walk down a sidewalk now and in real time download all the
information about that particular voter from the value of their house, to
what college their kid goes to, and whether or not they have a hunting
license and tailor a door to door message...(make) sure that that
technology is going to be fungible and that it is going to be able to
advantaged at the state level, otherwise you’re just letting the consultants
get rich.”233
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Chapter 4
Local Party Organization in Ohio
“All you can really ask a party to do is mind the gaps, right?”
- Elizabeth Walters, (D) Akron Councilwoman at large, Former OFA staffer and ODP
Executive Director
This chapter looks at local level electoral organization. Up to this point, this
dissertation has viewed the party through national and state politics. At these higher
altitudes, money flows and macro-strategic decisions happen. Yet, scenes of Washington
D.C. and even Columbus, OH remain far removed from where such strategies take place.
They succeed or fail on the ground, precinct by precinct. In this chapter, I will attempt to
sketch local party organization: the point of contact between campaigns and voters. Most
importantly, I suggest how mechanisms of micro-level fragmentation impede
institutionalization of an efficient party mobilization apparatus. At a superficial glance,
this may seem like a function of interpersonal tensions among the political actors
involved. Yet, I argue that such tensions result from structural conditions that create
different incentives and practices for party actors. Previous chapters have presented a
temporal narrative of specific sets of actors. Because of the idiosyncrasies of local level
politics, in this chapter I focus less on a detailed singular case, and more on situating
tensions and challenges that exist in the local setting.
Central to this discussion is the contrast between OFA and the local party. New
research has begun to reimagine contemporary political organization, focusing on
‘hybridity.’234 Information Communication Technologies have led to increased flexibility
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in modal forms of political organization. If organization has become increasingly
mercurial, our political system still imparts different institutional logics to intra-party
actors. These are challenges not mediated by smart phones and social media alone. In
fact, the incongruity between campaign environments that incentivize adapting to these
developments, and those that do not, can exacerbate these tensions further.
Recent academic works have discussed the development of the Obama
model,235 along with the diffusion of new forms of campaigning.236 Yet these shifts are
neither linear nor complete. They are characteristic of high resource, high competition
campaigning that is not reflective of most contemporary elections in the United States. At
the local level, presidential campaigns in states like Ohio penetrate deeper than ever
before with robust high resourced field operations. Yet this does not mean integration
with preexisting local party structures, developed under a very different electoral logic.
OFA brought unparalleled resources to the local level for presidential
campaigning. Staff worked close to the ground, organizing volunteers. This was not just
to engage in voter contact, but to develop and thicken horizontal relationships to
institutionalize Obama’s grassroots enthusiasm. Data deployed and cultivated by the
campaign offered a far more precise understanding of the electorate, and where its
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Democratic voters could be found, than ever before. Yet continuing institutionalization
would not fall in the long term to OFA, but instead to local party structures.

A Tale of Two Democrats
Picture a scenario. You are a young field staffer for the Obama campaign. You are
sitting across the table from the chair of the Democratic Party in a midsized Ohio county.
This is perhaps your first or second political campaign. Yet you are a representative of a
near billion-dollar organization whose chain of command leads directly to the highest
profile and most respected strategists within the party. You have been trained in the most
cutting edge campaign techniques, developed and instituted by a large and sophisticated
organization. Your campaign is at the forefront of using data and advanced voter turnout
modeling, while incorporating the outpouring of grassroots support for your candidate
from millions of activists, many completely new to the political process. Your job is to
build an organization to mobilize new and sporadic voters, while persuading voters who
might be undecided, through contact with trained campaign activists. You are confident
that by following the program you are in this county to implement, you will not only
mobilize voters for a presidential majority, but on behalf of the down ticket candidates
the local party supports.
The chair sitting across from you seems skeptical of your approach. He or she is
several decades older than you, and begins to tell you about how politics are ‘done’ here
at the county level. The chair boasts of his or her years of experience in local politics. Yet
the chair has never been a full-time staffer or worked for a national campaign. Perhaps it
is 2008 and you are coming off a record primary turnout, where your campaign out-
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organized the most dominant force in Democratic Party politics of the last several
decades (you did happen to notice the Hillary bumper sticker still on the chair’s car as
you passed it). Maybe it is 2012, and you are rebuilding the organization that carried
Ohio for the Democrats for the first time in twelve years in 2008; that won the first
national majority for the Democrats in several decades by mobilizing this new electorate
(that Hillary sticker is still there…if now next to an Obama one). You have the money,
the activists, and the computer scientists in Chicago. So why is this person talking your
ear off about palm cards with local judges?
A slightly different vantage point. You are the chair of the Democratic Party in a
midsized Ohio county. You are sitting across from a young staffer from the Obama
campaign assigned to your area. You grew up here, lived most of your life here. You
have spent most of your adulthood active in local party politics, slowly rising through the
ranks. Perhaps you have held office in local government at some point, or maybe you
have stayed within the party infrastructure, moving up through the county central
committee to your positon now. It has never been particularly glamorous work: potluck
fundraisers, dropping off lawn signs, distributing literature at the Veterans Day parade.
The lack of panache though makes it all the more important: after all, someone has to do
it.
Every four years there is a kid like the one sitting across from you. Nice and
enthusiastic, probably from New York or the Bay area (they usually are), who
nonetheless seems to think he or she knows a bit more than actually may be the case. The
kid will be gone in six months anyway; off to DC, or law school, or whatever. But you’ll
still be here. Your years of experience have given you hard-earned knowledge. You know
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what streets you need to hit at 5:00 PM on Election Day to get out those last couple dozen
Democratic votes; who has the house right off of Main Street that will let you put up the
6 x 6 sign for the top of the ticket candidate; who you can depend on to host a local
fundraiser; what local civics teacher or professor can be depended on to steer a few
interns your way; the names of the group of older ladies who will stuff envelopes on
Thursday evenings for all the campaigns; which streets not to waste time with because
they vote Republican, or just don’t vote. You know how politics work here, and when
that kid and their laptop are long gone, you will still be here, talking with the next kid
four years from now.

Fragmentation on the Ground
If this scene is marginally a work of fiction, it nonetheless is one that
approximates many of the conversations that take place in the summer and fall in local
party offices across Ohio (and the country) during the presidential season. Many good
national campaign staffers and local party officials will learn to work together and use
their disparate resources and knowledge for mutual benefit. Yet the tensions that
undergird this relationship are not interpersonal, but based within the deeply embedded,
fragmented institutional logic of American party politics. Both sides are in the right. Yet
the varied structural incentives within the American federal system mean that, on the
local level, where campaigns large and small actually interact with the citizenry, different
sets of resources, strategic templates, and even cultures will exist. This is as a response to
the different patterns of development within these organizations and institutions. They
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exist side by side, but rarely do they truly integrate as a party apparatus- into a unified
and efficient mechanism to mobilize the party vote.
If parties are multifaceted, we assume that a party organization remains
patterned coherently on the federal system: with national, state, and county party
organizations. Perhaps they are stronger or weaker based upon the idiosyncrasies of the
political era, but they are still holistic as entities. Yet in a given place during election
season, the party apparatus may be several different entities, working with little
organizational coherence beyond a rough understanding of an allied electorate. We
might think of this through the prism of the candidate-centered era, where party
organization was largely replaced by individual campaigns looking to idiosyncratically
aggregate majorities for singular candidates. Yet these are not candidate-campaigns in
this sense. Data, polarization, and money have changed campaigning in ways discussed
in earlier chapters. These organizations are built as centripetal forces over political
resources. They operate on behalf of mobilizing a defined and coherent party electorate.
Put plainly, many political organizations, and OFA especially, should be considered party
organizations. The last chapter illustrated OFA’s centrality to the state-level Democratic
ticket. Despite this, OFA did not integrate seamlessly into a joint organization with the
local party. It was however responsible for the bulk of party resources, in ways not
always aligned with other, often more durable, party actors.
The varying modes and scale of resources around each election create multiple
iterations of campaign templates, all operating in their own overlapping yet distinct
universes. Competitiveness and control/representation within government influence the
sort of resources that compel party unity, at and between different levels of government.
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Electoral organization remains an awkward combination of slick billion-dollar
modernized campaigning and old school ward heeling, in which party organizational
unity is contingent on wedding this diversity under one schematic. This remains a steep
challenge.
One thing most will agree upon is that when looking at the county level, is there
is very little generalizability. Each county has its own idiosyncratic culture based a
laundry list of variables. Competition, and intertwined strategic importance, activism
levels, and the organic political enthusiasm of the electorate will all affect local party
development. Yet in Ohio, we can make a crude contrast between different types of
dominant electoral and party organization that overlap, yet are largely without
integration, while representing multiple distinct political cultures.

Figure 4.1: Party Organizational Templates
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Resources, responsibilities, and tactics will vary on each level of the party
structure. Modes of field campaigning and voter contact look very different depending on
the resources available to the campaign. High resource models have become data
intensive and dynamic. OFA also introduced relational organizing techniques that
changed the responsibilities of both staff and volunteers on the ground. Organization
centers on the NTL/snowflake model, which requires a largely front-loaded staff presence
to construct a volunteer campaign mobilization apparatus. This however exists
independent from the local party structure. While the scale of OFA dwarfs that of local
organization, life for the local party goes on. City council candidates run small canvasses;
the county party has its summer fundraiser, and the Democratic Clerk of Courts candidate
gives her supporters T-shirts and lawn signs.

Mapping the Party Assemblage
Rasmus Nielsen, in his valuable description of the campaign assemblage in a
2008 Connecticut congressional race, traces campaign resource construction as mediated
by the congressional campaign itself.237 Nielsen describes the assemblage as an
ephemeral organization that draws from durable institutions such as parties, unions, and
civic groups, while also cultivating its own makeshift staff and activist networks. At the
base of the assemblage is the explicit campaign infrastructure, charged with integrating
the exogenous raw materials channeled into an electoral apparatus. It is:
Not a thing “out there” in the sense a human being is, but rather a name
for a combination of technologically augmented organizations, groups,
and individuals whose combined capacity for action is brought to bear on
237

Nielsen 2012.
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a shared project. In a few corners of the United States, where the finely
meshed networks still exist or have found new forms, one can perhaps
think of personalized political communication as something pursued by a
single organization or a set of firmly institutionalized practices.238

Yet Nielsen argues that such institutionalization is uncommon today. Entrenched
electoral organization has been replaced in politics by weak yet diffuse networks, and
money.239 This new environment makes local field organization construction ad hoc and
idiosyncratic. Campaigns use professionalization, aligned interest groups and activists; a
party, what the particulars of their situation allow.
The choice to focus on a congressional race makes sense in a state like
Connecticut—a non-presidential battleground, where the most highly resourced
campaigns are likely to be at the congressional level. Yet this description is contingent on
a campaign scaled accordingly, and the ancillary resources available to it. This is
unrepresentative of OFA, which had the financial capacity and organic activist support, to
build its own assemblage largely from scratch through the neighborhood team model.
OFA had the resources to subsume whatever skeleton of infrastructure existed in other
local races. It remained largely divorced in many places from the local party
organization, a significantly more modest, yet perhaps more durable assemblages.
A distinction between a campaign assemblage and party organization rests upon
the level of institutionalization of the organization. As networks and data become
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increasingly critical to electoral politics, organizational hybridity makes both modes of
organization, and the strategic incentives associated with them less defined. Whether
aligned with a current formal organization, candidate networks exist as a potential party
resource. For example: after 2004, Howard Dean supporters who got together at local
meetups through the primary, might have transitioned themselves into Democracy for
America (DFA), the formal organizational outgrowth of his campaign. Yet it is possible
(and given the modest size of DFA, even likely) that the network could be at least
partially maintained outside this formal organizational vessel. They might have organized
for John Kerry in 2004, perhaps after Dean became party chair, integrated themselves
into the local party, or for a progressive local candidate; potentially they joined or formed
the local MoveOn chapter or another local progressive group; maybe one of them even
eventually became an OFA NTL and brought the rest of group into their team. Networks,
once cultivated are likely to exist outside of the organizational apparatus that fostered
them. They exist, at least latently, beyond the structures that brought them into being.
Because assemblages are so unwieldy, creating efficiency among them can be
difficult. In the gap between local parties and presidential campaigns, are races that
command both financial and activist resources at the scale necessary for
professionalization. In a resource-heavy state where the federal is under the presidential
brand, such efforts would likely to be redundant. As discussed in the last chapter, in
2012, Sherrod Brown attempted to do this with a more modest, yet distinct field program
run through the state party. This created tension as the different Democratic campaigns
jostled over activist networks. Ostensibly, this was a function of the Brown campaign
considering a potentially larger electorate than that of Obama. Yet these redundancies
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carried over into urban areas, where at the micro-level it got in the way of building
efficient economies of scale. Campaigns wound up recruiting from overlapping
volunteer networks and engaging in overlapping voter contact.
Linkages between local party organizations and OFA did exist. Local parties can
often provide know how and even networks to OFA. The first point of contact for most
OFA staff when ‘getting on the ground’ is the local party chair. Many of these
interactions are warm and integral in helping OFA get off the ground locally. Elizabeth
McKenna, recalls her 2008 experience in Ottawa County initially meeting the county
party chair:
“(We met) over chicken salad, Wendy’s is a big deal in Ohio. She was a
Hillary supporter and so the training that I got on the Obama campaign
was simply to talk about myself…why I was interested in working for the
Obama campaign, and elicit her expertise on the county that I just
parachuted in to….talk (sic) about what we hoped to do in the county in
the next three or four months. Not just to elect Obama, but to strengthen
the progressive Democratic Party structure.”240

Yet this cooperation is largely idiosyncratic as there is no systematic
organizational apparatus or incentive to fuse party campaigning together under one roof.
OFA’s field plan was fundamentally distinct from that of the local party; as was its later
post-campaign bridge organizations Organizing for America (2.0) and Organizing for
Action (4.0). Politicians may share offices, know how, and even their homes with
national staff, yet they often remain organizationally balkanized, practically speaking
different languages.
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Figure 4.2: Party Organizational Flow

The figure above illustrates the flow of resources from the national party down
through the local level. OFA’s joint fundraising ventures do indirectly filter to the local
party through the state party. Yet there is no direct organizational linkage between OFA
and the local party, financially or otherwise. The state party will channel resources to
both the county parties and individual candidates running for state/federal office. These
candidates will run their own smaller voter contact operations, culling assemblages like
those described by Nielsen. At the local level, candidates will attempt to run their own
modest idiosyncratic campaigns with county level support. Such campaigns however,
will be a drop in the bucket, in both sophistication and output, of the federal level
campaigning going on around them.
There is no formal chain of command between local OFA and the local party.
OFA-local party relationships are idiosyncratic. In most places, only the county party
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chair, not local elected officials will have a working relationship with OFA. The county
party chair is likely to want to preserve their own chain of command and not want
interference from an outside force. Conversely, from OFA’s standpoint, since they do not
run coordinated campaigns with local candidates, there is little need to be in
conversation. While such a schema reflects a short-term electoral logic, there is no
mechanism for party-wide integration of networks and expertise. According to 2008
Regional Field Director and 2012 State GOTV Coordinator Max Lesko:
“There’s both the city level and the county level. I recall the county level
being the mama bear and ultimately trying to protect [the interests of the
local party]. The county executive was the starting point in conversation
between myself and the local community. There’s three entities: the
county party, the county executive’s office and the city elected
(officials)…but I never really spoke with the third group…(The county)
wanted things from us, we weren’t necessarily willing to do that, but
there’s ways to be approachable and receptive without necessarily
agreeing on everything. ”241

The Role of the State Party Locally
The state party derives its power, at least in a technical sense, from its county
party clients. Local candidates usually do not have access to significant fundraising
networks or large campaign staffs. They are dependent on the state party to help navigate
developments in campaigning as well as providing them with professional resources.
Actual locally dedicated financial resources are fleeting and often contingent on the
strategic importance of districts. Yet the state party is influential in directing federal-level
resources. This includes money, statewide campaign staffing, and events for principals
and surrogates. As put by Janet Carson, chair of the Ohio Democratic County Chairs
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Association (ODCCA), and Geauga County chair: “Most chairs work outside their party
chairman duties and most are older and have never had the professional training party
staffers have.”242
Permanent state staff such as the Executive Director and Political Director spend
much of their time working with county parties, assessing their needs and attempting to
procure the resources to meet them. Positions such as data and field directors exist on a
semi-permanent basis, as they scale for the height of the campaign cycle. This staff also
works with county parties often traveling the state attempting to train county party
leadership on data and organizational techniques early in the campaign season.
Compared with an organization like OFA’s presidential campaign, resources are
scarce. State staff is responsible for complementing 88 counties with largely volunteer
leadership, all with their own issues and demanding the state party’s finite attention and
resources. Urban vs. rural, majority vs. minority districts, and other variables all lead to
different considerations and challenges. For Carson, responsibilities and challenges
include:
“Bring(ing) county organizations into the 21st century (through) help with
technology, data and fundraising. To develop a regional structure so chairs
could mentor and communicate with their local peers, sharing best
practices to strengthen every county organization and to hold annual
listening tours to learn what is important to our members and their
constituents.”243

242
243

Personal communication
Personal communication

168

State parties get little in the way of support nationally as independent
infrastructure. Instead, the ODP’s role is often as firefighter of last resort in mediating
tensions between presidential campaigns and local parties. The small monthly DNC
contribution helps to support their bare bones staff, but state party building is largely a
function of the electoral clock and its impact on national fundraising. As a point of
comparison, there were on average several OFA organizers for each county during the
presidential elections.
If the state party exists as a mediating structure between national and local
parties, it only has the resources to do so in a passive sense. At the height of presidential
campaigns, its job is to build cohesion or at least keep the peace between the presidential
and local parties. State party staff will relay to local party leadership presidential
campaign events and surrogates coming to the state and their region. Yet as previously
seen, the state party’s resources are tethered to forces such as control of government.
Absent state level executive power, close support of localities, let alone the coercive
power necessary to promote party integration appears unrealistic.

The Challenge of Party Congruence
From the general perspective of the party, an efficient field strategy should be a
singular apparatus in which all resources of aligned party office-seekers combine to
mobilize a coherent party electorate. Money, volunteers, data would all integrate in a
single organization that conducts outreach in the service of mobilizing a party electorate
for its candidate slate. This however is not empirically the case, as various assemblages
and organizations work with little coordination. The consequences of this are a high
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resource top of the ticket campaign carrying the organizational burden with smaller
campaigns orbiting. Yet without integration, election-to-election resource disparities will
hamper the party’s ability to translate its latent coalition in the electorate into government
power.
From the local party’s perspective, it may be that there is little that OFA can do
to help build its organization. OFA recruits volunteers under the Obama brand, trains
them on a high resource campaign model that is based on organizing others around that
brand; and then institutes a sophisticated volunteer-led mobilization apparatus based on
targets that come from national headquarters, developed by dedicated targeting
professionals, once again on behalf of the specific appeal of the Obama brand to its voter
targets. The brand and resources that OFA capitalizes upon therefore is not easily
replicated. Yet even other forms of institutionalized resources can have difficulty
translating to the local party. Progressive activists are often loyal to ideological
candidates, not the party operating under constraints of government and/or sensitive to
other considerations of resource construction. From one long-time county chair’s
perspective:
“Obama activists have not become a part of local parties and though we
worked hard to court them, their interests weren’t in helping the party but
in supporting their candidate…many chairs felt this was a failing on the
part of OFA.”244

The lack of brand congruence on a local level is a function of the structural
impediments to a joint local party structure. Different political teams, linked to different
campaign assemblages and electorates, all exist within the same party. Methods of
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campaigning all develop due to the political culture fostered in response to peculiar
conditions. According to McKenna, older county party leaders:
“…were weary of the organizing techniques that Obama organizers were
taught to implement. So house parties, one on one meetings, neighborhood
teams, these were all an entirely different lexicon for establishment
Democrats. They were used to pot luck dinners, debate watch parties, and
yard signs.”245

Critiques of national organization are usually around what many consider a
cookie-cutter national template that does not prioritize the local idiosyncrasies of politics.
The long-term personal relationships that undergird local organization have little use in a
high resource election where turnout and salience is significantly higher. For Elizabeth
Walters:
“There’s always that push and pull between folks whether they be voters,
or volunteers, or donors who only show up during the presidential year
and wanting to encourage their activism and make a place for them within
the party and the operation. But then you also have that huge group of
long term activists who maybe they don’t knock doors as much as they
used to, they may be a little more old school, but they carry the banner in
the mayoral races in our communities every year and so…the (local
politicians) say yeah that’s nice Barack Obama, that you say if you win
it’s going to help me, but how do I know that the voter in my county even
knows my name when you won’t invest in a sample ballot, you won’t
carry my lit. If I go into your local campaign office on the ground, I’m
being told I can’t even leave my lawn signs or my literature there. It’s hard
and I don’t know what the answer is because I see both sides of the coin.”
246

245
246

Personal communication
Personal communication

171

Organization must be scaled beyond the local party organization, and it must be
done quickly. From the standpoint of the national organization, local strategies are often
ineffective. Based upon the management of moribund structures not subject to robust
electoral competition. Infrastructure appears hollow compared to the model OFA
implements. For one Regional Field Director, describing these divergent perspectives:
“Get a truck with a big poster on it and drive around these key
neighborhoods with a megaphone. That’s what folks thought of as turnout,
and we were saying, you know this idea of micro-targeting, where (sic) we
want to hit a lot of the voters in those areas, but we also want to hit these
traditionally maybe Republican neighborhood(s) where there’s key
pockets of Democratic voters that don’t always turnout. The pushback on
our universes was always a contentious argument. As a (Regional Field
Director), I didn’t have a firm understanding of how that (sic) universe
was created and I also didn’t necessarily have the ability to communicate
that.”247

From the standpoint of the local party, highly resourced organizers show up,
construct their own organization out of largely non-party activists, and leave. They may
well win and carry local candidates with them, but they will just as sure skip town after
the election and deconstruct their apparatus. They, nor their organization, will be there for
the mayoral race next year or state senate race the year after.
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Local Organization
In their book on Obama field organization, McKenna & Han contrast the OFA
model with traditional campaigning.248 They give comprehensive treatment to the
differences between electoral campaigning in the past and OFA. Yet this was not so
much of a transition from one method of campaigning to another. Instead, one form has
largely grafted itself over the other, ebbing once the presidential season has ended with
questionable impact on durable local party institutions.
Local campaigning tends to be a low resourced affair. Small donor events pay for
a modest staff, office space, mailings, and perhaps modest media buys. Much
campaigning still resembles the iconic picture of yesteryear’s parades and potluck
dinners. Visibility in low salience elections is important (or at least is perceived as so), as
is the party brand and ticket for politicians fortunate enough to be in the majority. Lawn
signs, literature, and downtown handshakes make up the lynchpin of a typical campaign
template. Voter targeting is an oral tradition of blocks, precincts, and wards that make up
the party vote. Walters, discussing the varying roles of the local party:
“It greatly varies by county. Some county parties say we’re going to drill
in, raise money to do a sample ballot, or raise money to support a judicial
candidate piece, because judicial candidates have a harder time raising
money at the local level… Very few counties have full time staff, usually
it’s just the bigger urban ones that are able to afford it. They provide office
space, they provide telephone lines, they provide connection to donor
networks if they exist in the county…time saving things that would take
the candidate or a volunteer two days to tack down, the county party does
it.”249
248
249
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The party can provide basic resources, institutional memory, and a venue to
workout conflict and build cooperation among party politicians. Tammany may be dead,
but the party, as a physical place, is still how politicians can coordinate on behalf of
shared interests and electorates. Large urban counties, and robust smaller ones, will have
offices that serve as meeting spaces for the community as well as political figures. These
venues can be integral for phone banking, fundraising, and morale of party loyalists. Over
the period under study, one major institutional development is the procurement of officespace for medium to smaller-sized county parties. Carson discussing the importance of
this for the county party:
“The (Republicans) had never had a HQ or office except during limited
campaign cycles. We have had a HQ open year round for the last six
years. Now the (Republican)’s have felt compelled to spend funds and
have their own HQ, although not permanent as ours is. This gives us a
presence in the county and makes it easier for Dems to find us.” 250

County party chairs and most elected officials are not full-time politicians, but
have significant experience with the local party. The prerequisites for these positions is
often mastering the local party template as candidate or campaigner.
Extra-organizational resources will vary significantly from one county to another.
A cornerstone of ODP organization in urban and industrial areas is still unions that have
significant resources to get out voters (especially members and their families) in many
places. In urban and liberal enclaves, there are often local progressive organizations such
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as MoveOn that have built a presence. These may be important fundraising networks as
well as provide ground troops for voter contact. These networks may constitute the basis
of resources on a local level, where they remain more durable than OFA activist
organization. In some instances, these more ideological organizations have been outlets
for activists groomed by OFA and other campaigns, who have remained ambivalent
about participating in explicit local party institutions.
Candidates however usually must provide basic campaign resources for
themselves. For those in small counties that nonetheless fall in major media markets,
television advertising is impractical. Viability is a function of demonstrating the
fundraising prowess necessary to build a campaign. County party endorsements in
primaries can be an important signifier in low turnout elections for party stalwarts. Yet
parties find themselves caught between wanting to put forward the strongest ticket
possible and risking making choices that could alienate stakeholders.
Local party organizations are highly institutionalized with clear hierarchies and
rules for advancement. They are not large organizations in the popular sense, but are what
is necessary to maintain an effective local apparatus for low salience local politics. They
are the institutional memory, and often gatekeepers, for political amateurs looking to
enter the electoral arena.
This presents a marked contrast with what the presidential template developed by
OFA looks like on the local level. Local organization is the tip of a highly sophisticated
and bureaucratized national organization. Financial resources are significant. So are the
raw materials that could be cultivated locally, especially volunteers. This is a function of
the salience of a presidential election, and particularly with a candidate of Obama’s
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appeal. Despite having to build an organization from scratch, OFA’s resources can very
quickly dwarf the organizational apparatus of the local party. Money, volunteers, data,
and staff infrastructure (especially when aggregated from the national level—such as the
data and communication staff in Chicago that work with local organizers) all are orders
of magnitude higher than what can be summoned by the local party.
Professionalization also operates through a very different landscape. While
volunteer networks are ‘snowflaked,’ at the staff level, the campaign remains very much
hierarchal. Strategies are dynamic, having come out of a national template through
electoral competition. Social media, data implementation, and even field tactics can all
quickly move from experimental to institutionalized within a national campaign
apparatus, when proven effective. Development and diffusion of new tactics is necessary
in this environment: with data, organizing, and communications strategies developing
rapidly to be best appropriated by the campaign. For example, resource intensive voter
contact A/B testing took place all over Ohio in 2012. This requires computer scientists
building a sophisticated model; field staff in place building the voter contact apparatus
months (if not years) before the election; and activists to go out and conduct voter
contact. Such a program would be impossible to scale without millions of dollars in
necessary campaign infrastructure.
The NTL model locally, is in function, independent from the party organization.
Senior volunteer cadre get significant training by dedicated local staff on the OFA model.
Focus is not just on the mechanics of voter contact, but relational organizing techniques
to build network capacity over the course of the campaign. The snowflake model further
diffuses campaign activity by putting organizations of precinct clusters into the hands of
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the volunteer neighborhood team leader who responds directly to the OFA field
organizer. This will usually take the place of whatever social diffusion might happen in a
local party campaign office. Some county party chairs relayed a sense that OFA is often
poaching their volunteers. This may stand at odds with claims by many of the same
people that OFA volunteers are qualitatively different from that of the party. Yet it is
evidence of the frustration of party regulars that local organizing is escaping the grasp of
the permanent party infrastructure.
“There was cohort of maybe a dozen to twenty folks (that) were the party
volunteers. We worked with them as the campaign continued. We
collaborated on how we can best lift all boats, but we could have 200
(OFA) canvassers across the county one day and they could say, nope
we’re going to do this thing that we’ve always done. That’s fine, the real
question is, it’s the people who have been involved in local politics, and
do they gravitate to that core of a dozen, or do they go on over to the
presidential. Do they go to the kids?”251 (Lesko)

While idiosyncratic, OFA volunteer networks are often built from scratch with
little channeled from preexisting organization. Some local party activists and even
politicians may join, but many will continue in their local party activities. OFA has
access to most of the existing party activist data. Yet it also has a linkage to those who
have signed up through OFA social media. Staff can continue to build networks through
early voter contact and the social networks of their prime volunteer targets. The point of
the community-organizing model is indeed to maximize their impact by drawing on their

251

Personal communication

177

social networks, rather than throw volunteers “onto doors.” This allows them to largely
bypass the party infrastructure and focus on molding new volunteer cadre.
Yet it is a resource intensive model that would be impractical for local
organization. There were instances reported of local party leadership participating in
OFA organization. Yet, OFA leadership is a labor-intensive task (NTLs are expected to
volunteer 10-15 hours a week) that would even in the best of circumstances be difficult
for volunteer party leadership, which must assume responsibility for normal party
functions.

Competition and Resources
In previous chapters, the fight over resources¾ where they go, and when they go
there¾ has been at the fore. Yet there is another important factor in incongruity, most
salient at the local level. Highly competitive national elections remain juxtaposed with
local politics—where increased spatial sorting and gerrymandering has stunted the
competitive environment.
A lack of competition at the county level is not a new phenomenon. County
level competition also does not guarantee higher-level party sponsors. Chairs in
competitive counties complain that they are also ignored, as statewide resources often
filter to Democratic ‘base’ turf. Yet the sorts of races that would be receptacles for
statewide party targeting, that encompass districts larger than many small counties, such
as congressional or state senate races, have been gerrymandered out of competition. It is
the varying and crosscutting levels of competition that so impacts the institutional logic
of campaign culture. This is especially so concerning ‘safe’ non-competitive Democratic

178

counties that (are perceived to252) receive the bulk of resources for statewide base
mobilization, and the high level of OFA resources dedicated there.
Long-standing theories explain how the party system is influenced by robust
electoral competition. Competitive two-party systems can lead to dynamic shifts in
leaders and representation.253 Under these conditions, competition can incentivize
individuals, and most importantly parties, to expand participation to construct their
majority.254 Yet, one-party systems display collusion among party elites, incentivized to
conspire and restrict competition.255 A narrow and managed electorate is under the
control of the leadership of the dominant party, who ensure stability through patronage
and the repression of countervailing organizational power, which could lead to
competition and threaten the status quo power arrangements.256
Historically speaking, the machine’s strength came from its control over the
mobilization apparatus.257 The local party held a monopoly over the institutional
knowledge of the precinct-by-precinct party vote. Yet this today is no longer the case on
the local level. There is a registered, at least latent electorate, loyal less to the local than
to the national party. This linkage is characteristically through the personalized brand
associated with the presidency. Indeed, it is the incongruity between the national brand
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and the local party organization, which is at the center of the struggle for organizational
integration. If the heart of the historical party was the local boss, it is now a voter file and
a presidential slogan.
Local parties often still display characteristics of the traditional political
machine. They are durable, hierarchal organizations. Advancement comes from working
your way up the party hierarchy over time. Robust competition on the county level is
rare, where electoral turnout and public attention is low. Majority parties will have some
amount of patronage to pass around. Minority parties meanwhile will have little in the
way to offer politicians and activists to engage them.
Yet safe counties today in battlegrounds such as Ohio are, if one-party dominant,
still analytically different from historically non-competitive systems. They are over-laid
by state and national campaign organizations that are functioning under the logic of a
competitive two-party system-- where high turnout elections are necessary. This does not
create a classic one-party system, but an incongruence between a permanent local
organization whose most narrow prerogatives (control of local government) remain
unaffected by mobilization, yet share a ticket with state and national campaigns whose
outcome will be decided by marginal gains in state-wide turnout. The increasing scale
and professionalization of national politics has increased the field presence of national
campaigns: to the point in that they now often create robust parallel organization, scaled
well beyond the durable party apparatus. This is especially true in Ohio. Its strategic
importance means building presidential assemblages exponentially larger and more
sophisticated than that of the local party. OFA’s implementation of neighborhood teams,
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however, has taken this to a new level. Hundreds of organizers built sophisticated local
organizations reliant on community-based volunteer cadre.
As an orchestrator of assemblages, the local party still best aggregates the local
apparatus, even if that organization exists largely outside the explicit hierarchy of the
party machine. This is to say; it falls largely to the party to capture whatever networks
exist for local candidate campaigning. It maintains institutional memory and
infrastructure, which provide necessary if not sufficient resources for new candidates.
Whatever latent tension might exist between OFA activists and the local party, there is
little to suggest long-term, large-scale competition between them in any systematic
fashion. OFA largely demobilized or continued to work on behalf of national politics,
paying little attention to the local organization. The label and narrative of OFA remains
strongly connected with national politics and that of the president. OFA 2.0 felt it would
be unsuccessful if it attempted to involve itself in local politics. The local party and
politics, if viewed with suspicion by those OFA successfully tapped into, generally
remained ignored as a vessel of contention. Yet true party building must be a function not
of segmentation of these networks and organizations, but integration.

Competition and its Consequences
History shows that managing of a one-party system will create a very different
logic and mode of organization than parties operating in competitive environments.258
Where a party operates outside of robust competition, its central focus is likely to be the

258

Key, Vladimir Orlando. Southern Politics in State and Nation. University of Tennessee Press,
1949.

181

management of patronage-based resources that fortify its dominant position.259 Intraparty conflict is handled not through democratic competition, but highly institutionalized
hierarchies. Success depends on the management of conflict to keep entrenched powers
satisfied enough to not have large scale revolt.
In competitive electoral environments, party cohesion is not a function of
maintaining the status quo, but creating structures that can increase electoral support.260
This means exerting centripetal force on electoral resources to create an efficient
economy of scale to mobilize for a party ticket. With this cohesion, resources
amalgamate to construct the infrastructure necessary to mobilize a dynamic electorate
and consolidate electoral coalitions. Yet cohesion comes out of an alignment of interests
among party stakeholders. If the county parties are not aligned with temporary high
resource presidential organization, as they are not responding to the same competitive
mechanisms, whether on the county level or overlapping state legislative districts, there is
little inducement for integration necessary for efficient mobilization.
Growth in the quantity of non-competitive elections, even in localities that
suggest strong competition, exacerbates these differences. Carson explaining the
consequence of this in minority districts:
“Unsuccessful local races tend to perpetuate the views that Democrats are
unelectable, we don’t have qualified candidates and that there aren’t many
Democrats in the county. These perceptions have to be reversed for
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voters to identify as Democrats and be willing to become active party
members.”261

Historically, one-party systems were typologically characteristic of the solid
south. Today, advanced gerrymandering techniques and more precisely targeted electoral
strategies have created patterns in which insulation from competition is the norm.262 This
is regardless of federal, state, or local nature of the race; and is even so in places like
Ohio that remain highly competitive on the state level. There is evidence of this as part of
a deliberate conservative strategy to curb representation away from an emerging
progressive majority.263 Resource construction has also become significantly more
idiosyncratic as advances in polling have incentivized the concentration of resources in
peculiar areas and elections in which they are likely to produce marginal strategic gains.
The strange consequence is that despite financial resources increasing by orders
of magnitude, and data innovations revolutionizing political communication, this
explosion of resources is being driven into increasingly narrow channels of electoral
competition: battleground states, battleground districts, battleground wards; with
precision focus on a select group of persuadable or sporadic voters. Almost unimaginable
resources are directed toward mobilizing the party vote, yet are applied on the ground in
ways that impede the development of something that looks like a traditional mass party
through unified and durable joint structure. Electoral strategies follow short-term logic,
with precision targeting of resources and voters. Yet, this precision creates strategic
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idiosyncrasies that hamper institutionalization of a mass party. Voters are not economic
or social classes, but individuals measured by party confidence scores based on data
points, histories of voting behavior and consumption habits, and their strategic need for
any given election.
Stunted competition manifests itself within the same geographic space, creating
overlapping but largely disconnected party structures. The resources, strategies, and
people involved are all largely different. This can translate to the brand, or lack of one at
a local level, and mistrust between the divergent activists and networks at the county
level. Without salience or resources, local activism has a much stronger relationship with
traditional patronage, or close personal relationships with the local party infrastructure. In
a micro-sense, activist patterns fall into different universes under different logics of
participation. OFA activists, conditioned for high resourced data intensive campaign
activities, follow national-level structures.
The local party infrastructure is seen as disconnected from the party’s
presidential electorate and activist base. It represents the management of the status quo.
For the local party, these activists present an inconsistent and undependable resource as
well as electorate. For locally dominant parties however, if it isn’t broke, why fix it? It is
unrealistic to expect the modal shift to come from politicians protected under the status
quo.
This tension was central to Obama’s narrative appeal in the Democratic primary.
Earlier chapters have discussed in-depth horizontal conflict. Yet it is worth reflecting on
how this conflict might play out at the community level between the party, its activists,
and voters. The Obama coalition demographically is what most think of when they
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imagine a national Democrat. Yet attitudes among these voters often reflect high degrees
of suspicion toward the institutions of the party. If this seems a paradox, it may be less so
when the national party profile is often absent at the local level, where voters actually
interact with the living breathing expression of the party. One OFA organizer relayed:
“(The party was) older and white…there were some leaders of color who
were excited to build this out in way that was different from the party,
(they saw the party) as not very responsive or interested in building
community leadership capacity.”264

Barack Obama represents the national party profile; and party solidarity
expresses itself through personalistic loyalty to him. At the local level, party precinct
captains and city council members: older, whiter, etc. can come across as vestiges of the
past. If the brand remains untethered to a local institutionalized organizational linkage,
there is no apparatus to connect the party to the electorate. Another OFA organizer:
“Our capacity exceeded what we could organize out of the local party
office and they had a volunteer coordinator and office manager and they
told us they wanted us to find another space and kicked us out of the
office…I got the sense that the local party leadership was old and out of
touch and not interested in running the kind of campaign that the Obama
organization was building…they were more interested in handing out lawn
signs then relational organizing.”265

The irony remains that when aggregated, the inability to connect the local party to
the national electorate leads to depressed turnout that harms the party on a statewide and
national level. National politics remains personalistic in the attachment to a particular
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candidate,266 or perhaps ideological demands.267 This exists in a different space from that
of the local party seeking to manage resources and power through transactional and
interpersonal relationships. Without an organization successfully mediating this however,
everyone is underrepresented.
From a partisan vantage point, this seems like a maddening disconnect. Political
actors whose cooperation would be to their overwhelming mutual benefit cannot find an
effective structure to come together. For Walters:
“There’s only going to be so much a county party chair or a county party
structure can do to engage an activist in a party structure, but what needs
to happen is that the county party has to be the bridge that takes the
activist who is passionate about their president and helps them become
just as passionate about their mayor.”268

Yet a collective action problem persists in that no actor is properly incentivized
to bridge the gap between the differing path-dependent party organizations. All are
responding to highly institutionalized peculiar logics. Whatever they have to gain is
counter-posed by what they have to lose—the autonomy to run campaigns in a way
consistent with customs dictated by their own structural conditions. Campaign finance
law also create high barriers to the construction of organization that transcends them. Put
simply—who would create such an apparatus? Local parties composed of elected
officials who are in safe seats? The national party constructed to prime turnout once
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every four years? A state party caught in between these two party forms with no true
local presence?
OFA 2.0 presented the most explicit organizational attempt to overcome these
boundaries, yet would be hard to characterize as transformative on the local level. Caught
in some ways between these structural boundaries, it lacked the resources, brand, and
institutional knowledge, to be effective as a permanent bridge organization bringing these
diffuse actors together.
Indeed, if the national and local parties are qualitatively different entities on the
local level, the state party remains largely absent. State parties remain stuck between on
the ground relationships and national salience. Even effective state campaigns are, as
seen in last chapter, based on the cultivation of financial resources and empowering
patronage based local organizations, rather than building grassroots organization such as
during presidential elections.
The Obama era has marked an observable decline in down ticket competition.
This has the consequence of reducing resources in a competitive national environment,
where donors and national organizations will channel resources where marginal gains are
most likely. While top of the ticket campaigns garner the greatest amount of resources,
competitive congressional races are also multi-million dollar campaigns that can affect
the party ticket. Republican-led gerrymandering has not only given the GOP a
representative advantage, but has also inhibited long-term Democratic resource
development. Both a reduction in incumbency and competitiveness have hurt Ohio
Democratic congressional fundraising. As the Democratic congressional caucus has
withered post 2010, so too has candidates’ ability to raise money.
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Table 4.1: Mean fundraising total per Ohio Congressional Democratic candidate.
Source: Opensecrets.org *After 2010 redistricting Ohio congressional delegation
was reduced from 18 to 16.
Year
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012*
2014*

Average Congressional Campaign Fundraising
$376,777
$712,420
$1,108,976
$977,231
$641,844
$414,190

In addition, the state legislature has been subject to a reduction in competition
over this time. Perhaps the greatest prize for Democrats on the state level was victory in
the state assembly in 2008. This victory was short lived however. Republicans
recapturing the state house in 2010, would consolidate these gains through redistricting,
making their majority virtually unassailable in the short term. Table 4.2 illustrates the
precipitous drop in competition since 2010. In 2012, races decided by less than three
points dropped to their lowest level in four elections. In 2014, a strong Republican year,
only five races were decided by less than ten points. This was significantly fewer than
any other election over the last decade. The senate, which already displayed a Republican
lean, had only one of its 15 seats up for grabs decided by less than ten points in 2012, and
none in 2014.
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Table 4.2: Competitive races in 99 member Ohio State Assembly. Source: Ohio
Board of Elections.
Year
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014

Less than 3 pts
3
5
5
7
3
2

3-5 pts
2
4
0
5
5
1

5-10 pts
9
9
8
8
8
2

As discussed in the previous chapter, this lack of competition decimates the
Democratic farm team, as there is little inducement to run for office and build fundraising
and organizational networks that can have positive effects on local party building. These
races would be the most resource heavy at the sub-state level. Local party building,
generating resource networks on behalf of state-level and congressional races, is not
feasible if there are no competitive races to build on behalf of.

Collusion or Inertia?
Piven & Cloward269 raise a serious caveat with Schattschneider’s assertion that
party competition creates equalitarian political institutions. Parties may at times socialize
conflict, yet are also inhibited by oligarchic tendencies that make them just as likely to
restrict and mange competition through collusion. The one-party system is every bit, if
not a more prevalent force in the American party system, as truly competitive electoral
equilibrium. This is not as an accident, but as a natural outgrowth of general
organizational dynamics from which parties are not immune.
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Yet when looking at contemporary Ohio, we often see both in the same place and
time, party organization based on high resource, high competition strategies, overlaid
with sturdy hierarchal local organization often responding to one-party dominance. From
a systematic standpoint, such stunted competition quite clearly appears caused by the
partisan motivations of the opposition party. Yet what motivations underlie Democrats
inability to respond effectively? This gap appears less the consequence of collusion in the
restriction of competition, than inertia. This is a result of the lack of a mechanism to
transcend local templates for ones useful for state and federal competition. These are
forces not so much resistant to change and dynamism, but without strong enough
incentives to institute a massive modal shift in resource construction. The institutional
logic of their position remains in the netherworld between the old machine and a newer
networked politics. Repertoires slowly seep through in many cases, yet there is no
organizational capacity to institutionalize OFA-like mobilization. Party actors are not
actively resistant, but have neither the resources nor strong incentive in their noncompetitive districts to adapt.
Mediating structures have been absent, at least at levels strong enough to bridge
networks, repertoires, and brand. OFA 2.0 and the ODP attempted to provide this
function. Yet neither statewide organization had the resources to work closely and
entrepreneurially with stakeholders such as local parties to convince, nor coerce, them.
Data and mobilization strategies have unevenly diffused into county calculations, yet
there is little systematic evidence that this has altered local practices in significant ways.
Local party leaders discuss these tools and strategies. They may quite sincerely want to
modernize, yet such changes take resources that they do not have the organizational
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capacity to build, nor do they feel they receive sufficient resources from higher levels of
the party.

Literature, Lawnsigns, & Laptops
Campaign tactics and the tension over their priority, effectiveness, and
application; illustrate how structural fragmentation plays out on a day-by-day basis.
While perhaps seeming pedestrian, such issues illustrate the gaps in practice that persist.
Data distribution seemingly comes with few transaction costs. Indeed, the VAN’s intent
was to establish a centralized user-friendly vessel for Democrats to have real time access
to voter and activist files. Yet the diffusion of data from presidential campaigns to county
parties has been uneven at best, with responsibility difficult to untangle.
While data for voter turnout is applicable on a small scale by local campaigns
(even without advanced universe modeling, ‘cutting’ lists of high probability Democrats
is simple), there is no real mechanism to integrate such tactics into local campaigns and
parties. While the state party attempts to coordinate with and train the local parties, they
do not have the staff presence to continually service local politicians and campaigns on
data maintenance. Without the resources to professionalize, many local party actors will
be unlikely to overcome the learning curve and integrate data into party activities.
Local party leaders are not luddites. They talk often and excitedly about data and
its current and potential importance to their efforts. Several smaller county parties have
volunteers dedicated to data maintenance:
“We have a full time VAN person who spends hours on the system
providing data to candidates. He is constantly checking the data imputed
by national and state organizations for accuracy and content. Our
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candidates use (the) VAN extensively and it’s an appreciated asset the
state party provides to counties.” 270 (Carson)

Yet as the last chapter illustrated, OFA personnel remain adamant that data itself
is worth little outside the OFA networks and culture that many local parties remain at a
distance from.
Mechanically, it is conceivable to do voter contact and even recruit volunteers,
while eschewing the OFA model and its associated network. Yet for OFA, ignoring the
philosophy of volunteer empowerment will stunt contact capacity and therefore the
ability to reconstruct Obama’s coalition. Conversely, local party actors feeling of having
vital information withheld increased distrust of OFA, making them less amenable to the
integration of tactics and networks. It is this propriety view of data, held across multiple
party factions that illustrates a lack of a truly joint party mechanism.
Another constant tension in campaign coordination involves the carrying of
candidate literature. For national staff, campaign literature pieces are a necessary but
largely anachronistic campaign focus. Voter persuasion is most effective when done
through the personalized narrative of volunteers (supplemented with the support of
analytics). Split ticket voting is not a concern when a Democratic majority is identified,
and certainly not one that can be addressed by a palm card. As one OFA RFD says:
“One big question is always how much lit will you carry? So when you’re
doing voter contact…will you carry down ticket candidate lit, how far
down ticket? Often there’s an agreement where there’s one presidential
piece of lit and one county-wide piece of lit that’s all the down ticket
(races). I think that was kind of assumed that we would do that, and the
idea that we wouldn’t would have been thought of as inconsistent with
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previous practice and so there’s a little bit of tension there in that it’s
assumed that we’re going to do this, but we haven’t agreed to do this
yet…it’s all on the margins of voter contact impact. The reason we do
voter contact is because it changes behavior, because (of the impact of)
someone who talks to their neighbor about why their supporting Obama. If
undecided, of every hundred voters they talked to, that changes two or
three, or four, or maybe five as the top end of that prediction, right? If the
message is more complex that dilutes our core message. For turnout…you
leave a piece of lit at the door as a reminder of who the candidate is and
what our core message is. But if you have two pieces of lit, it is more
likely to end up on the coffee table or end up in the trash.”271

Local parties and candidates however have long maintained their linkage to the
electorate through the ‘party ticket.’ They find it integral for campaigning. Their brand
and name recognition is a function of Democratic ‘literature drops’ that anchor them
within the community. For local candidates in low salience races, candidate visibility
along with the party identifier, are thought vital campaign tactics. Indeed, while broadly,
Obama’s victory carried Democrats, Obama’s votes did not always necessarily carry
down ticket candidates. Federal level candidates largely paralleled Obama’s success, yet
the further down ticket one looks, the more evidence of under-voting and even in some
cases party switching.
While perhaps exceptions to the rule of increased coherence of party voting, it is
understandable when politicians see evidence of colleagues in competitive seats losing
close races in districts that Obama easily carried to be reticent to defer to the national
party. Can office-holders be expected to trust new ways of campaigning if the top of the
ticket effects remain idiosyncratic?
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Conclusion
Fragmentation between OFA and the local party infrastructure is not always the
case. In a small number of circumstances, OFA organization has not just integrated
unevenly with county party structures, but has taken them over. This has tended to be the
case in rapidly growing exurban areas such as Warren County. This should not be
surprising. Such ‘high social capital’ areas are often most conducive to OFA style
organizing. Areas which are experiencing rapid population growth may also give people
increased motivation to create social bonds through organizational participation. Because
many of these communities tend to lean Republican, minority status may make activists
feel their political identity more acutely and instill bonds on that basis.
Yet another important consequence of Republican domination is weak county
party structure. These activists face little to no resistance in taking parties over, as there is
no strongly entrenched organization to resist. Weakly institutionalized party organization
may indeed present more opportunity for newer networks to institutionalize as a party
vessel. As these counties continue to grow and competiveness increases, they may be
able to respond with greater success in mobilization-- and perhaps with the integration of
national and local apparatuses. Whether the capture of formal party structures increases
network durability, campaign effectiveness, and party integration will be important
questions for further study.
Ohio has been at the fore of the rapid development of new presidential
organizational strategies in 2008 and 2012. These strategies have emphasized voter
contact and the scientifically targeted mobilization of a Democratic electorate. They
suggest a significant shift in the party organizational apparatus. Yet, when viewed from
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the ground, these shifts remain unevenly integrated into the permanent institutions of the
party. They would be measurable in resources including money, data, activists, and of
course most importantly an electoral coalition, that replicates presidential ticket success
in off-year elections.
On the national level, coalitional and institutional fragmentation impede efficient
resource construction. When we move to the micro level, these forms of fragmentation
become even more complex. At the local level, activist cultivation is a function of
networks instituted by multiple campaigns, all with different brands, in uneasy alliance
with the formal party structure. Peculiar electoral organizations develop varying modes of
campaigning ranging from precise micro targeting to blunter instruments of traditional
visibility.
Institutional variation at the local level is not just a product of the electoral cycle
and fundraising rules, but also highly idiosyncratic levels of competition and resources in
each locality. Competition attracts resources, as well as gives incentives for dynamism in
campaign strategies. While such resources are in abundance on the presidential level,
interaction with highly institutionalized local party structures, developed under very
different structural conditions, impedes diffusion and institutionalization over the few
months that are the zenith of the campaign season.
This is not to say such efforts have not had a significant effect on party resources.
The voter file gives the party a map to its electorate not even dreamed of a few years
earlier. Voters are now known block-by-block and precinct-by-precinct, with near
pinpoint precision. Local party’s live in an ocean of newly constructed activist networks,
experienced in sophisticated electoral operations.
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Further, these tensions do not mean integration is completely nonexistent. Almost
all interviewed had anecdotal examples of activists, networks, and on occasion even
large-scale local organizational diffusion into, if not the explicit local county party, at
least what could be viewed as durable resources accessible by party institutions. Many
long-time party officials were greatly impressed by OFA’s operation and looked forward
to incorporating both activists and organizing techniques. Yet such integration was not
deep and systematic enough to move turnout in ways evident at the state level.
What remains absent is effective mediating mechanisms to bond these varying
institutions, networks, and campaign modes together in the service of a joint electoral
organization. Fragmentation at the upper echelons of the party has impeded the
development of high resource vessels that could serve as such a bridge in local level
organization building. A disconnect remains between resources exhausted under shortterm campaign imperatives and the need for long-term institution building. Relationships,
while patterned by structural forces, matter deeply in politics. Mediating structures that
bring financial resources, institutional know-how, and (perhaps most importantly) put
people in a room together long enough to gain mutual understanding of their institutional
position and develop a shared culture can help overcome remaining challenges at the
local level.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

Fragmentation is at the core of the American electoral system. Yet, the early
twenty-first century brought vast and swift changes to modes of political participation. If
we think of parties as the vessel of a would-be majoritarian coalition, there are reasons to
suggest a strengthening of their logic. For Democratic Party office-seekers, the
institutionalization of the Obama coalition presents the clearest, and perhaps only, path to
electoral success. Yet, moving effectively and efficiently toward an apparatus in service
of this task has remained challenging. Institutional barriers to party building remain steep.
In its formative stages, this project sought to answer simply whether campaign
trends that favored mobilization strategies, provided evidence of strengthening party
organization and resources. Parties however are not simple. On the one hand, Obama
mobilized more people to vote for Democrats than ever before. Yet, the formal
institutions of the party, along with its representation in government across the country, is
significantly weaker than when he took office. Consensus around the New American
Electorate’s destiny appears shattered. In 2016, Democratic performance among the
white working class hit lows often thought unimaginable even in the post-Obama era.272
OFA projects, Organizing for America and Organizing for Action, designed to turn the
presidential grassroots army into a permanent force, far from revolutionized American
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politics. Rather, the right-wing populist insurgence of 2010 led to increased
gerrymandering and restrictive voting laws.
Conventional wisdom in 2007, found Obama’s electoral strategy audacious and
unrealistic. The same would be said of Mr. Trump’s eight years later. Certainly, if
nothing else, many assumptions about American politics seem ready for discarding.
Economic stagnation and social change have had profoundly alienating effects on the
average citizen’s relationship to political institutions.273 The media has made information
significantly easier to access, yet facts are more difficult to ascertain.274 From YouTube
ads to ‘fake news’ websites, campaigns and parties exploit these changes, yet can only
harness them for a short time. Long-term effects are more difficult to disentangle and
manage. Political communication advances quicker than professionals can master. Its
consequences unclear.
The future is difficult to predict. Yet what this project illustrates are the multidimensional barriers that parties must still hurdle under the American system. However,
invention in politics is often a consequence of desperation and necessity. The party, as a
collective good that can connect office seekers to a stable majority electorate, remains a
potent potential asset. A template has been developed that can provide networks and
legibility of such a party electorate, yet ironically, an organizational template to harness
this remains at a distance.
In this concluding chapter, I draw attention back to the key themes of this
dissertation, pointing to what this research might suggest about contemporary parties
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empirically and conceptually. I will also briefly discuss the 2016 election and how the
findings of this project can be reconciled with its results.

The Future of Competition
Competition sits at the center of the theory of party democracy. As we have seen
however, the peculiarities of the American system create many opportunities to insulate
politics from competitive dynamics and their consequences. Historically, the Electoral
College and senate distorted expressions of national majoritarian preferences. Yet new
challenges have also interceded. Spatial sorting of the electorate in states, regions, and
localities has created less organically competitive elections. Gerrymandering further
exacerbates this process.
Big data has also had a complicated impact on competition. Information lowers
costs and creates potential to mobilize voters, easing the task of finding an electorate that
could make a candidate or party competitive in a previously safe district. Those looking
to restrict competition however have the same tools available. Precision in electorate
mapping can also restrict party building strategies. A better understanding of where
chances for marginal effects are greatest means an increasingly narrow focus for resource
distribution. Ironically, this may lead to resource overkill in a district, as knowing where
voters are does not mean parties and campaigns know what and how much treatment is
necessary to influence voting behavior. The marginal impact on a district does not mean
that such an infusion of resources is effective, especially when deployed late in a
campaign. Once again, campaigns still operating under a candidate-centered paradigm of
organizational development may lead to continued inefficiencies. Yet absent a centripetal
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organizational force, there is little to correct this. Without a strong party organization to
manage and ration resources to build mobilization infrastructure with an eye on the longterm, resources will be concentrated on haphazard infusions in few areas with the greatest
predicted short-term marginal effect.
The decline of local level competition presents an extraordinary challenge for
not just party building, but democracy. Grafting parliamentary parties on a system such
as ours is not easy. Yet, districts siloed by party, where one-party is destined to rule, are
not sustainable in the American system. Our system’s design does not account for such
extreme polarization. A patchwork of one-party fiefdoms is simply unworkable under
American institutions designed for deliberation and compromise. Reforms for fairer
districting would help, yet as polarization has turned this into a zero-sum game, the
impediments to reform seem profound.
Could electoral reform gain popular salience? The public consistently derides the
gridlock that has become characteristic of late period American government.275 Yet mass
pressure for complicated procedural reform, subject to multiple levels of government,
through a patchwork American system, remains a difficult ask of the average citizen.
Democrats have claimed that if they were to win broad majorities, this would be at the
top of their agenda.276 Yet such concurrent majorities will not happen tomorrow, and
even if they were to exist, such notions of reform are easy to support in the abstract, but
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more difficult when they can harm the electoral fortunes of constituent party politicians.
Office-holders rarely legislate themselves out of a safe seat.

RPG and Polarization
Responsible Party Government advocates yearned for the grafting of
parliamentary parties over the American system. They imagined that the development of
strong and deliberate parties could overcome systematic barriers that our constitution puts
in the place of majority governance. Yet, fragmentation at the core of our system, led to
new developments that weaken the logic of parties. Politics were in fact nationalized, yet
institutions that political actors must be responsive to maintain decentralizing and
segmenting dynamics. Political contention is national and ideologically coherent, but
electoral institutions remain largely the providence of state-level rules.
If coherence makes parties more responsible, it does so at the price of
introducing a new set of mechanical problems for the majority party. A minority party
has many opportunities and the incentive to use its vested power to complicate the
already near Herculean task of majority rule. Recent history has shown nationalization
and polarization can create an ideologically and politically coherent minority, that can not
only limit a majority party’s agenda through obstruction, but capitalize on perceived
government dysfunction electorally.277 RPG assumes that by simplifying the process, the
average voter can better ascertain who to reward and punish come election time through
party cues.278 Recent work however, has laid doubts to even the most modest claims of
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retrospective voting.279 Yet even if one remains vigilant in their optimism for this basic
democratic linkage, polarization and coherence combine to produce a strong logic of
minority obstruction to majority rule, and produces a dynamic of presidential party
weakness. Cross-pressures of party, ideology, and section historically incentivized
cooperation for a critical mass of congress. Contemporary minority parties’ members,
need only concern themselves with constituents largely antagonistic toward the ruling
party, and interest group allies dependably opposed to that party’s agenda. In such an
environment, little power exists for the president and their party to influence opposition
party office-holders.
A myriad of electoral rules can further stymie institutionalization of a majority. A
coherent minority party, with the help of aligned interest groups, increased
gerrymandering.280 In an immediate sense, this distorts representation in both state and
federal government. Yet really, its most devastating long-term impact is its effect on
party building. Variation in competition lies at the center of coordination problems facing
a party’s constituent politicians. The lesser the level of competition, the less dependence
there is on the party as a necessary electoral tool.
Minority coherence has also supported efforts to erect barriers to the franchise.
Judicial and legislative strategies have made voting harder over this period in many
states.281 Historically such strategies have been the domain of the local party.
Nationalization however, has produced greater coherence and concentrated in service of
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the purveyors of such tactics. Once again, the clear immediate impact is the depression of
the vote to the partisan advantage of the party with the smaller but more consistent
electorate. Yet a less direct, but more significant, consequence is such barriers impact on
the political calculation of politicians to pursue mobilization. If costs of mobilization
make it ineffective as an electoral strategy, office-seekers will not to pursue it. This
means on a local level, eschewing party vessels for efficient mobilization, and leads to
further disjuncture between the local level and any national party apparatus pursuing
party mobilization. High resource national campaigns have a chance to overcome
marginally higher barriers to voting by still pursuing mobilization; for low resource local
races, this will usually not be the case.
If RPG hoped coherence could strengthen American democracy, it appears to
have undersold how many bullets it leaves in the chamber of a threatened coherent
minority to take advantage of institutional rules. This does not just impede majoritarian
efforts to govern, but wreaks havoc on the endogenous logic that undergirds party
building. Minority parties have opportunities for all sorts of mischief to weaken
unconsolidated coalitions in our system. Notably this does not entail peeling off factions
from that majority coalition, as ‘healthy’ party competition under democratic regimes
suggests,282 rather using the ample tools our system presents to weaken the internal logic
of the majority coalition. This makes mobilization and the resulting programmatic
possibilities of party government arduous, if not sometimes seeming near impossible.
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The System of 2010?
Changes in campaigning have affected party organization on the national, state,
and local level. Communication structures, activist networks, and the electorate itself
have been upended by recent political and technological change. Yet party organization
still must struggle against a system designed to stymie the institutionalization of a
majority coalition. Madison himself, who as constitutional architect and philosopher
railed about the dangers of the majority faction,283 was quickly rebuked by Madison the
politician, who saw the largeness of the republic itself as more than enough to constrain
majoritarian passions.284 Yet constitutional barriers to party government persisted and
grew as a function of minority faction entrepreneurs taking advantage of anti-party
sentiment to protect against threats of consolidated majority power.
Schattschneider, describing what he called “the system of 1896” argued party
competition at the turn of the twentieth century dulled through state level electoral
monopolies.285 Since then, nationalization and party coherence have had a complicated
effect on competition. At the statewide level, competition in strategically important races
is more important than ever. Mobilization efforts (and demobilization efforts) have
become increasingly integral to campaigning. Yet local organization remains hollowed
out. Mobilization is counteracted by anticompetitive strategies that dissipate the internal
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resource construction of local parties and increase their incongruity with national
organizations.
In 1896, the Democratic-Populist coalition failed because of an inability to link
urban immigrant party machines with rural farmer populists. Coalitional fragmentation
presented an opening for antagonistic forces to install further barriers to its possible
future success. Bryan’s would-be coalition was still a threat to powerful interests. They
responded by passing electoral reforms that reduced competition, mobilization, and the
broad outlawing of fusion voting. This curtailed the organizational logic of the Bryan
coalition.286 With the machine and fusion weakened, building such a coalition was
doomed. Perhaps a tempting historical counterfactual is that a Bryan victory, having
established this coalition at the federal level, could have invested in it the power to resist
eventual changes in electoral rules that ultimately made its viability untenable.
Yet in 2008 victory, not just for a president but a party coalition, was still not
enough. Like 1896, a set of powerful interests pursued a national strategy of institutional
reform designed to curb a potential consolidated majority. That redistricting would come
after a midterm election is an unhappy coincidence for Democrats. Minority status did
not prevent these counter-forces from capitalizing not just on this historical accident, but
the institutional advantages conferred on minority interests. The American electoral
system gave them capacity to pursue multiple strategies, preventing party government
and further undermining competition and organizational development. If the Democratic
electorate can only be competitive in presidential years, it will remain at a disadvantage.
Uneven performance in congress, state, and local government, means lacking influence
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over electoral rules, starving the party of its potential farm team for higher office, and
limiting the programmatic power of party to deliver policy goods for its constituents and
consolidate its coalition.
The system of 1896 was one in which the threat of a majoritarian coalition with
an eye on brokering class-based preferences was thwarted by various localized
mechanisms that undermined competition and the logic of mobilization. Today, party
mobilization remains frustrated by oppositional attempts to erect new barriers to voting
and limiting local competition through partisan redistricting. Only through victories at the
state-level and control over electoral institutions, can such structures be reshaped and
overcome.
Indeed, the electorate of 2008 is frustrated by the system of 2010. Momentary
success created a profound threat for an opposition party, supported by a smaller yet
more coherent electorate and powerful aligned special interests, united in concern about
the consequences of Democratic governance. Institutional fragmentation further
exacerbates coalitional tensions bound to rise as majority status is threatened. The system
of 1896 was only undone decades later after American economic catastrophe. Such
devastation finally bonded Bryan’s urban/rural majority as the New Deal coalition.
Extreme crisis did what national party entrepreneurs and organization could not.287
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Top of the Ticket-Centered Campaigning
In the late twentieth century, elections were ‘candidate-centered,’288 with party
organization passively complementing individual campaign constructions as a ‘party-inservice.’ Yet polarization and digitalization may be altering this dynamic. If parties have
not regained their machine-like centripetal force on resources, coalitional coherence and
transparency have increased incentives to focus electoral strategy on mobilizing a party
ticket. However, resources are cultivated and deployed by top of the ticket campaigns,
not a party boss. In the place of robust and institutionalized party organizations are
individual high resource campaigns that build a mobilization apparatus, which down
ticket party candidates can free ride upon. Yet these constructions are idiosyncratic,
ephemeral, and should not be confused with a satisfactory replacement for a durable mass
party organ. Top of the ticket races control resources. As such, the top of the ticket
maintains primary responsibility for electoral resource construction. The conundrum yet
remains that the top of the ticket changes from election to election. Party organization
traditionally, at the least, intendeds to be a bridge between such campaigns. Yet the
candidate-centered era has exacerbated vertical fragmentation in the American system.
Numerous vessels, with varying relationships to parties, exist for electoral resource
construction, all serving different specific prerogatives. Top of the ticket candidates
control resources, yet there are deep barriers to the construction of collective goods, even
at the state level, where presidential and gubernatorial candidates seek to mobilize similar
electorates.
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All top of the ticket races are not created equally. While at the presidential level,
incumbency is not the chief driver of funding, this is often the case for gubernatorial
candidates in states such as Ohio. Incumbency dictates fundraising, not just for the
candidate, but the state party organization. Incumbency also gives coherence to the state
party as an organization. Yet presidential victory does little to institute resources or
manage political actors on the state level. Fragmentation continues, as the primary
resource provider changes from election to election. This variation is not just at the
individual level, but is an institutional logic. Presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial
candidates all have not only different strategies, but also varying institutional linkages
with down ticket candidates and considerations.
The central paradox is that despite incentivizes for mobilization and party
coherence, organization struggles to escape candidate-centered vessels. The top of the
ticket must reconstitute the party repeatedly, assuming the costs of doing so, bringing
latent networks back to life or starting from scratch. In yesteryear, the party boss’
durability solved the collective action problem of permanent infrastructure building. Yet
today, party chairs (at all levels) are either brokers of a top of the ticket incumbent,
serving at their pleasure and structurally aligned with their institutional logic; or they
preside over an out-party, which will often struggle at the state and local level to raise the
resources necessary to develop organization and build infrastructure. One way or another,
the incentives and resources for robust party building do not line up. Institutional
weakness begets institutional weakness.
The party, as a set of latent resources is perhaps stronger than we have ever seen.
Coherence, data, and money present a clearer electorate and activist base than historically
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possible. Yet fragmentation impedes organization building, as party actors still reach out
for their idiosyncratic slices of the party pie absent the quadrennial presidential top of the
ticket. Who can create the boss, but the boss? Nationalized parties mean coherence is
subject to the coordination problems of the federal system. When party resources were
under local control, organizational logic and development followed. Yet national parties
have the entire panoply of fragmenting mechanisms in the American system standing in
the way of their development. If the burden falls on the national top of the ticket,
incentives for party building are weaker and challenges far deeper than for the
amalgamated local machines of the mass party era. Such campaigns will not have the
capacity to reconstruct the party locally, but must use their resources to override it.
Mobilization has two primary components: data and field. Party organization has
advanced greatly in building data infrastructure. Any candidate with VAN access has a
knowledge of the (and their) electorate that could only be dreamed of just a few years
ago. Yet capitalizing on this requires an equally robust field program. Here, the
development of durable party infrastructure has been significantly weaker. Instead, it is
the responsibility of the top of ticket to construct such an apparatus. Capacity and desire
remains idiosyncratic. Resources and electoral competition remain necessary prerequisites.

The 2016 Election: The Failure of Party Building
In liberal democracies parties are supposed to serve as a linkage between the
citizenry and the state. Yet at this moment, their ability to do so appears in grave

209

doubt.289 Party and civil society decline has resulted in a vicious cycle of delinking
citizens from the institutions expected to represent them. Communication is more
democratic, but the state as a mechanism to protect citizens has been weakened and lost
legitimacy in the eyes of much of the public. Alienation from, and antipathy toward, elite
institutions has been thought to have aided in the rise of not just Donald Trump on the
right, but Bernie Sanders on the left.290
The election of 2016 presented a compelling test of whether Democratic victory
in 2008 and 2012 was a function of institution building or simply Obama’s narrative
appeal. Superficially, the case for the former is difficult. Democratic vote share regressed
across the country. Turnout among the various groups within the Obama coalition
declined.291 Beyond this, the ramifications of a coalition overrepresented in urban areas,
structurally underrepresented in American government, were laid bare.292 Much was
made, in the weeks and months following the election, of how this has starved Democrats
on the state and local level over the past eight years.293
Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed independent socialist, whose primary challenge to
Hillary Clinton¾now the preferred candidate of Obama and his team-- was far more
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successful than even his most optimistic supporters could have imagined.294 That a
candidate, who does not even identify as a Democrat did so well, demonstrates how
difficult consolidation over this period has been. Significant amounts of Democratic
primary voters were moved by a message openly hostile to the Democratic Party as an
institution. Moving beyond Obama’s insurgent message, Sanders often advanced a
critique of a broadly coopted party duopoly. This critique found resonance among liberal
and especially young voters—staples of Obama’s primary and general election coalition.
The 2016 primary seemed to suggest a reopening of the intra-party tensions that
plagued the party’s progressive wing before Obama. Sanders had great success among
the youth vote, but struggled greatly with African-American voters.295 This could in part
be attributed to his distance (and perhaps critique) of Obama, as well as an outsider
strategy that often did not cultivate community leaders effectively. Yet the difficulty of
holding the Obama coalition together without Obama, is a clear indicator that no
institutional mechanism has been built that can be depended on to bind the party’s
presidential electorate together.
The success of anti-establishment and anti-institutional frames point to both the
failure of the party to provide this linkage, as well as the consequence of party weakness.
A lack of organizational consolidation could in part explain the aggravating of coalitional
rifts. The party could not consolidate its majority; it could therefore not provide sufficient
programmatic goods for its majority; and so the party turned to recriminations of itself.
This tension continued into the general election, with many Sanders loyalists continuing
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to be skeptical and critical toward Clinton. In addition, while Clinton was successful in
mobilizing the black primary electorate, she fell well short of Obama’s numbers in the
general election.296 This and her continued struggles with young voters were clear factors
in her loss.
The effectiveness of Clinton’s field efforts has been a point of contention since
the election. While her data team were confident that they were gliding toward a modest
but safe victory, her modeling appeared off.297 Yet her field trouble might have been less
attributable to faulty mechanics than a simple lack of enthusiasm.298 Integration and
efficient distribution of financial resources cannot overcome the necessity of a robust
volunteer activist base to run a successful high turnout field apparatus. While it is
incumbent on party officials to structure organization in ways open and efficient for
building volunteer voter contact infrastructure, top of the ticket activist enthusiasm is also
an integral ingredient.
Was weak party organization causally determinant? In an election as close as
2016, any number of variables are a safe bet for having a deciding influence. Field
campaigning pays dividends in high resource states decided on the margins. Here,
Clinton did far worse than Obama, losing several deciding states by fractions of a
percentage point. One can blame Clinton the candidate, or her campaign. However, party
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infrastructure is supposed to protect against such idiosyncrasies, especially with an
opponent who is anathema to the party base. As mentioned above, all tops of the ticket
are not created equal. A party over-dependent on its momentary lodestar is always
assuming substantial risk.

What the Future Holds
Political professionals have become increasing interested in field experiments,
attempting to identify scientific mechanics of mobilization.299 For all their hope, no set of
practices has so far overcome the scourge of low salience. Voter contact remains an
inexact science. Yet faith persists that it remains the future of value-added campaigning.
However, if hampered by inefficient party organizational structures, even the most
precise campaign treatments will produce suboptimal results.
More and more money goes toward narrow, yet dynamic localities. Local
institutions, not subject to influxes in resources and consistent competition, are charged
with (quite literally) carrying the party banner. Strengthening majoritarian institutions
follows strategically from the tenuous electorate of one of the major parties. Yet it must
navigate both internal tensions that turn its own actors away from this long-term strategy,
as well as an opposition party devoted not to finding their own majority through
competition, but limiting the Democratic vote through anti-competitive practices.
What can a party dependent on a sporadic high salience coalition do in low
salience elections? Demographic drift is unlikely to stop. Presuming coalitional stability,
the Republican Party will find itself operating on increasingly unfriendly electoral turf.
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Marginal effects of barriers that minimize turnout, and even the most efficient of
gerrymandering efforts, can only go so far in mitigating this.
Mechanisms of fragmentation will appear different depending on the perspective
from which you view them. Yet what remains consistent is coalitional and institutional
incongruities between political actors and their party team. This disjuncture is a process
of path dependent history that any actor must navigate. An abstract notion of the
importance of party building does not obviate the short-term electoral prerogatives that
predominate for office-seekers who constitute a party.
At the national level, we see fragmentation through its two baseline dimensions:
horizontally in the big tent party of a large republic and vertically through institutional
rules. The closer one gets to the ground, the more granularly one can see how campaign
organization remains at the mercy of these tensions. One party, many factions, many
logics. An opposition happily jumping on already tilted scales is not a new phenomenon
in American elections.
National level politics is an amalgamation of this disjuncture, as it affects the
various actors in the party. This is clear in the national party structure, itself fragmented
by organizational vessels focused on different offices. As has been illustrated, the
president as party leader, even one with long coattails, constructs organization at odds
with the priority of many party actors. Aggregating a national presidential majority is a
tough enough task in itself. Yet bridging the gaps that separate various faction within the
Democratic Party is critical if it is to actualize the Obama coalition as a governing
majority.
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This dissertation does not provide a precise measurement of (1) how responsible
field was for Democratic success and failures over the period of study, nor (2) how
generalizable the processes described have been. Several studies have attempted to
ascertain the effects of field treatments,300 yet to what extent field organization could
have improved Democratic prospects remains an open question. This project does not
pose an answer, instead accepting that field organization is one important treatment that
influences voter behavior, and that more of it practiced effectively produces marginal
gains for campaigns. Further, micro-processes describing organizational tensions rest on
largely qualitative characterization that nonetheless reflect rough consensus among party
actors, as illustrated by primary research and journalistic accounts. They are nonetheless
broad attempts at characterization of highly idiosyncratic processes. Yet they aim to
provide empirical description and conceptual heft to a set of phenomena that frustrate
party organizational development.
This project hopes to have initiated a cursory attempt to conceptualize and map
contemporary party organization. It attempts to put forth a framework describing the
national, state, and local level: illustrating how electoral resources are constructed, and
the structural constraints that impede even and efficient party building. Much further
research is needed, adding detail and generalizability to these processes. State party
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organization remains understudied, despite states being the locus of American electoral
institutions. Ohio, as a case, illustrates the advantages and difficulties of attempting to
build state infrastructure while being a top priority presidential battleground. While its
successes and failures map reasonably neatly on the national story, the study of other
states will yield significant variation and value. States that are not competitive at the
presidential level, or in other statewide elections, will follow different logics. This will be
a function of competition, as well as relationship to national party structures. Whatever
difficulties the ODP faced organizationally, it was still responding to dynamics of
competitive statewide elections. Deep blue and red states will likely function very
differently.
Local organization is also only discussed here in the broadest terms. This project
sought to sketch the logic of general intraparty incongruities as they manifest themselves
on the local level. Contemporary local party organization also suffers from a lack of
scholarly attention, especially using qualitative research to map relationships. This
knowledge is hard to gain through existing data sets. Yet as this project makes clear,
national-level mobilization is a product of the building and integration of local-level
infrastructure. There is much to gain by detailed mapping of county level organization
and networks. How electoral campaign organizations function on the ground, over time;
where, when, and to what extent, it institutionalizes as organization capable of
consistently mobilizing on behalf of a party ticket, is of utmost importance to
understanding contemporary American parties and elections. Understanding how
variation in resources and competition produce variation in patterns of local organizations
is key.
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While there is a body of emerging research mapping donor and even activist
networks,301 what this dissertation has hoped to do is place a politician-centered view of
resource construction back into consideration. All sorts of networks exist exogenous to
organization controlled by office-seekers. Yet parties, and party weakness (defined as
incongruity and inefficiency in organization) remains patterned by politicians, not aligned
interest groups. Analysis that avoids conceptualizing party structures as driven by a team
of politicians electorally and organizationally linked to a majority, at relative levels of
strength and coherence, is likely to miss important phenomena.
Party organization as traditionally understood, strengthens state-society linkages
by connecting politicians to an electorate without mediating interest organizations. The
difficulties of constructing such organization in the American system should be central to
any analysis of party networks. That interest organization fills the vacuum created by
weakness of the classically conceived party is the basis of Schattschneider’s framework.
What lies in the future for the Democratic Party? After 2016, the lag between the
presidential election and the race for DNC chair, left the formal organization of the
Democratic Party unequipped to harness the anti-Trump activism bursting all over the
country.302 In this vacuum, new decentralized digitally based organization, took hold.
Most notable was Indivisible, less an actual organization than a how-to manual adopted
by thousands of local chapters with loose national coordination.303 These networks (at
the time of writing) have in most cases no relationship with formal party structures or

301

Skocpol and Hertzel-Fernandez , 2016.
Newell, Jim. “The Democrats are Leading from Behind.” Slate. Feb 13 2017.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2017/02/the_democrats_are_leadin
g_the_resistance_from_behind.html
303
https://www.indivisibleguide.com/web/
302

217

politicians, yet they represent the primary vessel of activity early in the Trump era. How
they will integrate with the Democratic Party is still an open question.
The major puzzle remains whether the party can transcend short-term electoral
logics on behalf of a long-term strategy of infrastructure building. As this dissertation has
sought to demonstrate, politicians change strategy slowly and reluctantly. Styles and
modes of campaigning are path dependent practices. The benefits of incumbency mean
that successful office-holders are going to be unlikely to adopt to new modes of
campaigning to win unnecessary marginal benefits. Only when dislodged from stability
can we expect actors to make a dramatic shift. If nothing else, the Democratic Party does
appear to be currently dislodged. Rhetorical gestures by party leaders since Trump’s
election suggest a party with a renewed commitment to organization building. The two
main candidates for DNC chair both made central to their platform using the DNC to
revive a more muscular version of Dean’s 50 state strategy, with a focus on local party
infrastructure building.304 Chuck Schumer, now perhaps the most powerful Democrat in
office, has articulated strong support for this approach.305 One thing that appears beyond
contention is that things change very quickly in contemporary American politics. The
2020 election, a presidential year after which the decennial redistricting process will take
place, represents a generational opportunity for a presidential coalition to grasp power
over the process. Whether the party can take advantage of this, not just on the federal
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level, but in state representation all over the country, will pattern American politics
through the middle of the century. A reconstitution of the Obama coalition in 2018 and
2020 could have seismic impact on representation and eventually policy. The Republican
Party’s viability is dependent on institutional insulation from this coalition. Shifting this
terrain could put the Democrats in positon to overcome the legislative veto powers of the
GOP. Yet, such ambitions are married to maximizing turnout across the nation in
elections taking place between now and then, reconstituting and reinvigorating currently
moribund party structures with its base’s new anti-Trump energy. The clock is ticking.
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